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Abstract
This thesis contains four chapters. In the first chapter, I provide a structured survey of bal-
ance of payments (BP) constrained growth models. Unlike other surveys, this chapter reviews
the various mechanisms of relative price adjustments, undertakes a comprehensive review of
capital flows and surveys the literature on endogenous trade elasticities. The second chapter
contributes to the literature on technological gaps and BP constrained growth by develop-
ing a theoretical framework to account for the ambiguous effects of capital inflows on short-
and medium-run growth. The model shows that when a technological gap exists between
two countries in an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and it exceeds a critical thresh-
old, capital flows toward the technological laggard deteriorate its production structure and
reduce its BP constrained growth rate. Several conclusions are derived. The size of the tech-
nological gap and demand-regimes are consequential for relative economic performance and
regional cohesion. Capital flows within a community can produce both convergence and di-
vergence effects. Finally, if political consensus is lacking at the regional level as to the design
framework for a Fiscal Union, then the principal convergence criteria must include demand-
regimes and the size of the technological gap. The third chapter endogenizes the trade elastici-
ties as a an ambiguous function of the wage share but a positive function of the inverted tech-
nological gap. When the laggard economy has a small capital goods producing sector, high
inequality and conspicuous consumption, a tradeoff emerges between distribution and tech-
nological convergence. However, the tradeoff becomes less binding if an EMU provides for
investments in technological innovation and emulation that assist the catching-up process.
The fourth chapter incorporates the monetary economy into a three-incomes post-Kaleckian
model. It demonstrates how a devaluation can induce contractionary effects by lowering the
profit share and raising the loan rate. These results are driven by oligopolistic bankers who ex-
ercise market power in the bond and loan markets. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that
monetary policy increases bankers’ rent share, which lowers the rate of firm-level innovation.
These results imply that the effects of a devaluation depend on the degree of competition in
the banking sector, the size of banks’ foreign assets- and loan-capital ratios and whether or
not the economy is in a regime of excess reserves.
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Introduction
Much debate over the Eurozone crisis and its intra-current account imbalances have focused
on the divergence in labour costs and demand across member states. At one extreme, there
are scholars who argue that intra-external imbalances are driven by differences in labour cost
only (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2016; Sinn 2014; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013; Priewe 2011)
and at the other extreme, others contend that asymmetric growth in demand is the key driving
factor (Storm and Naastepad 2015a; Gabrisch and Staehr 2014; Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis
2013). Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos (2014) take a balanced view and explain that both costs
and demand factors matter for intra-Eurozone current account imbalances and growth diver-
gence.
Other scholarship emphasizes the role of technological gaps in the build-up of the Euro-
zone crisis. In a series of publications, Reinert and his co-authors contend that the European
crisis can only be properly understood in the context of dramatic deindustrialization of the
Eurozone periphery, a direct consequence of abandoning the previous strategy of symmet-
rical integration based on Listian principles (Reinert and Kattel 2019; Reinert 2019; Reinert
and Kattel 2014). Reinert (2019) emphasizes three Listian principles: 1. The preconditions
for wealth, democracy and political freedom are based on a diversified manufacturing sector
subject to increasing returns, 2. A nation first industrializes and is then gradually integrated
into nations at the same level of development and 3. Economic welfare is a result of synergy—
infrastructure, education and science. To support the latter view, several empirical studies
show that the Eurozone periphery has lost value added share in medium- and high-technology
exports since the introduction of the Euro (Storm and Naastepad 2015b; Botta 2014; Simon-
azzi et al. 2013; Reinstaller et al. 2012).
From the get-go, the Eurozone economic policy regime was not designed to serve as a
transfer union. Member states are required to maintain fiscal discipline and the European
Central Bank (ECB) was not designed to act as lender of last resort to member states (Stock-
hammer et al. 2019; 2015). Thus, the crisis in the Eurozone periphery is the consequence of a
flawed design, where no lender of last resorted existed and national level stabilizers were re-
moved without adequate centralized fiscal capacity (Lavoie 2015; De Grauwe 2013). In terms
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of reform of the Eurozone, several proposals exist, e.g. public investment in peripheral economies
through the European Investment Bank and the establishment of a European Finance Min-
istry (Stockhammer et al. 2019). Some scholars like Lapavitsas (2015) question the likelihood
of reform and ergo, call for a GREXIT, while others like Stiglitz (2017), call for Germany’s exit
from the Eurozone. Such proposals bring into sharper focus the role of the exchange rate in
influencing economic performance, e.g. the growth effects of a currency devaluation in the
case of a GREXIT.
Given Trump’s protectionist policies and the decline in world trade, regional integration
projects in developing countries have become re-energized. For example, the African Conti-
nental Free Trade Agreement was recently signed and Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance are
pushing for deeper financial integration (Constantine 2018). Unfortunately, these integration
projects uncritically emulate the European Model. In the case of Mercosur and the Pacific Al-
liance, they have paid too much attention to the convergence in interest rates in the Eurozone
and too little attention to the misallocation of capital flows. Several scholars show that cross-
border financial flows exceeded cross-border trade in goods (Chen et al. 2012; Diaz Sanchez
and Varoufakis 2013; Lane and McQuade 2013; Waysand et al. 2010) and that capital flows
were misallocated towards non-tradable and low-technology economic activities in periph-
eral countries (Storm and Naastepad 2016; 2015b). According to Storm and Naastepad (2015b),
the basis of the misallocation was higher returns in the construction sector as compared to
manufacturing and this insight underscores the explanatory power of technological gaps in
driving intra-Eurozone divergences in terms of growth, labour costs and trade balances. It
follows that financial integration widened the technological gap between Eurozone core and
periphery (Simonazzi et al. 2013; Botta 2014), unlike the theoretical prediction.
This dissertation formalizes key channels of the Eurozone crisis with the principal aim of
identifying teachable moments that can inform integration projects elsewhere. It takes the
Eurozone’s economic policy framework and technological gaps as the starting point. Chapter
1 presents a structured survey of the balance of payments constrained growth model, starting
from its historical origins to present day. Unlike other surveys (Ribeiro 2015; Thirlwall 2011;
McCombie 2011), this chapter reviews the various mechanisms of relative price adjustments
and undertakes a comprehensive review of capital flows in balance of payments constrained
growth models. For example, besides analyzing external debt sustainability and net interest
payments, the survey captures the effects of remittances on the balance of payments con-
strained growth rate. Moreover, unlike the reviews associated with demand growth and tech-
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nological catch-up (Romero 2015), this chapter surveys the rich literature that endogenizes
non-price competitiveness or the ratio of foreign trade elasticities in balance of payments con-
strained growth models. It demonstrates how distribution, the National System of Innovation,
Kaldor-Verdoorn and Schumpeterian technological change can alter the trade elasticities and
the balance of payments constrained growth rate.
Chapter 2 of the dissertation formalizes a new channel through which capital flows can
have ambiguous effects on the rates of growth of aggregate demand and the balance of pay-
ments constraint and thus, the evolution of the technological gap through Kaldor-Verdoorn
effects (Kaldor 1966; Verdoorn 1949). The chapter shows that when a technological gap exits
between two countries that share a common currency, capital flows toward the technologi-
cal laggard can deteriorate its production structure and produce lower productivity growth.
In other words, capital flows can engender a divergence in relative unit labour cost. As the
laggard economy loses cost competitiveness, it simultaneously produces a lower balance of
payments constrained growth rate. Other works within the balance of payments constrained
growth framework do emphasize the growth-reducing effects of capital inflows but these works
focus on the debt and foreign currency crises channels (Filho et al. 2013; Vera 2006; Curado
and Porcile 2002). These results are driven by a crucial assumption—that the technological
gap between the laggard and frontier economy exceeds the threshold that maximizes techno-
logical spillovers. It follows that the size of the initial technological gap matters for regional
cohesion and the growth and technology effects of capital flows. The key implication here is
that members or potential members of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) must pass
the litmus test of the maximum distance from the frontier country, lest divergence threatens
regional solidarity. However, this is a highly restrictive condition for membership in regional
groupings. As such, the chapter also presents results that demonstrate how technology policy
in laggard economies can promote technological convergence and sustain community cohe-
sion. This is finding supports recent calls for Regional Innovation Systems and Fiscal Unions
at the level of regional groupings that fund public investment and industrial policies in pe-
ripheral countries (Reinert and Kattel 2019; Stockhammer et al. 2019; 2015; Botta 2014). The
principal insight here is that regional cohesion and convergence are possible even when the
initial technological gap is large, if the community establishes a Regional Innovation System
to reduce technological asymmetries.
Chapter 3 presents a long-run balance of payments constrained growth model to demon-
strate the relationship among endogenous technological change, income distribution and
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economic growth between countries in an EMU. In this chapter, non-price competitiveness
is endogenously determined by technological change and income distribution (wage share).
Faster technological change through an improvement in the laggard’s National System of In-
novation, by way of public investment, improves product quality and the income elasticity of
its exports, while a more egalitarian distribution of income has ambiguous effects. On one
hand, a higher wage share increases import demand for consumer goods and crowds out the
share of capital imports. These in turn are necessary for capital accumulation and technol-
ogy transfer, so that a higher wage share reduces technological change and thus, non-price
competitiveness. On the other hand, lower inequality can improve workers’ access to educa-
tion and health care, which enhance their ability to emulate imported technologies, thereby,
promoting technological change. When the negative effect of the wage share dominates, the
laggard economy confronts a big tradeoff between lowering income inequality and advanc-
ing technological convergence and economic growth. It follows that differences in income
distribution affect regional cohesion and should serve as a convergence criterion in addition
to the initial size of the technological gap. The chapter produces several testable hypotheses.
First, only the least developed economies can experience inclusive economic growth and sec-
ond, beyond a threshold level, a tradeoff emerges. Third, the intensity of the tradeoff is higher
for economies with initially higher income inequality. Fourth, EMUs without a fiscal union
or adequate cohesion/technology policies, will experience technological polarization and its
accompanying crises. It is left for future work to empirically verify these propositions.
Chapter 4 looks at the question of how an exit from an EMU affects economic performance.
It presents a three-period post-Kaleckian model with three sources of income (wages, prof-
its and rents) to demonstrate the dynamic effects of a real devaluation. In the short-period,
when prices and distribution are constant, contractionary effects relate to higher costs of im-
ported capital goods and foreign interest payments. In the medium-run, prices, distribution
and the loan rate are endogenous and uniquely related to the monetary economy. The lat-
ter is modeled as a regime of excess reserves, where bankers’ liquidity preference for excess
reserves and central bank bonds and loans become perfect substitutes at non-zero rates of
interest. In the medium-term, a devaluation increases bankers’ liquidity preference and con-
tracts the supply of excess reserves through the sale of central bank securities, which increase
the loan rate. An increase in the latter raises bankers’ rent share and lowers the profit share,
thus investment demand. Bankers’ income also increases on account of a higher bond rate
and larger holdings of central bank securities. Additionally, a devaluation increases banks’
4
profitability of foreign assets in local currency. These medium-run responses lower the rates
of capacity utilization and capital accumulation. In the long-period, the rate of technological
progress is determined by retained earnings (profit share) and the cost of bank finance (loan
rate). Given the medium-run findings, a devaluation lowers the rate of technological progress
and by extension, the long-run rates of capacity utilization and accumulation. The implica-
tion of these dynamic contractionary effects is that the rate of net exports increases, in other
words, a regime of domestic demand stagnation co-exists with improvements in the external
balance. The central policy insight of the chapter is that the decision to exit currency unions,
undertake a real devaluation or adopt flexible exchange rate regimes, must be based on sound
assessments of the particular country’s context. The established literature highlights several
conditional factors that determine the effects of a devaluation: price elasticities, degree of fac-
tor substitutability, demand regimes, degree of import penetration, extent of excess capacity
and foreign liabilities. This work demonstrates that prospective devaluers must also consider
the degree of competition in their banking sector, size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-
capital ratios and whether or not their economy is in a regime of excess reserves.
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Chapter 1
Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Models: A
Structured Survey
1.1 Introduction
Since the global and Eurozone financial crises have erupted and discourses on protectionism
have taken centre stage in the political and economic debates, there has been renewed inter-
est in how the balance of payments affect growth, distribution and technological change. Of
particular interest, are income disparities at both the world and regional levels. The European
Economic and Monetary Union has promoted divergence rather than community cohesion
and a similar story holds for the effects of globalization (Stockhammer et al. 2015; Milanovic
2016). Since Kaldor (1970)’s famous lecture on the Regional Problem—different regions grow-
ing at uneven rates, some forging ahead and others being left behind—open economy de-
mand driven growth models have emerged to analyze the Regional Problem. Two decades
prior to Kaldor’s famous lecture, early development theorists have brought into sharper focus
the roles of external demand, balance of payments and production structures in explaining
what can be called the Global Problem (Prebisch 1959; 1950; Seers 1962). The latter can be un-
derstood as the global analogy to Kaldor’s regional problem. Building on these foundations,
Thirlwall (1979) has provided the workhorse open economy demand driven growth model.
The aim of this chapter is to present a structured survey of the balance of payments (BP) con-
strained growth model, starting from its historical origins to present day.
Unlike other surveys (Ribeiro 2015; Thirlwall 2011; McCombie 2011), this chapter reviews
the various mechanisms of relative price adjustments and undertakes a comprehensive re-
view of capital flows in balance of payments constrained growth models. For example, besides
analyzing external debt sustainability and net interest payments, the survey captures the ef-
fects of remittances on the balance of payments constrained growth rate. Moreover, unlike
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the reviews associated with demand growth and technological catch-up (Romero 2015), this
chapter surveys the rich literature that endogenizes non-price competitiveness or the ratio of
foreign trade elasticities in BP models. It demonstrates how distribution, the National System
of Innovation, Kaldor-Verdoorn and Schumpeterian technological change can alter the trade
elasticities and the balance of payments constrained growth rate.
In his seminal article, Thirlwall (1979) formally demonstrates that long-run growth can be
balance of payments constrained. In other words, given the necessity of BP equilibrium in the
long-run, output growth is constrained to grow no faster than the product of the trade elas-
ticities and the rate of growth of external demand. Economic growth is demand not supply
constrained. According to Thirlwall, the trade elasticities are deep structural parameters that
reflect non-price competitive factors like technological capabilities, economic diversification
and consumption patterns. This implies that structural change and production diversifica-
tion can increase these trade elasticities and accelerate the long-run rate of growth consistent
with BP equilibrium. In this seminal contribution, Thirlwall rules out any long-run effects of
currency devaluations and confine their effects to the short- and medium-runs.
This workhorse model has since been extended several measures over to capture more
complexities, so that the model can better fit the empirical data. For example, Thirlwall and
Hussain (1982) extend the model to account for capital inflows since these can accelerate eco-
nomic growth faster than that predicted by the original formulation. However, they fail to
impose any restriction on capital inflows. It is implausible to assume that a given economy
can indefinitely finance its current account deficit by way of accumulating ever rising exter-
nal debt. Several extensions impose various forms of restrictions: a constant ratio of external
debt to domestic income, imports, exports and also a constant rate of growth of capital in-
flows (Eliiott and Rhodd 1999; Barbosa-Filho 2001; Moreno-Brid 2003; Vera 2006; Alleyne and
Francis 2008). Other extensions endogenize long-run growth and ergo, the ratio of foreign
trade elasticities. One interesting finding in these extensions is that they resurrect the effec-
tiveness of devaluations for long-term growth. In this class of models, currency devaluations
affect the distribution of income in a two-class model of capitalists and workers. Specifically,
devaluations reduce the wage share and increase firm-level profits, which are then invested in
R&D, thereby, increasing the quality of commodities exported and the long-run rate of growth
(Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Missio and Jayme 2012; Fiorillo 2001). Some formula-
tions impose a non-linear relationship between distribution and technological change, thus,
producing ambiguous results for the relationship between a real devaluation and long-run
7
output growth (Ribeiro et al. 2016).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the historical ori-
gins of the balance of the balance of payments constrained growth model and section section
1.3 presents the BP model along with its various extensions. Finally, section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Precursors
1.2.1 The Laws of International Exchange
In his book, England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade in 1664, Thomas Mun outlines the doctrine
of Mercantilism. He explains that countries can become rich by accumulating precious met-
als (gold) through trade surpluses, which keep the rate of interest low and stimulate invest-
ment. In 1752, David Hume launches an attack on the doctrine of Mercantilism by way of
two influential essays, Of Money and Of the Balance of Trade. Hume argues that the accu-
mulation of precious metals only increases the price level without any real economy effects.
In other words, contrary to Mercantilists, trade surpluses have no effect on the rate of inter-
est and thereby, do not stimulate investment and economic growth. Herein lies the origin of
the Quantity Theory of Money, the idea of money neutrality and the classical dichotomy of
separating the real and monetary economy (Thirlwall 2011).
Building on Hume’s work, David Ricardo (1951) presents his theory of why nations engage
in international trade, even if one country has an absolute advantage in the production of all
commodities. Consider two countries, A and B, with absolute advantage and disadvantage in
all commodities traded respectively. In this instance, the basis of trade is the absolute cost ad-
vantage of country A and as trade takes place, country A and B experience a trade surplus and
deficit respectively. According to Ricardo, the surplus country experiences an inflow of gold
bullion, while the deficit country loses gold to country A. Relying on the work of David Hume’s
specie flow mechanism, Ricardo explains that the inflow and outflow of gold bullion engen-
der inflationary and deflationary tendencies in country A and B respectively, until the surplus
country loses cost advantage in some commodities and country B gains in others. These price
changes supposedly mirror differences in comparative costs or result in absolute advantage
reversals that produce differences in comparative costs (Constantine 2014). Essentially, price
changes are used as the adjustment mechanism that ensures balanced trade. A fundamental
implication of the Law of Comparative Cost is that free trade is beneficial to all countries—
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whether at the level of the world economy or a regional grouping—irrespective of the size
of the technological gap between trading partners or a country’s absolute cost disadvantage
(Shaikh 1980).
Ricardo’s theory of trade firmly establishes the neutrality of money and thus, assumes that
resources are fully employed. Given this theoretical frame, Ricardo’s theory implies that trade
imbalances or balance of payments disequilibria are only temporary and inconsequential to
the performance of the real economy. The doctrine of Mercantilism has been overthrown and
each nation can engage in international trade for mutual benefit rather than trade with the
aim of accumulating trade surpluses.
Almost a century later, John Maynard Keynes discovers the common wisdom during the
Mercantilist period, that monetary factors can affect the real economy (investment) through
changes in the rate of interest (Keynes 1936: ch. 13, 23). Harrod (1957) builds on Keynes (1936)
and applies his insights to the open economy. He contends that capital flows between coun-
tries affect liquidity and the rate of interest rather than relative prices. It follows that a surplus
country experiences a relative decline in its rate of interest as gold bullion or capital enters
its economy. In turn, capital flows are reversed to the deficit country in search of higher rates
of return, thereby, undermining the specie flow mechanism that balances trade in Ricardian
theory. Accordingly, the Harrodian mechanism shows that free trade reflects competitive cost
advantages and disadvantages not negate them (Shaikh 2014: pp. 55).
The debate between the Mercantilists and the Free Traders has come full circle. On one
hand, Keynes, Harrod and the Mercantilists make the case that income (employment) adjusts
to restore balance of payments equilibrium and ergo, external disequilibrium has significant
real and macroeconomic effects. On the other hand, Hume and Ricardo argue that balance
of payments disequilibrium is a temporary monetary phenomenon with no real economy ef-
fects. In its modern form, the debate rests on the effectiveness of income and price adjust-
ments in restoring balance of payments equilibrium. Unlike the period of the gold standard
where exchange rates were at a fixed parity to gold, in the modern context, price adjustments
are through flexible wages and exchange rates. Proponents of the price adjustment mecha-
nism call for currency devaluations (in the case of external deficits) or a complete adoption
of flexible exchange rate regimes that facilitate faster and more effective changes in relative
prices. In the case of a regional grouping, say a currency union or an Economic and Mon-
etary Union, where the exchange rate is essentially fixed for member countries, proponents
of the price adjustment mechanism call for internal devaluations (Stockhammer et al. 2015).
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The latter includes the reduction of labour’s bargaining power through lower minimum wages
and lower employment protection etc. The key idea is that lower bargaining power engenders
lower wage demand, which allows the price mechanism to adjust external disequilibrium.
Further, regional groupings, particularly those with a common currency, strongly advocate
for the free mobility of labour, so that balance of payments disequilibrium between member
states can be corrected through the labour market (price mechanism). For example, Mundell
(1961) explains that countries in a currency union lose the price adjustment mechanism that
balances trade when wages and prices are rigid. In his view, factor (labour) mobility is the only
reliable adjustment mechanism.
In addition to the historical evidence1 against the price mechanism as a means to balance
trade, a number of theoretical models have emerged to demonstrate the real economy effects
of balance of payments. The author discusses these in turn.
1.2.2 Harrod’s Foreign Trade Multiplier
In his critique of balance of payments adjustments through relative price movements, Harrod
(1957) indicates that the price adjustment mechanism is premised on the dual assumptions of
full employment and that the price level is determined by the quantity of money. As explained
earlier, based on Keynesian theory, changes in the quantity of money alter the rate of interest,
induce a reversal in capital flows and undermine the necessary price movements that adjust
the balance of payments.
To present a formal treatment of Harrod’s ideas, the author follows McCombie and Thirl-
wall (1997) and (Ribeiro 2015: pp. 23). Assume that there are constant terms of trade in a given
economy, with no government, savings and investment. It follows that income is generated
from the production of consumer goods (C ) and exports (X ) as shown below.
Y =C +X (1.1a)
Correspondingly, all income is spent on C and imports (M ).
Y =C +M (1.1b)
1See Cooper (1982), McCloskey and Zecher (1976) and Triffin (1964) for historical evidence that balance of
payments have adjusted through changes in expenditure rather than relative prices during the period of the
gold standard.
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Let M =M0+µY , where M0 and µ are autonomous imports and the marginal propensity
to import respectively. Given the restriction that trade is always balanced (X =M ), aggregate
expenditure is given by:
Y =
X −M0
µ
(1.1c)
Equation (1.1c) demonstrates the principle of the foreign trade multiplier, where 1/µ is the
multiplier.
∂ Y
∂ (X −M0) =
1
µ
Should the hypothetical economy experience a trade surplus, its level of income and ex-
penditure increase to restore balanced trade. As income expands, expenditure increases on
both domestic and imported goods until external balance is restored. Conversely, an initial
trade deficit engenders a contraction in both income and expenditure and thus, lowers expen-
diture on imports to restore external equilibrium. Based on Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier,
the inflow and outflow of gold bullion or capital flows generally, affect the level of income or
employment rather than prices. Moreover, his analytical contribution also indicates that the
level of income in some countries expand, while others contract to achieve balanced trade.
Hicks (1950)’s super-multiplier is an important extension of Harrod’s foreign trade mul-
tiplier. The key idea is that there is only a partial direct effect of an increase in exports on
national income through the foreign trade multiplier. It follows that external equilibrium de-
pends on a super-multiplier that provides for a complete effect on national income as exports
expand. To see this more clearly, consider the following extensions to Harrod’s foreign trade
multiplier with constant relative prices.
The standard Keynesian model can be described by Equations (1.2a)-(1.2g), where Y , C ,
I , G , X , M and T are aggregate income, consumption, investment, government spending,
exports, imports and tax revenue respectively.
Y =C + I +G +X −M (1.2a)
C =C0+ c (Y −T ) (1.2b)
T = t Y (1.2c)
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I = I0+ b Y (1.2d)
G =G0 (1.2e)
X = X0 (1.2f)
M =M0+µY (1.2g)
After substitution, the level of income is given by:
Y =
1
k

C0+ I0+G0+X0−M0

(1.3)
The Keynesian multiplier k is defined as:
k = (1− c − b +µ+ t c ) (1.4)
where c , b ,µ and t c are marginal propensities to consume, invest, import and tax respec-
tively. Note that k = (1− c − b +µ+ t c ) > µ so that the Hicks super-multiplier is greater than
the Harrod foreign trade multiplier.
Equation (1.3) in growth rate form is shown below, where y , x and q are the growth in
output, export and autonomous demand respectively and α= X /Y .
y =
1
k

αx + (1−α)q

(1.5)
The growth in imports (m) induced by the growth in exports is given by:
m =
µ
k
x (1.6)
Since k > µ, Equation (1.6) says that the growth in imports is less than the growth in ex-
ports, so that balanced trade trade is not obtained. Hicks contends that in the long-run, the
growth in autonomous demand increases as export demand grows and this in turn increases
expenditure on imports and restores balanced trade. Equations (1.7) and (1.8) show the for-
eign trade and super-multiplier respectively.
y =
1
µ
αx (1.7)
y =
1
k

αx + (1−α)q

(1.8)
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Hicks introduced the idea that investments can be induced by increases in aggregate in-
come, which implies that expenditure can increase beyond that indicated by the foreign trade
multiplier. Alternatively, tax revenues grow as income increases and this can produce a fiscal
surplus given autonomous government expenditure. Assuming that a balanced budget is re-
quired, balanced trade can be obtained through fiscal expansion as x increases. In short, the
Hicks super-multiplier ensures that autonomous demand adjusts to achieve balanced trade
as export demand accelerates.
1.2.3 Raul Prebisch
In two seminal papers, Prebisch shows that the allocative efficiency gains from free trade may
be negated by the underutilization of resources, when foreign exchange is the dominant con-
straint on output (Prebisch 1959; 1950). Prebisch (1959) demonstrates the problem with a
numerical example. He assumes that the less developed country (LDC) exports only primary
commodities with an average income elasticity of export demand (εL D C ) of say, εL D C = 0.8.
Further, Prebisch assumes that the developed country (DC) exports only manufactured goods,
which have a higher income elasticity of export demand, εD C = 1.3. It follows that the income
elasticities of import demand for the LDC and DC are piL D C = 1.3 and piD C = 0.8 respectively.
If both countries grow at the same rate, say 5 percent, it becomes clear that a persistent ex-
ternal imbalance emerges. In the case of the LDC, its imports grow at the rate of 5∗1.3 = 6.5
percent and export growth is given by 5∗0.8 = 4 percent. It follows that the LDC accumulates
external deficits if it grows at the same rate as the DC. Since external disequilibrium cannot
be sustained indefinitely, Prebisch contends that the LDC must contract its rate of economic
growth. Specifically, given the DC’s rate of growth of 5 percent, the LDC’s rate of economic
growth consistent with balance of payments equilibrium is given by:
yL D C =
(0.05)(0.8)
1.3
= 3.1 (1.9)
or, the LDC is constrained to grow at only 62 percent of the growth of the DC:
yL D C
yD C
=
0.8
1.3
= 0.62 (1.10)
Prebisch’s central conclusion is that free trade between countries with different production
structures, as proxied by differences in their income elasticities of demand for exports and im-
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ports, inevitably produces divergence in economic performance to maintain balanced trade.
Thirlwall (2011) acknowledges that Prebisch (1959) is the closest formulation to his balance of
payments constrained growth model and credits Prebisch as the first to formalize growth as
constrained by the balance of payments.
1.2.4 Seers’ Model
Seers (1962) presents a centre-periphery model to analyze economic performance between
manufacturing and primary commodity exporters under the condition of balanced trade. As
such, Seers’ model is similar to Harrod (1957) and Prebisch (1959) in that he assumes balanced
trade, constant terms of trade and different export structures in the centre (c ) and periphery
(p ).
Consider Seers’ linear import functions for the centre (mc ) and periphery (mp ):
mc = Ac +Bc yc (1.11a)
mp = Ap +Bp yp (1.11b)
and under the condition of balanced trade (mc =mp ), income growth in the periphery is
given as follows.
yp =
Ac −Ap +Bc yc
Bp
(1.11c)
Therefore, relative income growth is derived as shown below.
yp
yc
=
Ac −Ap
Bp yc
+
Bc
Bp
(1.11d)
Seers assumes that income grows exponentially in the centre country (yc 0e
r t ) and after
substitution into Equation (1.11d), relative income growth becomes:
yp
yc
=
Ac −Ap
Bp yc 0e r t
+
Bc
Bp
(1.11e)
Differentiating with respect to time:
d (yp/yc )
d t
=
−r (Ac −Ap )
Bp yc 0e r t
(1.11f)
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Equation (1.11f) shows how relative rates of economic growth evolve through time and
when Ac > Ap , balanced trade between centre and periphery requires that the periphery be-
comes relatively poorer. This insight is similar to Harrod (1957) and Prebisch (1959), where
the level of income or rate of economic growth adjust to maintain balanced trade. Seers and
Prebisch are more specific in that they show that it is the periphery—the economy that exports
agricultural commodities—that experiences lower economic growth. Why should Ac > Ap ? If
the income elasticity of demand for imports in the periphery exceed unity, then Ap must be
negative and if the income elasticity of demand for imports in the centre is less than unity,
then Ac is positive (Seers 1962; Thirlwall 1983). Recall from Prebisch (1959) that the LDC or
the periphery has a higher income elasticity of import demand and this implies that Ac > Ap .
Therefore, relative incomes diverge under the condition of balanced trade.
1.2.5 Kaldorian Export-led Growth Model
In 1970, Nicholas Kaldor delivers a speech to the Scottish Economic Society and outlines a
narrative model of what he calls the regional problem—different regions growing at uneven
rates—some forging ahead and others being left behind (Kaldor 1970). Central to Kaldor’s
thesis is Myrdal (1957)’s idea of circular and cumulative causation (CCC). Kaldor explains that
the concept of CCC is simply increasing returns to scale, related to large scale industrial pro-
duction, skills development, creation and diffusion of ideas and the growth of industry. Ac-
cording to Kaldor, when trade is opened up between two countries, the one that is more de-
veloped industrially gains at the expense of the less developed country. This is the idea of
centre-periphery divergence under conditions of balanced trade.
The cumulative causation approach views growth as based on two elements:
• A causal link between demand growth and growth in production
• A causal link between demand growth and productivity growth.
The key mechanisms are as follows. Rapid export growth leads to faster output growth
through increased utilization rates and stimuli to investment, which in turn increases pro-
ductivity growth through induced technical change—learning by doing (Arrow 1962). As pro-
ductivity growth accelerates, international price competitiveness is enhanced and by exten-
sion, export demand, reinforcing the cumulative causation growth process. This literature
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finds consensus that the nexus between demand and productivity growth is explained by re-
turns to scale, specialization and market size, induced technical change and learning by doing
(Boyer and Petit 1989; Kaldor 1981; Lawson et al. 1989; McCombie and Spreafico 2016). Ver-
doorn (1949) is the first to formalize the idea that there is a causal link between output growth
and productivity growth and after Kaldor (1966) discovers empirical support for this claim, he
later restates this thesis as a Law. The literature now identifies the well documented statistical
relationship2 as Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law (McCombie et al. 2002).
Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) are the first to formalize Kaldor (1970)’s ideas. Consider the
system of four equations that illustrates a two-country model with a common currency:
y = γx (1.12a)
x =ρpd +δpf +β z (1.12b)
p =τ+w − aˆ (1.12c)
aˆ = a0+λy (1.12d)
where y is the rate of output growth; x is the rate of export growth and γ> 0 is the constant
elasticity of output growth with respect to export growth. The domestic and foreign inflation
rate are given by pd and pf respectively. Moreover, the respective price and cross elasticities
of export demand are ρ < 0 and δ > 0; β is the income elasticity of exports; z is the growth
rate of foreign demand; w is nominal wage growth; τ is the growth of the mark-up factor; aˆ is
the growth of labour productivity; autonomous productivity growth is a0 and 0 < λ < 1 is the
Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient. After substitution, output growth is given by:
y =
γ[ρ(w −a0+τ) +δpf +β z ]
1+γρλ
(1.13)
The first point to note is that sinceρ < 0, output growth is a positive function of a0,λ, pf ,β
and z but inversely related to w and τ. Second, if regional differences exist in the parameter
values, the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient (λ) exaggerates these differences. Third, it is λ that
presents the effects of CCC. For example, according to Dixon and Thirlwall (1975), should a
country obtain an advantage in the production of industrial goods with a highβ , this increases
2For empirical evidence of Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law see Romero and McCombie (2016a), Romero and Britto
(2017), Millemaci and Ofria (2014), Angeriz et al. (2008), McCombie et al. (2002), Fingleton and McCombie (1998)
and Leon-Ledesma (1999).
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the rate of its output growth and through the Kaldor-Verdoorn effects produce cumulative
rounds of uneven growth, what Kaldor calls the regional problem. Third, Dixon and Thirl-
wall (1975) explain that differences in industrial composition between countries determine
the size of λ, so that regional inequality is a function of differences in production structures.
In terms of policy, Dixon and Thirlwall recommends regional intervention by way of identify-
ing economic activities with a high β and encouraging their production in depressed regions
through capital and labour incentives. Fourth, Dixon and Thirlwall are careful to emphasize
that any exogenous shock to a country’s rate of economic growth is not sufficient to produce
sustained uneven growth, unless the shock affects the parameters of the model. In the ab-
sence of this, the economy’s rate of growth simply converges back to its initial equilibrium
growth rate.
To assess the adjustment process, Dixon and Thirlwall take into account a lagged export
function:
xt =ρpd t −1+δpf t −1+β zt −1 (1.14)
Combining Equation (1.14) with Equations (1.12a), (1.12c) and (1.12d) derives the lagged
general solution, where A is the initial condition.
yt = A(−γρλ)t + γ[ρ(wt −1−a0+τt −1) +δpf t −1+β zt 1−1]1+γρλ (1.15)
Output growth now depends on the value of γρλ and sinceρ < 0, it follows that−γρλ> 0.
This implies that the condition for cumulative divergence is given by −γρλ> 1, which Dixon
and Thirlwall rules out given realistic parameter values. They conclude that divergence is only
possible if the parameter values continually change through time, which continually changes
in the equilibrium rate of growth. For example, the price and income elasticities of demand
can change through time as the structure of production changes and these engender different
or uneven equilibrium growth rates.
The models associated with the works of Harrod, Prebisch, Seers, Dixon and Thirlwall
bring exports, foreign exchange and income to the forefront as it regards the debate on trade
and balance of payments adjustments. In these models, it is changes in the level of income
or economic growth that adjusts external disequilibrium and absent intervention, they imply
that external equilibrium necessitates a persistent gap between rich and poor countries.
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1.3 Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model
Notwithstanding the fundamental role of export growth to demand growth and induced tech-
nical change through the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, Thirlwall (1979) contends that economic
growth is ultimately balance of payments (BP) constrained. He notes that faster output growth
can increase import demand and consequently, constrain the effectiveness of cumulative growth.
To derive the balance of payments constrained growth rate (yB P ), Thirlwall defines the balance
of payments identity as follows, where Pd , X , Pf , M and E are the domestic price level, export
demand, foreign price level, import demand and nominal exchange rate respectively.
Pd X = Pf M E (1.16)
In growth rate form, the condition for balance of payments equilibrium is given below,
where lower cases indicate rates of change.
pd + x = pf +m + e (1.17)
The export demand function is given by Equation (1.18), where Z represents income in
the foreign country. The parameters α < 0 and β > 0 are the price and income elasticities of
export demand respectively.
X =
 Pd
Pf E
α
Z β (1.18)
In growth rate form:
x =α(pd −pf − e ) +β z (1.19)
Import demand assumes the following specification, where the parameters γ< 0 and " > 0
are the price and income elasticities of import demand respectively. The parameter Y repre-
sents the level of income in the domestic economy.
M =
Pf E
Pd
γ
Y " (1.20)
In growth rate form:
18
m = γ(pf + e −pd ) + "y (1.21)
After substitution of Equations (1.19) and (1.21) into (1.17), Thirlwall derives the rate of
growth of the domestic economy consistent with balance of payments equilibrium (yB P ).
yB P =
β z + (1+α+γ)(pd −pf − e )
"
(1.22)
The following propositions follow from Equation (1.22):
• A faster growth of foreign income (z ) and a higher β raise yB P .
• A higer income elasticity of demand for imports (") lowers yB P .
• A devaluation or currency depreciation (e > 0) increases yB P , if the Marshall-Lerner con-
ditions holds, i.e. |α+γ|> 1. Thirlwall adds the qualification that a devaluation cannot
permanently increase the balance of payments constrained growth rate, since after a
devaluation, e = 0 holds. A devaluation can only increase the equilibrium growth rate if
it favourably affects the parameters of the model.
• Higher rates of inflation in the domestic economy reduce the balance of payments con-
strained growth rate if |α+γ|> 1.
Further, if relative prices measured in a common currency do not change in the long-run,
the balance of payments constrained growth rate becomes Thirlwall’s Law:
yB P =
β z
"
(1.23)
Equation (1.23) explains that a country’s rate of economic growth consistent with balance
of payment equilibrium, is a positive function of the growth of foreign demand and non-price
competitive factors—the ratio of foreign trade elasticites (β/"). Note the striking similarity
between Thirlwall’s Law and the works of Harrod, Prebisch, Seers and Dixon and Thirlwall
that emphasize foreign demand and trade elasticities. Unlike the work of Dixon and Thirlwall
(1975), the balance of payments constrained growth model has an import demand function
and is absent of cumulative causation. Moreover, unlike Seers (1962), the BP model includes
both export and import demand functions and no assumption regarding the growth of exter-
nal demand is imposed. Thirlwall’s Law is closer to Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier but in
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a dynamic context. To see this more clearly, the author rewrites Thirlwall’s Law. At constant
terms of trade in the long-run, β z = x per Equation (1.19) and after re-substitution yields:
yB P =
x
"
(1.24)
Equation (1.24) is the dynamic version of Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier. Recall the trade
multiplier as:
Y =
X
µ
which can be written as:
∆Y =
∆X
µ
or,
∆Y =∆X /(∆M /∆Y ) (1.25)
Multiplying the left-hand side of Equation (1.25) by X/Y and the right-hand side by M/Y
derives:
∆Y /Y = (∆X /X )/[(∆M /M )/(∆Y /Y )] (1.26)
By definition, Equation (1.26) is equivalent to Equation (1.24):
yB P =∆Y /Y = (∆X /X )/[(∆M /M )/(∆Y /Y )] =
x
"
(1.27)
1.3.1 Elasticity Pessimism
Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) attempt to reconcile their earlier work of export-led growth (Dixon
and Thirlwall 1975) with the balance of payments constraint growth model developed by Thirl-
wall (1979). Equation (1.28a) shows the export-led growth model with cumulative causation
developed by Dixon and Thirlwall (DT), while Equation (1.28b) illustrates the balance of pay-
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ments constrained growth model, where the subscript T represents Thirlwall.
yD T =
γ[ρ(w −a0+τ) +δpf +β z ]
1+γρλ
(1.28a)
yT =
β z + (1+α+γ)(pd −pf − e )
"
(1.28b)
To derive Thirlwall and Dixon (1979)’s reconciliation, substitute Equations (1.12c) and (1.12d)
into Equation (1.28b), where the subscript T D means Thirlwall and Dixon.
yT D =
β z + (1+α+γ)(w −a0+τ−pf − e )
"+λ(1+α+γ)
(1.29)
Equation (1.29) captures the balance of payments constraint and cumulative causation,
which demonstrates that both price and non-price competitiveness affect economic growth.
However, as noted by Ribeiro et al. (2017b), there is no explicit mechanism that ensures the
convergence of relative prices and output growth towards their respective equilibrium val-
ues. Only when the assumption of cumulative causation is dropped, do the predicted rates
of growth and prices coincide with their long-run values. To see this clearly, assume that the
Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold (1+α+γ= 0), which collapses Equation (1.29) into
Thirlwall’s Law (yB P =β z/"). This assumption best illustrates the elasticity pessimism in bal-
ance of payments constrained growth models. Proponents of export-led growth models stress
the value of changes in relative cost competitiveness, driven by endogenous technological
change as the source of export success. However, scholars in the tradition of BP models con-
tend that such changes dissipate in the long-run (elasticity pessimism). Therefore, Thirlwall’s
law is viewed as the long-run equilibrium growth rate, while Equation (1.29) and other vari-
ants that include price effects are understood as medium-run models.
1.3.2 Relative Price Adjustments
Due to the elasticity pessimism, only a handful of scholars consider relative price adjustments
in balance of payments constrained growth models (Ribeiro et al. 2017b; Porcile and Lima
2010; Pugno 1998).
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1.3.2.1 Labour Market Institutions
Ribeiro et al. (2017b) model the mechanisms by which Thirlwall and Dixon (1979)’s growth rate
coincides with Thirlwall’s Law without the restrictive assumption that the Marshall-Lerner
condition does not hold. To do so, they extend Thirlwall and Dixon (1979)’s model in two
ways. First, they include imported intermediate inputs into the prime cost of domestic firms
and second, they model the determination of wages as conflicting income claims between
workers and capitalists.
Consider their mark-up pricing Equation, where T is the firm’s mark-up factor, W /a is
nominal unit labour cost and Pf Eµ is the unit imported intermediate inputs cost in domestic
currency.
Pd = T
W
a
+Pf Eµ

(1.30)
In growth rate form, domestic inflation evolves as follows, where lower cases indicate rates
of change and ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
pd =τ+ϕ(w − aˆ ) + (1−ϕ)(pf + e ) (1.31)
The share of unit labour cost in total prime costs is given byϕ = (W /a )/[(W /a )+Pf Eµ] and
is directly related to the bargaining power of workers but inversely related to the proportion
of imported raw materials in firm’s unit variable cost. The first point to note about Equation
(1.31) is that a currency devaluation (e > 0) increases the rate of change of the unit imported
intermediate input cost and then feeds its way to domestic prices with a lag. Second, de-
pending on relative bargaining power between workers and capitalists, the rate of change of
money wage increases with a lag to match the higher costs of imported raw materials. This in
turn increases the rate of domestic inflation until real wage growth equals productivity growth
(w −pd = aˆ ). Third, a currency devaluation improves the market share of domestic goods as
the costs of imported goods increase, which raises the mark-up factor and domestic prices.
Nominal wage growth adjusts to changes in relative prices in the short-run as shown below,
when t0 < t < t
∗.
w =w0 (1.32)
It is assumed that there is strong nominal wage rigidity in the short-period, so that wage
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growth is constant in the short-run. However, in the long-run when t > t ∗, the wage bargain-
ing process begins and nominal wages grow as follows:
w = pd +ηaˆ (1.33)
where η= 1− (1/k )(ϕe −ϕ), k > 0 is an adjustment parameter andϕe is workers’ expected
long-run wage share. The stronger the bargaining power of workers, the closer is η to unity,
which implies that workers are able to incorporate the gains of productivity growth into faster
nominal wage growth. Moreover, in the long-run, when the actual share of unit labour cost
approaches workers’ expected share (ϕ → ϕe ), the adjustment parameter approaches unity
(η→ 1) and growth in real wages matches productivity growth (w −pd = aˆ ).
Since a currency devaluation increases the market share of domestic goods and the mark-
up factor, T can be endogenized as follows:
T =δ
E Pf
Pd

=δ
h E Pf
T (W /a +Pf Eµ)
i
(1.34)
where δ > 0 is an adjustment parameter. In rate of change:3
τ=−(ϕ/2)[w − aˆ − (pf + e )] (1.35)
Equation (1.35) says that a currency devaluation (e > 0) increases the rate of change of the
mark-up factor.
Substitution of Equations (1.35) and (1.32) into Equation (1.31) derives the short-run do-
mestic inflation rate:
pd = (ϕ/2)(w − aˆ ) + (1−ϕ/2)(pf + e ) (1.36)
In turn, the substitution of Equations (1.35) and (1.33) into Equation (1.31) derives the
long-run domestic inflation rate:
pd = [(η−1)aˆ/(1−ϕ/2] +pf + e (1.37)
Recall that in the long-run η = 1, so that pd = pf + e , which implies that relative prices
are constant in the long-run. In other words, as the actual share of unit labour cost matches
3See Ribeiro et al. (2017b) Appendix 4 for proof.
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workers’ expected share (ϕ → ϕe ⇒ η → 1), relative prices do not change. The novelty in
Ribeiro et al. (2017b)’s formulation is that the stronger the bargaining power of workers, the
faster relative prices adjust to their long-run equilibrium level.
Given the derivation of the short- and long-run domestic inflation rates, it is simple to de-
rive the short- and long-run balance of payments constrained growth model. Ribeiro et al.
(2017b) present the following extended balance of payments identity to account for the disag-
gregation of imports into imported intermediate inputs (M i ) and imported consumer goods
(M c ). For simplicity, it is assumed that Pf = P if .
Pd X = E (Pf M
c +P if M
i ) (1.38)
In rates of change:
pd + x = e +pf +θm
c + (1−θ )m i (1.39)
where θ =M c /M and (1−θ ) =M i/M . Export demand growth assumes the familiar form:
x =α(pd −pf − e ) +β z (1.40)
Their import demand functions in growth rate form are shown below:
m = γ(pf + e −pd ) + "c y (1.41a)
m i = y (1.41b)
where "c is the income elasticity of demand for imported consumer goods. Equation (1.41b)
says that the demand for imported intermediate inputs is directly related to output growth.
Substitution of Equations (1.41a), (1.41b) and (1.40) into Equation (1.39) derives the bal-
ance of payments constrained growth model, where " = θ"c +(1−θ ). This implies that the in-
come elasticity of import demand is a weighted average of the income elasticities of demand
for imported consumer goods and intermediate inputs. In Ribeiro et al. (2017b)’s set-up, the
growth of labour productivity in constant in the short-run, so that the short-run model omits
cumulative causation.
y =
β z + (1+α+θγ)(pd −pf − e )
"
(1.42)
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Substitution of Equation (1.36)—the short-run domestic inflation rate—into Equation (1.42)
derives Ribeiro et al. (2017b)’s short-run (SR) balance of payments constrained growth model.
yS R =
β z + (1+α+θγ)(ϕ/2)(w0− aˆ −pf − e )
"
(1.43)
To derive their long-run balance of payments constrained growth model, recall that pro-
ductivity growth is given by:
aˆ = a0+λy (1.44)
Substitution of Equation (1.44) into the long-run domestic inflation rate—Equation (1.37)—
and its corresponding solution into Equation (1.42), derives Ribeiro et al. (2017b)’s long-run
(LR) balance of payments constrained growth model.
yL R =
(1−ϕ/2)β z + (1+α+θγ)(η−1)a0
(1−ϕ/2)"− (1+α+θγ)(η−1)λ (1.45)
Recall that in the long-run η = 1, which collapses Equation (1.45) into Thirlwall’s Law
(yB P = β z/") without the assumption that the Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold (1+
α+θγ= 0), unlike Thirlwall and Dixon (1979).
1.3.2.2 Labour Market Adjustments
Other formulations of relative price adjustments in balance of payments constrained growth
models place greater emphasis on the dynamics of the labour market rather than labour mar-
ket institutions as in Ribeiro et al. (2017b). For example, Pugno (1998) extends Thirlwall (1979)’s
model to demonstrate how wages adjust to changes in relative prices. Pugno endogenizes
wage growth as a positive function of employment growth, so that a tighter labour market
increases nominal wage growth. Pugno shows that any gains of enhanced price competi-
tiveness, say through a currency devaluation, accelerates short-run economic growth. This
in turn increases employment growth and boosts nominal wage growth, which reduces the
price competitiveness of domestic firms. It follows that changes in relative prices are constant
in the long-run due to labour market adjustments. Porcile and Lima (2010) provide an inter-
esting extension to Pugno’s model and endogenize the labour supply as a positive function of
the wage gap between the modern and the subsistence sector. In their dual economy macro-
dynamic model, the higher the elasticity of labour supply, the more responsive are workers in
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the subsistence sector to the wage gap. For example, a marginal increase in the modern sector
wage rate generates an inflow of subsistence labour toward the modern sector and eliminates
the wage gap. It follows that the short-run change in relative prices are eliminated in the long-
run when the labour supply responds so quickly to the wage gap that relative prices remain
constant.4
In the works of Pugno and Porcile and Lima, relative price adjustment is exclusively a phe-
nomenon of the labour market, i.e. movements in the demand and supply of labour. But as
neatly demonstrated by Ribeiro et al. (2017b), price adjustments can take place independently
of the labour market, so as long as labour market institutions—labour unions—have sufficient
bargaining power to influence wage growth. The principal insight here is that Thirlwall’s Law
can be observed even when there is slack in the labour market.
1.3.2.3 Capital Flows and Trade Barriers
Garcimartin et al. (2010) incorporate relative prices and capital flows in a balance of pay-
ments constrained growth model and present an alternative channel by which relative prices
approach their long-run equilibrium values. Consider their system of Equations where the
overdot indicates time derivative. Variables Y , X , M are incomes, exports and imports re-
spectively; export and import prices are X P and M P ; E R is the exchange rate; and Z1, Z2
are unrequited transfers and net capital inflows respectively. The parameter α is the speed of
adjustment.
y˙ =α1(x + z1+ x p −m −mp − e r ) +γZ2 (1.46a)
x˙ =α2(x
e − x ) (1.46b)
m˙ =α3(m
e −m ) (1.46c)
Z˙2 =α4(K −Z2) (1.46d)
˙e r =α5(e r
e − e r ) +γ3Z2 (1.46e)
4Porcile and Lima defend this theoretical formulation based on the empirical evidence that the natural rate of
economic growth is endogenous to the actual rate of growth for 15 OECD countries (Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall
2002; 2000) According to Porcile and Lima (2010), the labour supply is endogenous through several mechanisms:
hours worked, labour participation rates—particularly among females—reallocation of labour from low to high
productivity sectors and immigration.
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Further, x e = a+β1(x p−p ∗−e r )+β2 y ∗, where the star (∗) indicates variables for the foreign
country. Similarly, m e = b +β3(mp +e r −p )+β4 y and the equilibrium value of capital inflow
is the constant K . According to Garcimartin et al. (2010), the expected exchange rate is given
by:
e r e = P P P +δ (1.6)
where PPP is purchasing power parity andδ is a constant that captures the deviations from
PPP due to non-tradable goods or trade barriers. Garcimartin et al. (2010) explain that capital
flows may influence the speed of adjustment, e.g. if the exchange rate is above its equilib-
rium value, in the long-run it converges towards it, but this path can be mitigated, amplified,
or even reversed by capital flows. The key ideas here are that changes in relative prices or
short-run deviations of the exchange rate from PPP are mitigated over time by capital flows
and lower trade barriers. Unlike the formulations associated with labour market institutions
and adjustments, Thirlwall’s Law can be observed as tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are
lowered. The principal story here is that the Law of One Price and PPP are more likely to hold
under the condition of free trade.
After substitution, the steady-state rate of economic growth yields:5
λy =
(λx p −λm p ) +β1(λx p −λp ∗−λP P P ) +β3(λp −λm p −λP P P ) +λz 1+β2λy ∗
β4
(1.7)
where λi is the steady-state growth rate of variable i . When trade barriers are eliminated
and net capital inflow assumes its constant value in the long-run, then Equation (1.7) collapses
into Thirlwall’s Law (λy =β2λy ∗/β4).
1.3.3 Capital Flows
Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) acknowledge that developing countries are able to attract capital
inflows to fund ever-growing current account deficits. Under such circumstances, economic
growth is no longer constrained by the balance of payments but by the rate of growth of capital
inflows, which reduces the predictive power of Thirlwall’s Law. As such, Thirlwall and Hussain
amend the balance of payments constrained growth model to allow for capital inflows. The
5See Garcimartin et al. (2010) Appendix A for derivation.
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balance of payments identity is given by:
Pd X +C = Pf M E (1.8)
where C > 0 is net capital inflows. In growth rate form:
θ (pd + x ) + (1−θ )c = pf +m (1.9)
where θ = (X Pd )/(Pf M E ) and (1−θ ) =C /(Pf M E ); 0<θ < 1. In other words, θ and (1−θ )
represent the share of imports funded by exports and capital inflows respectively. Recall that
exports and imports grow as follows:
x =α(pd −pf − e ) +β z (1.10a)
m = γ(pf + e −pd ) + "y (1.10b)
and after substitution into Equation (1.9), the balance of payments constrained growth
rate is given by:
yB P =
θβ z + (1+θα+γ)(pd −pf − e ) + (1−θ )(c −pd )
"
(1.11)
where c −pd is the growth rate of real capital inflows. This is Thirlwall and Hussain (1982)’s
result where growth can be disaggregated into four components:
• Real terms of trade effect (pd −pf − e /")
• Real terms of trade effect combined with the weighted price elasticities of exports and
imports (1+θα+γ)(pd −pf − e )/")
• Weighted growth in foreign demand (θβ z/")
• Weighted growth in real capital inflows ((1−θ )(c −pd )/").
If the assumption of constant relative prices are imposed, then Equation (1.11) reduces to:
yB P =
θβ z + (1−θ )(c −pd )
"
(1.12)
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which demonstrates that a country’s balance of payments constrained growth is the weighted
sum of the growth of exports and the growth of real capital flows divided by the income elas-
ticity of demand for imports. Note that if all imports are funded by export earnings (no capital
inflows), then θ = 1 and Equation (1.12) collapses into Thirlwall’s Law (yB P =β z/").
One important limitation of Thirlwall and Hussain (1982)’s model is that it imposes no re-
striction on the evolution of the current account deficit and ergo, fails to consider the long-run
sustainability of external debt. In other words, the Thirlwall and Hussain model is useful for
analyzing medium-run growth dynamics when an economy experiences economic growth,
external deficits and capital inflows. But this medium-run growth trajectory is unlikely to be
observed in the long-run since most economies cannot indefinitely accumulate external lia-
bilities to fund their trade deficits. As external liabilities rise, financial uncertainty increases
until c = 0 and θ = 1, which impose Thirlwall’s Law as the long-run trend.
Moreno-Brid (1998) extends the Thirlwall and Hussain model and imposes the restriction
that the current account deficit must be a constant share of domestic income. This restric-
tion allows for a sustainable accumulation of external debt rather than an explosion of for-
eign indebtedness as in the Thirlwall and Hussain model. Moreno-Brid’s restriction can be
formulated as follows:
Pd X −Pf M E
Pd Y
=
Pd C
Pd Y
=
C
Y
= k (1.13)
where Pd Y is the restriction of nominal domestic income; C /Y is the ratio of capital in-
flows to income or the ratio of current account deficit to income, which is equivalent to the
constant k > 0. This implies that:
c = y (1.14)
which is necessary per the restriction k . Substitution of Equation (1.14) into (1.12) yields
the balance of payments constrained growth rate consistent with a constant ratio of current
account deficit to domestic income.
yB P =
θβ z + (1+θα+γ)(pd −pf − e )
"− (1−θ ) (1.15a)
Under the assumption of constant terms of trade in the long-run, Equation (1.15a) becomes:
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yB P =
θβ z
"− (1−θ ) (1.15b)
Equation (1.15b) says that the larger the current account deficit as a share of domestic in-
come that the economy can sustain, the higher the balance of payments constrained growth
rate. But Moreno-Brid (1998)’s model omits an important countervailing force associated with
external liabilities, i.e. interest payment on debt. Several studies have incorporated debt ser-
vicing in balance of payments constrained growth models (Eliiott and Rhodd 1999; Barbosa-
Filho 2001; Moreno-Brid 2003; Vera 2006; Alleyne and Francis 2008). To account for interest
payment on debt, the balance of payments identity is revised as follows:
Pd X +C −R = Pf M E (1.16)
where R represents net interest payments on external debt. In growth rate form:
θ1(pd + x )−θ2r + (1−θ1+θ2)c = pf +m (1.17)
where θ1 = (Pd X )/(Pf M E ); θ2 = R/(Pf M E ); (1−θ1+θ2) = C /(Pf M E ). In this formulation
R and C are linked proportionally to nominal domestic income and θ2 captures the share of
net interest payments relative to imports. Substitution of Equations (1.10a) and (1.10b) into
Equation (1.17) under the restriction that c = y , derives the balance of payments constrained
growth rate that accounts for net interest payments and sustainable external debt.
yB P =
θ1β z −θ2r + (1+θ1α+γ)(pd −pf − e )
"− (1−θ1+θ2) (1.18a)
If terms of trade are constant in the long-run, Equation (1.18a) yields:
yB P =
θ1β z −θ2r
"− (1−θ1+θ2) (1.18b)
Assuming a zero current account deficit (1−θ1+θ2 = 0) yields:
yB P =
θ1β z − (1−θ1)r
"
(1.18c)
and if the rate of net interest payments is zero (r = 0) or insignificant (θ1 = 1), Equation
(1.18c) reduces to Thirlwall’s Law:
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yB P =
β z
"
(1.18d)
An often omitted form of capital inflows is net transfers (I )—remittance inflow. The unique
feature of net transfers is that they have no corresponding debt obligations, since these are gift
transfers from friends and families living in more developed countries (Alleyne et al. 2008).
Alleyne and Francis (2008) is the first to incorporate net transfers into a balance of payments
constrained growth model. They amend the balance of payments identity as follows:
Pd X +C −R + I = Pf M E (1.19)
and in rates of change:
θ1(pd + x )−θ2r +θ3i + (1−θ1−θ3+θ2)c = pf +m (1.20)
where θ1 = (Pd X )/(Pf M E ); θ2 = R/(Pf M E ); θ3 = I /(Pf M E ); (1−θ1−θ3+θ2) =C /(Pf M E ).
Substitution of Equations (1.10a) and (1.10b) into Equation (1.20) under the restriction that
c = y , derives Alleyne and Francis (2008)’s balance of payments constrained growth rate that
accounts for net interest payments, net transfers and sustainable external debt.
yB P =
θ1β z −θ2r +θ3i + (1+θ1α+γ)(pd −pf − e )
"− (1−θ1−θ3+θ2) (1.21a)
If terms of trade are constant in the long-run, Equation (1.21a) yields the following, where
it is transparent that the growth rate of net interest payment and net transfers decreases and
increases the balance of payments constrained growth rate respectively.
yB P =
θ1β z −θ2r +θ3i
"− (1−θ1−θ3+θ2) (1.21b)
Alleyne and Francis endogenize net transfers as shown below, whereψ< 0 is the income
elasticity of net transfers. Equation (1.22a) says that net transfers are positively and negatively
related to foreign and domestic income respectively. The basic mechanisms are as follows:
1. As friends and relatives earn more income in the rest of the world, they remit more trans-
fers to the domestic economy, 2. As domestic income contracts, friends and families remit
more transfers and 3. As domestic income increases, residents in the domestic economy re-
mit transfers to the rest of the world to support the education of children abroad and other
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relatives and friends in need (Alleyne and Francis 2008).
I =
 Y Pd
Z Pf E
ψ
(1.22a)
In growth rate form:
i =ψ(y +pd − z −pf − e ) (1.22b)
Substitution of Equation (1.22b) into Equation (1.21b) under the assumption of constant
terms of trade yields:
yB P =
θ1β z −θ2r +θ3ψ(−z )
"− (1−θ1−θ3ψ+θ2) (1.23)
Equation (1.23) is a fully specified long-run balance of payments constrained growth model
that incorporates capital inflows. It takes into account external debt sustainability, net inter-
est payments and net transfers and their direct and countervailing effects on the balance of
payments constrained growth rate. Moreover, Equation (1.23) shows that growth in external
demand (z ) increases the balance of payments constraint growth rate through two channels:
1. Growth in export demand (θ1β z ) and 2. Growth in net transfers
 |θ3ψ(−z )|> 0. However,
Alleyne and Francis (2008) add the important qualification that the various effects of capital
inflows must be interpreted with caution, since the share parameters (θ ) are not constant.
1.3.4 Technological Gaps and Non-Linear Spillovers
Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) formally demonstrate that differences in the Kaldor-Verdoorn co-
efficient engender uneven growth between countries. The key limitation of cumulative growth
models is that they pay scant attention to technological spillovers from frontier countries and
learning constraints within laggard economies. These have been the principal concerns of
the technological gap approach to economic growth (Fagerberg 1987; 1988; Verspagen 1991).
This approach is summarized by (Fagerberg 1987: pp.88) in four propositions:
• There is a close relation between a country’s economic and technological development
• Economic growth is a positive function of the rate of growth in the technological level of
the country
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• It is possible for a country facing a technological gap to increase its rate of economic
growth through imitation or catching-up
• The rate at which a country exploits the possibilities offered by the technological gap
depends on its ability to mobilize resources for transforming social, institutional and
economic structures.
The technological gap literature posits that a country’s rate of growth depends on its level
of technological capabilities and that technological backwardness can be beneficial to the
laggard economy through the process of technological catch-up (Veblen 1915; Gerschenkron
1962; Maddison 1982; Abramovitz 1986; Maddison 1994; Helpman 2004).
Technological diffusion takes effect through knowledge spillovers from frontier countries
and since these effects are greater through trade interaction, Baumol et al. (1994) contend that
more extensive trade increases the rate of technological diffusion and ergo, accelerates the
rate of technological convergence. This implies that spillover effects must be maximized in
EMUs and other regional groupings where intra-regional trade is extensive—predicting tech-
nological convergence from deeper economic integration. However, the technological gap
approach demonstrates that a country’s domestic capacity to absorb knowledge spillovers is a
fundamental determinant of technological convergence. Scholars like Fagerberg (1987; 1994),
Verspagen (1991; 1993) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) argue that the use of modern
technology and its adaptation to local context can be cost prohibitive in laggard economies
and that limited absorptive capabilities can undermine the catching-up process. Several stud-
ies have shown that the size of the initial technological gap determines a country’s learn-
ing/absorptive capabilities (Abramovitz 1986; 1995; Nelson and Phelps 1966; Rogers 2004).
In a series of papers, Abramovitz makes the case that a country’s social capabilities—its social
attitudes to learning, educational attainment, organizational and commercial skills etc.,—and
technological congruence6—the appropriateness of the leader’s technology to the follower’s
economy—determine a country’s potential to catch-up (Abramovitz 1986; 1995). In two sem-
inal pieces, Verspagen formalized the non-linear relationship between the technological gap
and a country’s ability to absorb knowledge spillovers (Verspagen 1991; 1993). The central
idea is that as the initial size of the technological gap exceeds a threshold, the process of
6In the early 1950s Caribbean, there was an intense debate between A. Lewis and Plantation School scholars
on the appropriateness of imported technology. Lewis made the case that foreign investment will accelerate the
pace of technological diffusion and thereby, economic growth. For a full treatment of this debate, see Figueroa
(1996) .
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catching-up is undermined as the country lacks the learning capabilities to utilize the knowl-
edge spillovers.
Let the technological gap (G ) be defined as:
G =
Sf
Sh
(1.24a)
where Sf and Sh are the existing stock of knowledge or technological capabilities in the
foreign and the home (laggard) country respectively. Verspagen (1991) presents the following
non-linear function of technological catch-up:
sh = aG e
−G /ϕ (1.24b)
where sh is the rate of technological progress in the laggard economy; 0 < a ≤ 1 is the
potential rate of catch-up (which is proportional to the size of G ); ϕ > 0 is the economy’s
intrinsic learning capacity and e −G /ϕ captures absorptive capacity. The latter shows that ab-
sorptive capacity is negatively related to the size of the technological gap but increases with
learning capacity.
Verspagen’s formulation presents two regimes:
• Technological catch-up (G <ϕ), i.e. high learning capacity and small G
• Falling behind (G >ϕ), low learning capacity and large G .
As noted by (Rogers 2003: pp. 50), a quadratic formulation of Verspagen’s model may be
more intuitive and straightforward in terms of empirical estimations:
sh =ρ(G − c G 2) (1.24c)
where ρ > 0 is a response parameter and c > 0 is a constant that reflects the appropriate-
ness of the imported technology and other features of absorptive capacity. As illustrated in
Equation (1.24c), when the technological gap (G ) is small, there are opportunities for techno-
logical emulation and knowledge spillovers that accelerate the pace of technological progress
in the laggard country. However, as the technological gap increases beyond a critical point
(ρ− 2ρG ), technological spillovers are reduced due to the lack of indigenous capabilities re-
quired to learn from the frontier.
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1.3.5 Conditional Convergence and the BPCG Model
Several studies within the balance of payments constrained growth literature have outlined
the various conditions for technological convergence. Two basic propositions emerge:
• Technological convergence is possible when an economy has a high share of manufac-
turing output in gross domestic product and an undervalued foreign exchange rate
• The probability of technological catch-up increases with improvements in an economy’s
National System of Innovation (NSI).
These insights are derived from North-South models,7 where Kaldor-Verdoorn effects do
not produce explosive dynamics in the South because of the balance of payments constraint
(Cimoli et al. 2019; Porcile and Spinola 2018; Missio and Gabriel 2016; Gabriel et al. 2016;
Ribeiro et al. 2016; Cimoli and Porcile 2014; Da Silva Catela and Porcile 2012; Caldentey and Ali
2011; Cimoli and Porcile 2010; Cimoli et al. 2010; Botta 2009; Porcile et al. 2007; Meliciani 2002).
These studies find that a currency devaluation increases firms’ profit share, capital accumula-
tion and technical change, when the share of manufacturing output is already high. For exam-
ple, Gabriel et al. (2016) show that currency devaluation increases the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect
and learning capabilities, therefore, promoting technological convergence. A key ingredient
in these models is the role of the National System of Innovation—the set of formal and infor-
mal institutions that coordinate the interactions of firms, research institutes and universities
involved in the process of learning and technical change (Freeman 1995). It follows that public
and private investment in schooling, R&D, ICT infrastructure, efficiency wages and effective
coordination among various institutions etc., enhance absorptive capabilities and increase
the probability of technological catch-up. Hence, these scholars advocate for extensive use of
industrial and technology policy to accelerate the pace of technological convergence. These
findings are similar to the conclusions drawn from the technological gap approach and cu-
mulative causation growth models. However, the crucial difference is that these North-South
models impose a balance of payments constraint.
7See Findlay (1980), Taylor (1981b), Burgstellar and Saavedra-Rivano (1984), Dutt (1989) and Darity (1990)
for early formulations of North-South models, where the principal conclusions are that technological change
engenders asymmetries in output and employment growth between countries and that free trade and capital
mobility can undermine the catching-up process.
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1.3.5.1 National System of Innovation
NSI refers to the framework within which government forms and implements policies to in-
fluence the innovation process (Metcalfe 1995). Government assumes a leading role in coor-
dinating the various actors (universities, firms, private & national research councils, private
& national financial institutions etc;) to accelerate the process of technological emulation,
innovation and diffusion (Cimoli 2014; Cimoli and della Giusta 2000; Freeman 1995; Nelson
and Rosenberg 1993). The importance of public sector investment and the coordinating role
of government were recognized by classical development thinkers, who explained that eco-
nomic development and diversification require a simultaneous big-push across several sec-
tors (Rosenstein-Rodan 1957; Nurkse 1963). Cimoli (2014) explains that the NSI sets the con-
straints and opportunities each innovator or firm faces, e.g. the availability of skilled labour,
cheap capital and information on new technologies etc. This body of scholarship concludes
that the role of government is to create and diffuse general purpose technologies, develop the
technological infrastructure in both private and public sectors and expand certain industries
that advance technical change (Freeman and Soete 1997). In the case of emulation and reverse
engineering, Freeman (1995) states the following.
[. . . ] nations should not only acquire the achievements of more advanced nations, they
should increase them by their own efforts.
The National System of Innovation is essential to the process of emulation since this de-
pends on technical institutes and re-training schemes, the national acquisition of new tech-
nologies and diffusion by means of technology shows or parks. It follows that the NSI and
government policy are important for both technological leader and laggard but in the interest
of technological convergence, these are even more important for laggard economies.
In her celebrated book, Mazzucato (2013) has recently documented the role the U.S. gov-
ernment played in the commercial success of Apple technologies, modern smartphones and
Google’s search engine. She shows that the U.S. government funded both national and private
research councils to undertake high-risk but innovative research projects, e.g. space explo-
ration, nuclear technologies, GPS navigation etc. Her work builds on the scholarship of inno-
vation systems, which emphasizes that a country’s national capabilities are greater than the
sum of its individual firm-level capabilities (Lall 2000; Freeman 1995). This literature under-
lines the point that governments do not merely fix market failures but also actively create and
shape markets (Mazzucato 2013; Freeman 1995; Polanyi 1994). In recent work, Mazzucato and
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Semieniuk (2017) and Perez (2013) make the case that government procurement policy serve
the twin purposes of providing early stage high-risk finance and accelerating the diffusion of
new technologies. But national procurement policy is an old strategy of technological and in-
dustrial upgrading. A series of historical studies carefully document how governments in East
Asia, Old Europe and the U.S. led the charge on technological innovation, acquisition and theft
(Evans 2012; Reinert 2008; Chang 2002; Freeman 1995; Polanyi 1994). For example, Freeman
(1995) provide a historical survey that show how Prussia—later Imperial Germany—overtook
Industrial Britain by establishing training institutes that modified and improved British ma-
chines. Prussia also actively pursued British engineers when tacit knowledge was important.
Further, Freeman along with Chang (2002) demonstrate how the U.S was even more successful
than Imperial Germany in overtaking Britain during the second half of the nineteenth Century.
These scholars contend that intellectual theft was rampant between the U.S. and Britain and
that governments in both countries were the leading actors in this regard. The central idea
here is that based on both historical and recent evidence, governments cannot be divorced
from innovation and technological progress.
Mazzucato and Penna (2015) make the case that public investment is particularly com-
plementary to private ingenuity in developing countries. They show that the Brazilian De-
velopment Bank provide low-cost finance to key infrastructure projects and basic industries
through a combination of direct lending to industry and indirect financing via private finan-
cial institutions. In a series of papers, Keith Nurse argues that inadequate funding for R&D
and data infrastructure are the key reasons for little innovation8 in the creative industry in
the Caribbean (Nurse 2000; 2001; 2011). According to Nurse and Hendrickson et al. (2012),
Caribbean countries have failed to establish the data infrastructure to capture the economic
contribution of their creative industry, thereby, undermining firms’ ability to claim royalties
and the incentive to develop new products within the sector. Martins Neto and Porcile (2017)
is one study that directly connects public investment to non-price competitiveness in a BPCG
model, where firm-level innovation and emulation in laggard economies are based on effi-
cient public utilities and a skilled workforce. In this regard, Perrotti and Sanchez (2011) and
Calderon and Serven (2003) provide evidence to show that feeble public investment in in-
frastructure is a contributory factor to the widening of the productivity gap between Latin
8See Alleyne et al. (2017) and Nurse (2007) for evidence that Caribbean countries record substantially lower
coefficients of innovation as compared to their peers in Latin America.
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American and Asian countries.9
1.3.6 Endogenizing the Trade Elasticities
Since Thirlwall (1979) several studies have extended the BPCG model to account for non-price
competitiveness. Fagerberg (1988) was the first to explicitly model the technological gap in the
BPCG model and Meliciani (2002) provides an extension to account for differences in techno-
logical specialization across countries. In Fagerberg’s formulation, non-price competitive-
ness is determined by the twin factors of the technological gap and a country’s capacity to
deliver goods and services to its export markets. In the latter case, Fagerberg refers to an econ-
omy’s physical capital stock and its production capacity to meet export demand. These deter-
minants are included as arguments in a country’s export and import demand functions and
prove to be statistically significant for 15 OECD countries between 1961-1983. In Meliciani’s
extension, countries that specialize in fast-growing technologies are better positioned to ab-
sorb technological spillovers and thus, benefit from faster balance of payments constrained
growth rates.
Since these early works, the emerging consensus is that technological convergence be-
tween laggard and frontier economy drives the foreign trade elasticities (Davila-Fernandez
et al. 2018; Porcile and Spinola 2018; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Cimoli and Porcile 2014; Feijo and La-
monica 2013; Da Silva Catela and Porcile 2012; Krugman 1989).10 For example, in an aggregate
BPCG model, Ribeiro et al. (2016) modeled the technological laggard as a one-sector economy
that imports intermediate capital goods and endogenized its foreign trade elasticities as a pos-
itive function of the inverted technological gap. As the laggard economy converges to the tech-
nological frontier, it is better able to produce higher quality goods, which are associated with
higher income elasticities in export markets.11 This study shows that firm-level investment
in R&D promotes technological convergence and thereby, increases the equilibrium growth
rate. In other formulations, particularly North-South models, the income elasticity of exports
is modeled as a positive function of economic complexity, in turn determined by the techno-
9In the case of an EMU, see Makkonen (2013) for evidence that the Eurozone periphery—Portugal, Spain, Italy
and Greece—reduced public investment in R&D since 2008.
10 Numerous studies have empirically verified that technological change increases non-price competitiveness
as measured by the trade elasticities (Gouvea and Lima 2010; Romero and McCombie 2016b; 2018; Cimoli et al.
2010; Martins Neto and Porcile 2017).
11Fiorillo (2001), McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and Fagerberg (1988) argue that technological progress im-
proves product quality, while Krugman (1989) makes the case for product differentiation.
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logical gap (Cimoli and Porcile 2014). The latter scholars argue that specialization patterns are
determined by relative technological capabilities and that income elasticities of export vary by
technological specialization. They argue that medium- to high-technology commodities are
associated with higher income elasticities as compared to say, low-technology goods in the
agricultural sector. This approach to endogenizing non-price competitiveness is similar to
the work of Da Silva Catela and Porcile (2012). This study finds that faster balance of pay-
ments constrained growth rates are associated with higher shares of high-technology exports
in the total volume of exports.
Other specifications build on the scholarship that emphasize how technical change is em-
bodied in machines or a country’s capital stock (Kaldor and Mirrless 1962). Feijo and Lamon-
ica (2013) build on this idea and modeled the ratio of foreign trade elasticities as a function
of the average age of capital goods between countries. These scholars contend that the more
modern an economy’s capital goods, the greater the technological content of its output and
the faster is its balance of payments constrained growth rate. In this formulation, the ratio of
trade of elasticities—non-price competitiveness—is dependent on the relative effort to accu-
mulate new capital goods. However, this study finds that a large pool of informal labour in
laggard economies can reduce the rate of capital accumulation and by extension, perpetuate
the technological gap.
One innovative contribution to the determinants of non-price competitiveness is the sem-
inal work of Araujo and Lima (2007). These scholars are the first to derive Thirlwall’s Law
using a multi-sectoral BPCG model, inspired by the work of Pasinetti (1981; 1993) on struc-
tural economic dynamics.12 In a two-country model, where average productivity is higher in
the foreign country, trade emerges when certain sectors in the laggard economy have higher
levels of productivity as compared to the technological leader. Therefore, trade and produc-
tion specialization are determined by the differences in sectoral productivities. They demon-
strate that the aggregate ratio of foreign trade elasticities is simply the weighted average of
sectoral elasticities, so that changes in the sectoral composition of the economy can alter the
weighted trade elasticities. For example, a sectoral reallocation biased towards technology-
intensive sectors can increase the aggregate foreign trade elasticities. Alternatively, for given
sectoral elasticities, an economy’s BPCG rate increases if its structure of demand changes
and increases a sector’s share in total exports. The central contribution here is to demon-
12See Romero and McCombie (2016b), Gouvea and Lima (2013), Gouvea and Lima (2010) and Bagnai (2010)
for empirical support of the multi-sectoral Thirlwall’s Law.
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strate how changes in sectoral composition can affect the equilibrium growth rate through
changes in the weighted average of foreign trade elasticities. In much earlier work, Setterfield
(1997), Pasinetti (1981) and Cornwall (1977) underline the importance of sectoral changes for
non-price competitiveness. They contend that as household income grows, consumers move
through a commodity hierarchy, where different quality goods have different income elastic-
ities of demand. It follows that an economy’s production structure must continually evolve
with changes in the structure of demand to maintain a high ratio of foreign trade elasticities.
Richardson (1965) explains why the latter may be unlikely. He notes that a country may be-
come locked-in to a certain stage of the commodity hierarchy, if the interrelatedness between
its existing industries and capital stock prevent the emergence of new industries. This lock-in
effect is an important mechanism by which an economy’s trade elasticities can be depressed
as the structure of demand changes. Thirlwall (1997) makes a similar suggestion and pro-
poses an inverted-U relationship between an economy’s income elasticity of exports and its
production transformation from agriculture to manufacturing. He credits the inverted rela-
tionship to lock-in effects in outdated industrial structures. McCombie and Roberts (2002)
employ a similar set-up of non-linearity between the trade elasticities and economic growth.
In this study, poor previous growth rates create pressures to reform the production structure,
thereby, increasing the trade elasticities. McCombie and Roberts explain that the pressure for
reform comes from the citizenry—concerned about employment—and the private sector—
concerned about low returns on investment. In their formulation, the non-linearity emerges
as rapid growth rates produce lock-in effects and depress the trade elasticities.
In recent work, Davila-Fernandez et al. (2018) formalize Thirlwall (1997)’s suggestion of
an inverted-U relationship between the trade elasticities and production transformation. The
basic argument in this study is that non-price competitiveness is directly related to economic
complexity and diversification.13 The key mechanism is that at low levels of diversification, an
economy’s marginal propensity to import is relatively high, which produces a comparatively
high income elasticity of import demand and undermines non-price competitiveness. But
what explains the inverted-U relationship? These scholars build on the work of Abramovitz
(1995) and formally demonstrate in an aggregate BPCG model that a continuous process of di-
versification is inevitably constrained by an economy’s social capability—its capacity to con-
tinuously adapt to new institutions and technologies. This study presents an interesting twist
13See Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2007) for evidence that eco-
nomic complexity and diversification increase economic growth.
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to the idea of lock-in effects. It shows that rapid diversification produces a payoff structure
with uncertain distributional implications and consequently, creates incentives to resist change
or further diversification.14 In their basic set-up, they model a small open economy with-
out a government sector and allow for Kaldor-Verdoorn effects. Output growth below the up-
per limit of social capabilities, increases productivity growth and non-price competitiveness
through production diversification. However, as growth and diversification create distribu-
tional uncertainties, sectoral concentration ensues and depresses the trade elasticities.
In other approaches, several studies build on Kaldor (1981) and endogenize the trade elas-
ticities as a function of output growth—the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect (Porcile and Spinola 2018;
Setterfield 2011; Fiorillo 2001). An interesting formulation of this approach is the work of Fio-
rillo (2001). This study presents a multi-sectoral Kaldorian export-led growth model, where
the Kaldor-Verdoorn effects are localized by sector. Fiorillo proposes a profits-technology-
income elasticity of exports causal chain. As output growth increases sectoral productivities,
cost competitiveness is enhanced through lower unit labour costs, which increase firm-level
profits. These in turn fund firm-level innovation and R&D, which provide for improvement
in product quality and differentiation. Thus, this study shows that Kaldor-Verdoorn effects at
the sectoral level can increase the weighted trade elasticities and activate further rounds of
output growth. However, Fiorillo indicates that the process of cumulative causation is limited
by countervailing forces. Namely, retaliatory currency devaluations from trading partners,
higher wage demand as firm-level profits rise and increased rates of entry into the industry as
profits grow.
Several other scholars incorporate the ideas of Kaldor (1981) and self-financing at the firm-
level in BPCG models and endogenize the trade elasticities as a function of the real exchange
rate. For instance, Missio et al. (2017) extends Araujo and Lima (2007)’s multi-sectoral BPCG
model and allow for Kaldor-Verdoorn effects. In this model, a currency devaluation reduces
real wages and increases firm-level profits, which provides the necessary self-financing re-
quired for innovation and R&D at the sectoral level. Moreover, the study shows that the share
of technology-intensive and higher value-added sectors is an important determinant of pro-
ductivity spillovers and economic growth. It follows that a short-term policy of currency de-
valuation, which promotes technological change and increases the share of high-technology
sectors, can accelerate an economy’s long-run growth rate. In earlier work, Missio and Jayme
14For evidence that rapid growth produces strong diversification effects and then strong concentration effects,
see Romano and Trau (2017), Haraguchi and Rezonja (2013) and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003).
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(2012) incorporate the continuum of goods approach into a multi-sectoral BPCG model. In
this set-up, they account for two types of commodities: Ricardian commodities produced by
the laggard economy and innovative commodities produced by the frontier country. In their
model, labour is the only production cost, so that relative labour costs determine special-
ization in trade. Under this assumption, a currency devaluation reduces real wages (relative
labour cost) and allows the laggard economy to produce innovative commodities. Given this
sectoral change, the economy’s need for imported capital goods falls and this reduces the in-
come elasticity of imports. Further, unlike Missio et al. (2017), a currency devaluation also
increases capital accumulation and the income elasticity of exports as demonstrated by Feijo
and Lamonica (2013). Missio and Jayme (2012) conclude that exchange rate policy can have
profound long-run growth effects.
Ribeiro et al. (2016) add an important note of caution to the thesis that devaluations reduce
wage shares and engender technological progress. Unlike the previous studies, Ribeiro and
his co-authors present a non-linear relationship between technological change and real wages
(wage share) in an aggregate BPCG model. This modeling approach builds on the work of Lima
(2004), who demonstrates that too low or high wage shares reduce the rate of technological
change. The key implication is that devaluations only increase technological progress and
the trade elasticities if the wage share (real wages) is initially high. These scholars formally
demonstrate that devaluations in a low wage share economy, retards technological progress
and long-run economic growth.
As demonstrated thus far, the literature is partial to the income elasticity of exports and
only a handful of studies bring the income elasticity of imports into central focus. A recent
contribution in this line of research is the work of Ribeiro et al. (2016). Their complete spec-
ification of the foreign trade elasticities include the inverted technological gap and the wage
share. Since the mechanisms of the former have been fully discussed above, the author fo-
cuses exclusively on the role of the wage share here. In this model, the wage share has am-
biguous effects on the trade elasticities. Higher wage shares can induce a capital substitution
and allow for the production of capital-intensive goods (higher income elasticity of exports),
while lower wage shares can reduce the income elasticity of exports by incentivizing capital-
ists to produce labour-intensive commodities. In the case of income elasticity of imports, a
higher wage share increases and decreases the demand for luxury imports for workers and
capitalists respectively. The net effect determines how changes in income distribution affect
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the overall demand for luxury imports and by extension, the income elasticity of imports.15
Notwithstanding the ambiguous effects of changes in the wage share on the trade elasticities,
Ribeiro et al. (2016) assume that a rising wage share has positive effects on non-price com-
petitiveness. These scholars place greater premium on the capital substitution effects of an
increase in the wage share.
In much earlier work, Thirlwall and Hughes (1979) and Thirlwall and White (1974) demon-
strate that the tightness of the labour market can increase the demand for imports indepen-
dent of the level of income. It follows that the income elasticity of import demand increases
when the labour constraint is binding. More recently, Palley (2003) endogenizes the income
elasticity of import as an inverse function of excess capacity, so that capacity constraints re-
duce the ratio of foreign trade elasticities. Other strands of the literature make the case that
lower income inequality (higher wage share) reduces the demand for luxury imports and by
extension, increases the ratio of foreign trade elasticities (Francois and Kaplan 1996). This
result hinges on the assumptions that domestic and imported consumer goods are substi-
tutes and that the working class does not emulate the consumption pattern of the rich. Ab-
sent these conditions, lower income inequality can reduce the foreign trade elasticities and
non-price competitiveness. Porcile et al. (2007) add an interesting twist to the literature on
distribution and the trade elasticities. Porcile and his co-authors employ the efficiency wage
theorem16 in an aggregate BPCG model and demonstrate how wage increases can improve
workers’ capacity to learn and imitate foreign technologies, so that a rise in the wage share
can lead to specialization in goods with higher income elasticity of exports. This result holds
up to a threshold level of real wages (wage share), after which higher wage shares undermine
non-price competitiveness.
1.4 Conclusion
This survey has summarized the main themes in the balance of payments (BP) constrained
growth literature. Namely, its historical origins, the elasticity pessimism and relative price ad-
justments, capital flows and endogenous trade elasticities. The review is partial to aggregate
15It is not inevitable that rising demand for luxury imports increases the income elasticity of imports. This
requires that the foreign country alters the quality of its product or the structure of its production to meet the
new structure of demand.
16Higher wage shares provide for better access to education and health care (Ranis and Stewart 2002) and
stronger motivations to work (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1989).
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BP models but where it is instructive, multi-sectoral BP models are discussed. One limitation
of this review is that it omits criticisms raised against the balance of payments constrained
growth model and the corresponding replies, but the interested reader is encouraged to con-
sult McCombie (2011) for extensive details.
The structured survey is able to identify several gaps within the class of BP models. First,
the monetary economy is largely omitted with the exception of the nominal exchange rate.
The role of finance and banking and how these interact with the BP constraint is an obvious
gap within the literature. Second, distributional analyses are only undertaken within two-
class models but there are strong reasons why a three-class approach might be more insight-
ful. For example, financial and land rentiers can undermine many of the predicted results in
two-class models and thereby, derive new analytical insights and policy scenarios. This ap-
proach is particularly important given the prominence of open capital accounts, the power
of global financial markets and oligopolistic banks in poor and developing economies. Third,
when one accounts for the potential Dutch Disease effects in currency unions, capital inflows
can produce new countervailing effects unrelated to interest payments and currency crises.
To take one example, capital flows can reduce medium-run economic growth when it pro-
duces Dutch Disease effects and lower productivity growth. This is particularly problematic
in currency unions as it promotes divergence is relative unit labour costs. This leads to the
final point. Given renewed interest in regional integration, BP models should further inves-
tigate growth dynamics under assumptions of fixed exchange rate regimes and fiscal policy
bounded by limits imposed through regional agreements. Should countries opt for deeper
regional integration in light of rising protectionism, BP models should assume a stronger re-
gional focus.
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Chapter 2
Production Structure, Capital Flows and The Short-
Run–Medium-Run Macrodynamics
2.1 Introduction
Economic integration can take many forms, some more conducive to development and con-
vergence than others. Colonialism is perhaps the best example of asymmetrical integration,
where the core economy—the technological leader—maintains its economic and technologi-
cal advantages by decree. In other words, the colony—the technological laggard—is prevented
from embarking on the process of economic development and technological catch-up. Nu-
merous scholars argue that the present form of globalization, European integration and re-
gional groupings reproduce this asymmetrical relation of core-periphery (Stockhammer et al.
2015; Reinert and Kattel 2014; Simonazzi et al. 2013; Girvan 2009; Blecker 1996). Proponents
of this view posit that the economic policy framework at the level of the world economy or the
Eurozone, in the case of a regional grouping, does not provide adequate space for technolog-
ical catch-up through industrial policy and various forms of demand management. But neo-
classical theory of convergence contends that closer economic ties at the world level through
trade liberalization etc., or deeper economic integration within regional groups, will close the
gap between rich and poor countries (Baumol et al. 1994). These scholars argue that the pe-
riod of convergence engenders temporary external imbalances and capital flows toward lag-
gard economies that facilitate the catching-up process (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002).
This chapter makes several key contributions to the literature on capital flows, conver-
gence and economic growth. It presents a balance of payments constrained growth model
within a regional setting, an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The first contribution
the chapter makes is to the balance of payments constrained growth literature. It formal-
izes a new channel through which capital flows can have ambiguous effects on the balance of
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payments constrained growth (BPCG) rate. The model shows that when a technological gap
exits between two countries that share a common currency, capital flows toward the tech-
nological laggard can deteriorate its production structure and produce lower productivity
growth. In other words, capital flows can engender a divergence in relative unit labour cost.
As the laggard economy loses cost competitiveness, it simultaneously produces a lower bal-
ance of payments constrained growth rate. Other works within the balance of payments con-
strained growth framework do emphasize the growth-reducing effects of capital inflows but
these works focus on the debt and foreign currency crises channels (Filho et al. 2013; Vera 2006;
Curado and Porcile 2002). For example, Filho et al. (2013) and Curado and Porcile (2002) argue
that faster capital inflows expose an economy to sudden stops and lead to debt accumulation
and high interest payments, which constrain economic growth. These studies along with Al-
leyne and Francis (2008), Moreno-Brid (2003) and Barbosa-Filho (2001) illustrate how capital
inflows can reduce the BPCG rate through debt repayment. It follows that the channel ad-
vanced in this chapter is closer to the Dutch Disease mechanism, where capital inflows lead
to deindustrialization and lower productivity growth. Unlike this traditional literature (Botta
2017; Rajan and Subramanian 2011; Paldam 1997), the Dutch Disease effects in this chapter
are captured within the context of an EMU and a balance of payments constrained growth
model.
One important implication of this finding is that cost and non-cost competitiveness can-
not be neatly divided—non-cost factors like production structures or economic complexity
can affect cost competitiveness. This insight leads to the second contribution of this chap-
ter, by providing some clarity on the intense debate regarding the role of unit labour costs in
driving intra-Eurozone current account imbalances (Storm and Naastepad 2016; 2015a; Stock-
hammer et al. 2015). Germany’s price competitiveness may be more related to its super tech-
nological capabilities rather than wage suppression per se. Alternatively, it can be said that the
Eurozone periphery has lost price competitiveness partly because of a deterioration in their
production structures. This interpretation produces the policy conclusion that technology
policies rather than labour market reforms are needed in the Eurozone periphery.
The third contribution relates to how capital flows lower the BPCG rate and provide for
weaker effects of induced technological change, which widens the technological gap between
core and periphery. Moreover, the model shows that when the demand regime is wage-led,
capital inflows increase the short-run growth rate and widen the external deficit until equi-
librium is restored by way of a financial crisis. There are strong evidence in the case of the
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Eurozone to support these results. Several empirical studies show that the Eurozone periph-
ery has lost value added share in medium- and high-technology exports since the introduc-
tion of the Euro (Storm and Naastepad 2015b; Botta 2014; Simonazzi et al. 2013; Reinstaller
et al. 2012). Rapid capital flows toward the Eurozone periphery led to significant growth in
aggregate demand and unit labour cost, a deterioration in their production structures and a
rise in external imbalances that eventually ended in a sudden stop of capital inflows (Storm
and Naastepad 2015b). To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first time that the
dynamics of intra-Eurozone divergence are formalized.
These results are driven by a crucial assumption—that the technological gap between the
laggard and frontier economy exceeds the threshold that maximizes technological spillovers.
It follows that the size of the initial technological gap matters for regional cohesion and the
growth and technology effects of capital flows. The key implication here is that members or
potential members of an EMU must pass the litmus test of the maximum distance from the
frontier country, lest divergence threatens regional solidarity. However, this is a highly restric-
tive condition for membership in regional groupings. As such, the model presents results that
demonstrate how technology policy in laggard economies can promote technological con-
vergence and sustain community cohesion. This is finding supports recent calls for Regional
Innovation Systems and fiscal unions at the level of regional groupings that fund public in-
vestment and industrial policies in peripheral countries (Reinert and Kattel 2019; Stockham-
mer et al. 2019; 2015; Botta 2014). The principal insight here is that regional cohesion and
convergence are possible even when the initial technological gap is large, if the community
establishes a Regional Innovation System to reduce technological asymmetries.
The final key contribution relates to the importance of demand regimes in influencing
how laggard economies transition to a medium-run growth and technological path. For ex-
ample, the above results no longer hold when the laggard economy has a profit-led demand
regime. As opposed to the wage-led regime, capital inflows produce a short-run contraction
but medium-run convergence or divergence depending on the net-effect of capital inflows on
the balance of payments constrained growth rate. When the positive effects dominate, capital
flows produce a short-run contraction but economic recovery in the medium-run. However,
when the negative effects dominate, the laggard economy experiences a short-run contraction
and a medium-run stagnation in both economic growth and technological capabilities. These
varying results demonstrate the importance of demand-regimes for regional integration.
Several conclusions can be derived from the multitude of results presented in this chapter.
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First, the size of the technological gap between countries in an EMU is consequential for con-
vergence in technological capabilities. Second, demand-regimes matter for relative economic
performance and ergo, regional cohesion. Third, capital flows within a community can pro-
duce both convergence and divergence effects. Fourth, given the prevailing conclusions, the
design framework at the regional level is fundamental to compensate for the forces of diver-
gence. Finally, if political consensus is lacking at the regional level as to the design framework
for a fiscal union/Regional System of Innovation, then the principal convergence criteria must
include demand-regimes and the size of the technological gap.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoreti-
cal model and section 2.3 outlines the first equilibrium solution and comparative dynamic
results. In section 2.4, the chapter formalizes the demand-regimes and in section 2.5, the
second equilibrium solution is derived and new comparative dynamic results are discussed.
Finally, the chapter concludes in section 2.6.
2.2 Model
Assume that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) consists of two countries: a techno-
logically advanced foreign country and a technological laggard—the home country. An inde-
pendent central bank issues the common currency and there is no fiscal union. Each country
is obligated by treaty to maintain balanced fiscal accounts and observe both debt and deficit
limits. It follows that there is little room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Thus, in this model,
the role of government is ignored and it is assumed that all fiscal obligations are met. Given
the EMU, both countries are financially integrated and capital can flow freely between coun-
tries. Due to the latter and the elimination of exchange rate risks, interest rates are assumed to
converge between countries. Also, the home country is composed of two classes: a capitalist
class with a given savings rate and a working class that does not save.
2.2.1 Production Structure
The home country produces a good of given technological complexity—knowledge input or
know-how—by combining capital and labour in fixed coefficients, where output, employment
and capital stock are Y , L and K respectively. The corresponding productivity coefficients are
a and b and the fixed coefficient combination is determined by the existing stock of knowl-
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edge. The latter determines the difference in input efficiencies independent of relative factor
prices.
Y =min (a L , b K ) (2.1a)
For a given technological gap, home country produces a range of goods for which it has rel-
ative cost advantage. Consistent with the modeling approaches of Cimoli and Porcile (2010),
Cimoli (1988) and Dosi et al. (1990), the home country loses cost advantage as the technolog-
ical intensity of a commodity increases. It follows that for a given technological gap, relative
cost differences are higher for technology-intensive goods. Assume that the continuum1 of
commodities with varying technological complexity can be ranked from the lowest complex-
ity (N = 0) to the highest (N = 1).2 For a given technological gap, the home country produces
up to N ∗ when the following holds:
Wh
ah
≤ Wf
a f
=N ∗ (2.1b)
where the wage rate and labour productivity are W and a respectively. Equation (2.1b) says
that the home country specializes in a range of goods up to N ∗, where it has a lower relative
unit labour cost (Wh/ah ).
3 Moreover, for its given pattern of specialization up to N ∗, only tech-
nological change can pierce the barrier of N ∗, though losses in economic complexity can easily
be experienced in the medium-run. The technological leader produces all goods beyond N ∗
but it also produces low-technology commodities too, demonstrating its absolute and com-
parative advantage over its peer. In this model, technological asymmetries is the defining
factor for comparative and absolute advantages between the home and the foreign country.
It can now be assumed that the home country specializes in the production of commodities
with relatively low levels of technological intensity, see Figure 2.1.
The continuum of goods is used only as an analytical device to organize thinking regarding
patterns of specialization and its dynamics. It is assumed that the home country’s production
possibilities can move along the continuum of complex goods indicating changes in the pro-
duction structure, either at the sectoral or at the commodity level. Just to fix ideas, consider
1See Dornbusch et al. (1977), Wilson (1980), Collins (1985) and Cimoli (1988) for earlier modeling approaches
that employed a continuum of goods to define patterns of trade and specialization.
2For evidence that commodities can be ranked based on their complexity, see Hidalgo et al. (2007), Reinert
(2008) and Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009).
3In this chapter unit labour cost (U C L) always refers to aggregate rather than sectoral U LC .
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Figure 2.1: Technological Intensity and Specialization
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an example at the aggregate level. Ceteris paribus, the home country moves leftward along
the continuum of complex goods, if its auto-industry manufacturing firms decide to relocate
in the foreign country. In this case, the home country’s share of manufacturing in its gross
domestic product declines, indicating a loss in medium- to high-technology commodities.
Given the prevailing specifications, this chapter defines production structure as the matrix
of goods that a country produces for domestic and external demand. This matrix of produc-
tion illustrates given technological capabilities and defines both opportunities and limits for
learning and innovation, which influence demand and productivity growth in the medium-
to long-run (Cimoli et al. 2016).
2.2.2 Evolution of the Technological Gap
Let the technological gap (G ) be defined as:
G =
Sf
Sh
(2.2)
where Sf and Sh are the existing stock of knowledge or technological capabilities in the
foreign and the home country respectively. In turn, the evolution of the technological gap is
given as follows, where lower cases indicate rates of change.
g = s f − sh (2.3)
Equation (2.3) illustrates that the rate of growth of the technological gap depends on the
differential rates of technological change between countries. It follows that there is techno-
logical convergence or divergence when s f < sh or s f > sh holds respectively. Technological
change in the leader country is modeled according to Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law.
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s f =ρ f +λ f z (2.4)
Verdoorn (1949) is the first to formalize the idea that there is a causal link between output
growth and productivity growth and after Kaldor (1966) discovers empirical support for this
claim, he later restates this thesis as a Law. The literature now identifies the well documented
statistical relationship4 as Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law (McCombie et al. 2002). Autonomous growth
in technology is given by ρ f , which depends on the autonomous rate of disembodied techni-
cal progress, the autonomous rate of capital accumulation and the degree to which technical
progress is embodied in capital accumulation (Caldentey and Ali 2011; Dixon and Thirlwall
1975). In turn, induced technical change is captured by the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient (λ f ),
which is a function of learning by doing and the extent to which capital accumulation is in-
duced by economic growth (Dixon and Thirlwall 1975). Given autonomous technical change,
Equation (2.4) says that the foreign country advances the technological frontier when its rate
of output growth (z ) increases.
The home country’s technological progress function assumes the following form:
sh =ρh +λh yB P (2.5)
where ρh is autonomous growth in technology and yB P is the home country’s balance of
payments constrained growth rate. The latter is used instead of the actual growth to focus
exclusively on the technology effects of long-run growth. Following Targetti and Foti (1997)
and Caldentey and Ali (2011), the home country’s Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient (λh ) is modeled
as a non-linear function of the technological gap:
λh =σ1G −σ2G 2 (2.6)
where λh increases with G up to the critical point of (σ1− 2σ2G ), after which the Kaldor-
Verdoorn coefficient declines.5 At low levels of G up to the critical point, there are opportu-
4For empirical evidence of Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law see Romero and McCombie (2016a), Romero and Britto
(2017), Millemaci and Ofria (2014), Angeriz et al. (2008), McCombie et al. (2002), Fingleton and McCombie (1998)
and Leon-Ledesma (1999).
5Magacho and McCombie (2017a) estimate Kaldor-Verdoorn’s Law for 70 countries, including those with high,
middle and low per capita income levels. They controlled for a linear technological gap and levels of schooling
and find that the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient is higher in low-and middle-income countries in almost all man-
ufacturing industries as compared high-income countries. However, the theoretical formulation in Equation
(2.6) demonstrates that these empirical estimates may be biased upwards as the empirical exercise omitted the
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nities for technological emulation and knowledge spillovers that accelerate the pace of tech-
nological progress in the home country. However, beyond the critical point, technological
spillovers are reduced due to the lack of indigenous capabilities required to learn from the
frontier. Note that the restriction (λh > 0) holds, so that technological gaps beyond the critical
point only reduce the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient and never produce a negative value.
This quadratic technological progress function follows (Rogers 2003: pp. 50)’s formulation
of Verspagen (1991)’s non-linear function of technological catch-up. It is based on the tech-
nological gap approach to economic growth that emphasizes technological spillovers from
frontier countries and learning constraints within laggard economies (Fagerberg 1987; 1988;
Verspagen 1991). The technological gap literature posits that a country’s rate of growth de-
pends on its level of technological capabilities and that technological backwardness can be
beneficial to the laggard economy through the process of technological catch-up (Veblen 1915;
Gerschenkron 1962; Maddison 1982; Abramovitz 1986; Maddison 1994; Helpman 2004). How-
ever, several scholars demonstrate that a country’s domestic capacity to absorb knowledge
spillovers is a fundamental determinant of technological convergence (Fagerberg 1987; 1994;
Verspagen 1991; 1993; Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002). These scholars argue that the use
of modern technology and its adaptation to local context can be cost prohibitive in laggard
economies and that limited absorptive capabilities can undermine the catching-up process.
Other scholars contend that the size of the initial technological gap determines a country’s
learning or absorptive capabilities (Abramovitz 1986; 1995; Nelson and Phelps 1966; Rogers
2004). In a series of papers, Abramovitz makes the case that a country’s social capabilities—its
social attitudes to learning, educational attainment, organizational and commercial skills and
technological congruence—the appropriateness of the leader’s technology to the follower’s
economy—determine a country’s potential to catch-up (Abramovitz 1986; 1995). It follows
thatσ1 > 0 andσ2 > 0 in Equation (2.6), capture the appropriateness of imported technology
and other factors that determine absorptive capacity.
Substitution of Equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) into Equation (2.3) yields the rate of growth
of the technological gap.6
g = (ρ f −ρh ) +

λ f z −

σ1G −σ2G 2

yB P

(2.7)
non-linearity that my reduce the induced technology parameter.
6Equation (2.7) shows that the balance of payments constraint is asymmetrical between the foreign and the
home country and ergo, z rather than the foreign country’s balance of payments constrained growth rate is em-
ployed.
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2.2.3 Extended Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model
This section builds on the scholarship that demonstrates how capital inflows can relax the
balance of payments constraint and thus, increase the rate of economic growth consistent
with balance of payments equilibrium (Thirlwall and Hussain 1982; Moreno-Brid 1998; Eliiott
and Rhodd 1999; Barbosa-Filho 2001; Moreno-Brid 2003; Vera 2006; Alleyne and Francis 2008).
The principal contribution here relaxes the assumption of constant terms of trade to demon-
strate the idea that capital inflows can have ambiguous effects on the balance of payments
constrained (BPCG) rate. The model presented here is closer to Thirlwall and Hussain (1982)
since no restriction is imposed on the rate of growth of capital inflows (c ). To prevent explo-
sive external debt dynamics, several studies have imposed a range of restrictions: 1. Capital
inflows are held constant, 2. Capital inflows are assumed to be a fixed proportion of domes-
tic income, exports and imports (Moreno-Brid 1998; Dutt 2003; Alleyne and Francis 2008). It
is not the objective of this chapter to analyze external debt dynamics, so the present model
abstracts away from these complications. It is sufficient to assume here that the home coun-
try cannot infinitely finance its current account deficit and that in the long-run, the rate of
change of net capital inflows is zero.
The balance of payments identity is given by:
Ph X +Ph C = Pf M (2.8)
where C > 0 is net capital inflows; Ph , X , Pf , M are the home country’s price level, export
demand, the foreign country’s price level and the home country’s import demand respectively.
In growth rate form, where lower cases indicate rates of change:
θ (ph + x ) + (1−θ )(ph + c ) = pf +m (2.9)
where θ = (Ph X )/(Pf M ) and (1−θ ) = Ph C /(Pf M ); 0< θ < 1. In other words, θ and (1−θ )
represent the share of imports funded by exports and capital inflows respectively.
The export demand function is given by Equation (2.10), where Z represents income in
the foreign country. The parameters α < 0 and β > 0 are the price and income elasticities of
export demand respectively.
X =
Ph
Pf
α
Z β (2.10)
53
In growth rate form:
x =α(ph −pf ) +β z (2.11)
Import demand assumes the following specification, where the parameters γ< 0 and " > 0
are the price and income elasticities of import demand respectively. The home country’s level
of income is given by Y .
M =
Pf
Ph
γ
Y " (2.12)
In growth rate form:
m = γ(pf −ph ) + "y (2.13)
Assume that a representative firm in the home country adds a mark-up (T ) to its unit
labour cost (U LC ) as follows:7
Ph = T
W
a

(2.14)
In turn, inflation in the home country evolves as shown below:
ph =τ+w − aˆ (2.15)
where τ, w and aˆ are the growth rate of the mark-up factor, nominal wages and labour
productivity respectively. Assume that the mark-up factor is constant so that τ = 0. This im-
plies that inflation is a positive function of the growth rate of unit labour cost (ul c ) or the
extent by which wage growth exceeds productivity growth.
ph = ul c =w − aˆ (2.16)
Let nominal wage growth be defined as a simple function of output growth and autonomous
wage growth (ν0 > 0). This modeling approach envisions that the labour market gets tighter as
economic growth accelerates, which increases labour’s bargaining power and nominal wage
demand (Stockhammer 2011). Autonomous wage growth (ν0) can represent labour market in-
7This mark-up pricing approach is consistent with the empirical evidence on firms’ behavior (Hall and Hitch
1939; Hall et al. 1996; Fabiani et al. 2006).
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stitutions, say union power that affects nominal wage growth independent of labour market
conditions.
w = ν0+ν1 y (2.17)
In turn, labour productivity grows as follows:
aˆ =µ0−µ1g −µ2c (2.18)
whereµ0 > 0 is autonomous growth in labour productivity and g is the rate of growth of the
technological gap between the foreign and the home country. Equation (2.18) says that pro-
ductivity growth is negatively related to the rate of growth of the technological gap and capital
inflows. The motivation behind an inverse relationship between aˆ and g is straightforward.
As the rate of growth of the technological gap increases, the home country drifts farther away
from the technological frontier, which undermines its technological know-how or labour pro-
ductivity. In other words, as g increases, the home country moves leftwards along the contin-
uum of complex goods. As Andreoni (2014) and Bellandi et al. (2018) argue, the process of
learning and unlearning depend on the cognitive structure embedded in the technological
intensity of the production structure, so that a leftward movement along the continuum of
complex goods reduce productivity growth. Moreover, as Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor (1966)
demonstrate, the productivity effects of learning by doing (Arrow 1962) and overall produc-
tivity growth are stronger in manufacturing activities or technologically complex economic
activities. An important mechanism is that technology-intensive commodities provide for
a more extensive division of labour, which increases productivity growth (Smith 2003). The
central implication is that as g increases, both economic complexity and productivity growth
are reduced. Further, this theoretical formulation is consistent with the modeling approach
in North-South models that demonstrate how changes in the technological gap can produce
new patterns of specialization and productivity growth (Porcile and Spinola 2018; Cimoli and
Porcile 2014; 2010).8
8See Reinert (1995) for a wealth of historical evidence that show how productivity grows faster in the pro-
duction of high quality or technologically complex economic activities. For recent empirical evidence, consult
Romero and McCombie (2018); Romero and Britto (2017); Magacho and McCombie (2017b); Romero and Mc-
Combie (2016a;b). For example, Romero and McCombie (2016a) find evidence that high-technology manufac-
turing industries exhibit larger degrees of returns to scale than low-technology manufacturing industries. Their
empirical study uses data from the EU KLEMS database, covering a sample of 12 manufacturing industries in 11
OECD countries over the period 1976-2006. Similar results are obtained in Romero and Britto (2017) and their
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Why should capital inflows reduce the rate of growth of labour productivity? The basic
hypothesis is that capital inflows reduce the rate of production transformation along the con-
tinuum of complex commodities and this undermines productivity growth. This formulation
is similar to the Dutch Disease effect, where capital inflows appreciate the domestic currency
and undermine the manufacturing sector, which deteriorates the production structure and
productivity growth (Botta 2017). But since the home country does not have an indepen-
dent currency the mechanisms are different. Capital inflows toward the technological laggard
seek the highest private returns and this necessarily means investment in low-risk and low-
technology commodities in the home country. The accompanying effects can support a boom
in what Tregenna (2014) calls circulatory services—a growth in services unrelated to commod-
ity production—and generate new lock-in effects biased towards lower-technology economic
activities, which in turn reduce productivity growth through the mechanisms outlined above.
Why should capital flow toward the technological laggard—the home country?9 In an EMU
where financial markets are integrated, foreign exchange rate risks are eliminated, fiscal and
debt limits are stringent and interest rates converge between the technological leader and
laggard—as assumed in this chapter—the creditworthiness of the home country increases
and produces a form of Keynesian animal spirits in financial markets. Consequently, bor-
rowing costs fall in the home country, perceived risks decline and the rate of capital inflows
increases.10
Substitution of Equations (2.17) and (2.18) into Equation (2.16) derives the home country’s
extended inflation rate:
ph = ν0+ν1 y −µ0+µ1g +µ2c (2.19)
In turn, the substitution of Equations (2.11), (2.13) and (2.19) into Equation (2.9)—the bal-
ance of payments identity—derives the extended balance of payments constrained growth
rate (yB P ):
yB P =
θ zβ + (1−θ )c + (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.20)
where (1+ θα+ γ) < 0 is the extended Marshall-Lerner condition that guarantees an in-
finding is robust to controls such as research intensity (R&D expenditure) and various econometric methods.
9The empirical evidence at the level of the world economy shows that capital flows toward richer and more
technologically advanced countries (Goktan 2015; Lucas 1990).
10See Lane (2013) for evidence of capital flows toward the technological laggards in the case of the Eurozone.
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crease in price competitiveness spurs economic growth. Note that if there are no capital in-
flows (θ = 1) and the Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold (1+θα+γ) = 0, then Equation
(2.20) becomes Thirlwall’s Law (yB P = zβ/") (Thirlwall 1979).11 Thirlwall’s Law states that a
country’s long-run rate of growth—consistent with balance of payments equilibrium—is de-
termined by the growth of external demand (foreign country’s demand) and the ratio of its
foreign trade elasticities (β/"). Thirlwall argues that non-price competitiveness is reflected
in these elasticities, in turn determined by technological capabilities. Further, as noted by
Blecker (2013), Thirlwall’s Law is based on the assumption that domestic expenditures must
alway expand or contract to prevent the accumulation of reserves or external deficits respec-
tively.
The balance of payments constrained growth rate can be disaggregated into the following
components:
1. Real terms of trade effect [ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf /"− (1+θα+γ)ν1]
2. Real terms of trade effect combined with the weighted price elasticities of exports and
imports [(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf )/"− (1+θα+γ)ν1]
3. Income elasticity of import demand effect combined with the weighted price elasticities
of exports and imports ["− (1+θα+γ)ν1]
4. Weighted growth of capital inflows [(1−θ )c + (1+θα+γ)(µ2c )/"− (1+θα+γ)ν1]
5. Weighted growth in foreign demand (θβ z/"− (1+θα+γ)ν1).
Components (1) and (2) reproduce the standard results in the balance of payments con-
strained growth literature but with a twist. Similar to Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) and Ribeiro
et al. (2017b), the model endogenizes domestic prices as a function of productivity growth but
unlike these models, it also incorporates the growth rate of capital inflows as a determining
factor. This approach to modeling price competitiveness undermines the well-established
dichotomy of price and non-price competitiveness—it demonstrates that these are more in-
terrelated than originally understood. Some variants of the balance of payments constrained
growth model neatly separate price and non-price competitiveness into the price and income
elasticities respectively. Other approaches either endogenize the trade elasticities (Ribeiro
11This law reflects Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier or Hicks’ supermultiplier in a dynamic context, see Thirl-
wall (1979) and Thirlwall and Hussain (1982).
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et al. 2016; Cimoli and Porcile 2014) or include the technological gap as an argument in the
export and import demand functions (Porcile et al. 2007; Amable and Verspagen 1995; Fager-
berg 1988). The approach adopted in this chapter is similar to the work of Dosi et al. (2010).
These scholars show that technological change can have both short- and long-run growth ef-
fects and that demand management is central to smooth output fluctuations, which in turn
increases the rate of technical change. The central idea here is that changes in the technolog-
ical gap do not simply affect trade specialization and the ratio of trade elasticities but also the
calculus of price competitiveness.
This contribution has a number of implications. First, it can shed light on the intense
debate regarding the role of unit labour costs in driving intra-Eurozone current account im-
balances.12 To put it succinctly, the Eurozone core, Germany in particular, may appear price
competitive partly because of its super technological capabilities.13 Alternatively, it can be
said that the Eurozone periphery has lost price competitiveness partly because of a deteri-
oration in their production structures. Third, it contributes to the debate on the so-called
elasticity pessimism14 and adds intellectual support to export-led growth models15 regarding
the debate on the role of relative prices in economic growth. Relative prices matter for eco-
nomic growth to the extent that they are determined by non-price factors, i.e. technological
change.
This chapter makes two additional contributions to the literature by way of components
(3) and (4). Component (3) says that when the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, the higher
the coefficient of induced wage growth (ν1), the lower the balance of payments constrained
growth rate. The principal mechanism is through the income elasticity of import demand.
This implies that the labour market can influence yB P independent of income. The final con-
tribution relates to the class of balance of payments constrained growth models that incorpo-
rate capital inflows. Unlike the standard formulation, component (4) says that capital inflows
12Numerous commentators explain Germany’s export surplus on account of wage restraint and others simul-
taneously blame wage inflation in the periphery for their external deficits; see Stockhammer et al. (2015) for an
overview of this debate.
13For evidence on Germany’s technological advantage over the Eurozone periphery, consult Constantine
(2017b), Storm and Naastepad (2015b), Botta (2014), Simonazzi et al. (2013) and Reinstaller et al. (2012).
14Proponents of export-led growth models stress the value of changes in relative price competitiveness, driven
by endogenous technological change as the source of export success. However, scholars in the tradition of the
balance of payments constrained growth model, contend that such changes dissipate in the long-run (elasticity
pessimism).
15See Setterfield (2002; 1997); Setterfield and Cornwall (2002); Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) for formal models of
export-led growth, which emphasize the role of relative prices in the growth process.
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have ambiguous effects on the balance of payments constrained growth rate. As explained
earlier, this ambiguity arises because of the negative effects capital inflows can have on the
home country’s production structure. As such, this chapter presents a new channel of how
capital inflows may reduce an economy’s balance of payments constrained growth rate. Un-
der what conditions do the negative effects of capital inflows outweigh the positive effects?
This chapter proposes that the wider the technological gap between the home and the foreign
country, the more likely capital inflows reduce the balance of payments constrained growth
rate. In the case where the technological gap is initially small, capital inflows can profitably
fund medium- to high-technology economic activities and accelerate yB P .
A handful of scholarship within the balance of payments constrained growth framework
do emphasize the growth-reducing effects of capital inflows but these works focus on the debt
and foreign currency crises channels (Filho et al. 2013; Vera 2006; Curado and Porcile 2002).
For example, Filho et al. (2013) and Curado and Porcile (2002) argue that faster capital in-
flows expose an economy to sudden stops and lead to debt accumulation and high interest
payments, which constrain economic growth. Vera (2006) presents an interesting model of
financial transfers and trade imbalances, where the asymmetric North and South are interde-
pendent. Vera finds that net interest payments from the indebted South produce both con-
tractionary and expansionary growth regimes depending on parameter values. These studies
along with Alleyne and Francis (2008), Moreno-Brid (2003) and Barbosa-Filho (2001) illustrate
how capital inflows can reduce yB P through debt repayment. It follows that the channel ad-
vanced in this chapter is closer to the Dutch Disease mechanism but within the context of an
EMU and a balance of payment constrained growth model (Botta 2017; Rajan and Subrama-
nian 2011; Paldam 1997).
The final contribution relates to component (5), where the growth in foreign demand is
now weighted by the share of imports funded by exports (θ ) and the weighted trade elasticities,
particularly, the weighted income elasticity of import demand ("−(1+θα+γ)ν1). Unlike other
formulations of extended balance of payments constrained growth models, this result shows
that the growth effects of foreign demand are lower due to the weighted price elasticities of
export and import demand.
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2.3 Equilibrium I
Given the rate of growth of the technological gap and the extended balance of payments con-
strained growth rate, a system of two Equations is formed and they are reproduced below.
Equation (2.21a) is the rate of growth of the technological gap, henceforth, the technology
regime (T R ) and Equation (2.21b) is the extended balance of payments constrained growth
rate, henceforth, the balance of payments regime (B P ).
T R : yB P =
λ f z − g + (ρ f −ρh )
σ1G −σ2G 2 (2.21a)
B P : yB P =
θ zβ + (1−θ )c + (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.21b)
Equating Equations (2.21a) and (2.21b) yields the equilibrium rate of growth of the tech-
nological gap (g ∗):
g ∗ = (ρ f −ρh ) + z

λ f −

σ1G −σ2G 2
 θβ
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

− σ1G −σ2G 2 (1−θ )c"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1 
+

σ1G −σ2G 2
 (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2c −pf )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

(2.22)
The dynamics of the technological gap can be disaggregated into the following key com-
ponents:
1. The difference in autonomous growth in technology (ρ f −ρh )
2. Induced technological change in the frontier country (λ f z )
3. The weighted Thirlwall’s Law

(σ1G −σ2G 2)θβ z/"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1
4. The weighted growth of capital inflows
−(σ1G −σ2G 2)(1−θ )c +(σ1G −σ2G 2)(1+θα+
γ)(µ2c )/"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1
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5. The size of the initial technological gap (σ1G −σ2G 2).
When z = 0 and G = 0, it is transparent that the evolution of g ∗ depends on the difference
in autonomous technological change. The rate of change of the technological gap increases,
decreases or remains the same depending on the following conditions:
g ∗

> 0⇒ (ρ f −ρh )> 0 Divergence Effect
= 0⇒ (ρ f −ρh ) = 0 Neutral Effect
< 0⇒ (ρ f −ρh )< 0 Convergence Effect
Now assume that ρ f −ρh = 0; c = 0; θ = 1 and (1+ θα+ γ) = 0. When these assump-
tions hold, a faster rate of growth in the foreign country produces both convergence and diver-
gence effects. As the foreign country’s rate of output growth increases, the rate of growth of the
technological gap rises on account of the foreign country’s Kaldor-Verdoorn effect (λ f ). The
growth effects that promote technological divergence is referred to as the Kaldor-Verdoorn ef-
fect (Caldentey and Ali 2011). Simultaneously, faster growth in the foreign country increases
the home country’s balance of payments constrained growth rate and narrows the technolog-
ical gap through the weighted Thirlwall’s Law:

(σ1G −σ2G 2)β z/". The convergence effect
relating to faster growth in the home country is referred to as the Thirlwall effect (Caldentey
and Ali 2011). It is clear that the strength of the Thirlwall effect depends non-linearly on the
size of the technological gap. This implies that the convergence effect increases with G up
to the critical point of σ1− 2σ2G , after which the convergence effect decreases. Accordingly,
the Thirlwall effect is stronger when the initial gap is within the convergence range and the
follower economy has sufficient capabilities to absorb technological spillovers. This is a fun-
damental insight. Integrating economies with technological gaps that exceed the critical point
ofσ1−2σ2G , lowers the convergence effects. Recall the assumptions of strong limits on fiscal
expenditure in the EMU and the absence of a fiscal union, so that countries with large techno-
logical gaps are unable to undertake industrial and technological policies to build absorptive
capabilities. Economic and Monetary Unions with such design framework can promote tech-
nological divergence.16 Given the divergence and convergence effects associated with faster
output growth in the foreign country, the dynamics of the technological gap depend on the
difference between the Kaldor-Verdoorn and weighted Thirlwall effects. When the assump-
16The Eurozone’s design flaws relating to fiscal and monetary policy are excellent examples of how an EMU’s
design flaws can promote asymmetries (Stiglitz 2017; De Grauwe 2015; Stockhammer et al. 2015).
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tions of c = 0 and (1+ θα+ γ) = 0 are relaxed, the model allows for the influences of capital
inflows and relative prices on the Thirlwall effect. Therefore:
g ∗

> 0⇒z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

> 0 Divergence Effect
= 0⇒z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

= 0 Neutral Effect
< 0⇒z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

< 0 Convergence Effect
Note that a higher θ increases the convergence effect but a higher induced wage growth
(ν1) and productivity-technological gap effect (µ1) lower the Thirlwall effect.
To focus on the effects of capital inflows independent of the Thirlwall effect, assume that
z = 0. It is immediately evident that faster growth of capital inflows produces both conver-
gence and divergence effects. This is illustrated by the negative and positive signs of the home
country’s induced technology parameters: −(σ1G −σ2G 2) and +(σ1G −σ2G 2). These result
arise because of the ambiguous effects capital inflows have on the balance of payments con-
strained growth rate. This result is unlike the finding in Caldentey and Ali (2011) and the con-
vergence literature (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002), where capital inflows produce unambigu-
ous convergence effects. The dynamics of the technological gap are given by:
g ∗

> 0⇒−σ1G−σ2G 2 (1−θ )c"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1 
+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

> 0 Divergence Effect
= 0⇒−σ1G−σ2G 2 (1−θ )c"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1 
+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

= 0 Neutral Effect
< 0⇒−σ1G−σ2G 2 (1−θ )c"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1 
+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

< 0 Convergence Effect
Note that the effects of capital inflows are weighted by the size of the initial technological
gap. This implies that both the positive and negative effects of capital inflows are lower when
the technological gap exceeds the critical point (σ1−2σ2G ).
When all assumptions are relaxed, the rate of growth of the technological gap depends on
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the following conditions:
g ∗

> 0⇒(ρ f −ρh )+z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

−

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1−θ )c
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

> 0 Divergence Effect
= 0⇒(ρ f −ρh )+z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

−

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1−θ )c
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

= 0 Neutral Effect
< 0⇒(ρ f −ρh )+z

λ f −

σ1G−σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

−

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1−θ )c
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

+

σ1G−σ2G 2

(1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2 c−pf )
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

< 0 Convergence Effect
2.3.1 Stability Analysis I
This section analyzes the stability of the equilibrium rate of growth of the technological gap,
when the T R and B P regimes intersect.
T R : yB P =
λ f z − g + (ρ f −ρh )
(σ1G −σ2G 2)
B P : yB P =
θ zβ + (1−θ )c + (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1
In yB P − g space, the T R and B P curves are downward sloping and stability requires that
the slope of the T R curve is steeper than the B P curve. Formally, the condition for stability is
given by (2.23a) and as noted in Blecker (2013), provided that there is not too much cumulative
causation, the system solves for a unique and stable equilibrium (Figure 2.2a).
−1
(σ1G −σ2G 2) >
(1+θα+γ)µ1
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.23a)
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The unstable equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.2b, where the T R curve is flatter than
the B P curve or the stability condition is not realized. Formally,
−1
(σ1G −σ2G 2) <
(1+θα+γ)µ1
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.23b)
In the comparative dynamic analyses that follow, this chapter assumes that a unique and
stable equilibrium exists and accordingly, rules out the possibility of an explosive technolog-
ical convergence or divergence between countries.
Figure 2.2: Stability Analysis I
(a) Stable Equilibrium
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2.3.2 Comparative Dynamics I
This section explores three comparative dynamics: 1. A positive demand shock, 2. A positive
shock to net capital inflows. and 3. A positive shock to the income elasticity of exports. The
relevant partials for g ∗ are shown below, where the mathematical expression (2.24a) shows
the ambiguous effects of an increase in z on the rate of change of the technological gap. The
mathematical expression (2.24b) presents similarly ambiguous results for an increase in c .
The mathematical relation in (2.24c) illustrates that the rate of growth of the technological
gap decreases as the income elasticity of exports (β ) increases.
g ∗z =

λ f −

σ1G −σ2G 2
 θβ
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

(2.24a)
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g ∗c =−

σ1G −σ2G 2
 (1−θ )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

+

σ1G −σ2G 2
 (1+θα+γ)(µ2)
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

(2.24b)
g ∗β =−

σ1G −σ2G 2
 θ
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1− (1+θα+γ)µ1

(2.24c)
These partials imply the following for the T R and B P regimes. The mathematical relations
in (2.25a) and (2.25b) demonstrate that the ambiguous results of g ∗z depend on the size of these
effects.
T Rz =
λ f
(σ1G −σ2G 2) (2.25a)
B Pz =
θβ
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.25b)
Similarly, recalling that (1+θα+γ)< 0, the partial derivative in (2.25c) illustrates the am-
biguous response of the B P regime to faster rates of growth of capital inflows. The relation in
(2.25d) shows the positive response of the B P regime to an increase in the income elasticity
of exports.
B Pc =
(1−θ ) + (1+θα+γ)µ2
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.25c)
B Pβ =
θ z
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.25d)
2.3.2.1 Positive Demand Shock
This section presents the comparative dynamic results for an exogenous increase in the for-
eign country’s rate of economic growth (z ). Per the partials in (2.25a) and (2.25b), both the
T R and B P regimes shift to the right, indicating an unambiguous increase in the balance
of payments constrained growth rate. However, there are ambiguous effects on the rate of
change of the technological gap. Figure 2.3a illustrates the case where the Kaldor-Verdoorn
effect dominates the weighted Thirlwall effect, hence, technological divergence. Consider the
initial equilibrium of yB P 0 − g0 associated with the T R0 − B P0 regimes. A positive shock to
the growth rate of external demand produces the equilibrium solution of yB P 1−g1 associated
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with the T R1 − B P1 regimes. It is obvious that a positive shock to z increases the balance of
payments constrained growth rate from yB P 0 to yB P 1. However, an acceleration in yB P is in-
sufficient to close the technological gap. In fact, the comparative dynamic results show that a
faster rate of economic growth in the foreign country accelerates the rate of growth of the tech-
nological gap from g0 to g1. While faster output growth in the foreign country increases the
rate of technological progress in the home country through its weighted Thirlwall’s Law, tech-
nological progress grows faster in the foreign country because of its higher Kaldor-Verdoorn
coefficient. This result has significant implications for members of Economic and Monetary
Unions and regional groupings that aspire to deeper economic integration.
Figure 2.3: Growth in External Demand
(a) Technological Divergence
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(b) Technological Convergence
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Growth with technological divergence is more likely when the initial technological gap ex-
ceeds the critical point of σ1 − 2σ2G . It follows that a necessary condition for convergence
in growth and technological capabilities is that members or potential members of an EMU
must pass the litmus test of the maximum distance from the frontier country, as defined by
σ1−2σ2G . This comparative dynamic result also urges a rethink of the conception of conver-
gence. The established view is that convergence requires faster rates of economic growth in
the laggard economy, so that living standards can converge between core and periphery. For
this reason, external imbalances and capital inflows are necessary conditions for convergence,
whether at the level of an EMU or the world economy (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). But
this approach to convergence omits the historical evidence that no core or developed econ-
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omy improved its standard of living without building technological capabilities.17 This chap-
ter takes the view that convergence should mean the reduction of technological capabilities
among participating countries, whether within an EMU or at the level of the world economy.
The result of economic growth with technological divergence also adds an interesting wrin-
kle to the policy recommendation of coordinated fiscal expansion at the level of the world
economy, regional groupings and/or two-country settings with extensive trade linkages (Hein
and Truger 2012; McCombie 1993). For example, in the case of the Eurozone, several scholars
recommend expansionary fiscal policy in the Eurozone core (Germany) as a means to acti-
vate a Eurozone recovery (Hein and Truger 2017; Stockhammer et al. 2015; Stockhammer and
Onaran 2012). The results presented here add support to this Keynesian policy package but
also demonstrates how an economic recovery can be underpinned by a widening of the tech-
nological gap. It follows that the policy package must be one where Keynes meets Schumpeter
(Dosi et al. 2010)—demand management in conjunction with industrial and technology pol-
icy.
In Figure 2.3b, the comparative dynamic results show that convergence in economic growth
and technological capabilities are possible when the weighted Thirwall effect dominates the
Kaldor-Verdoorn effect. Such a scenario is possible if the technological gap between the home
and the foreign country is at or below the critical level of σ1 − 2σ2G . This implies that tech-
nological spillovers from the frontier economy is maximized and that the home country has
adequate absorptive capabilities to utilize these spillovers. In other words, these are the con-
ditions for technological convergence.
The principal insight here is that asymmetric integration without any compensating tech-
nology policy at the country and/or community level can engender significant forces of tech-
nological divergence if the degree of technological asymmetry exceeds a critical threshold.
This finding is robust even if the laggard economy benefits from strong growth in external
demand.
2.3.2.2 Positive Shock to the Income Elasticity of Exports
This section presents the comparative dynamic results of a positive shock to the home coun-
try’s income elasticity of export demand (β ). Consider Figure 2.4 where the initial equilibrium
associated with T R0 − B P0 is yB P 0 − g0. A positive shock to β shifts the B P0 regime upwards
17See Reinert (2008) and Reinert (1995) for an excellent survey on the economic history of technology policy
and the role it played in improving living standards since the renaissance.
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to B P1, per the mathematical expression (2.25dc). This results in economic growth—yB P 0 in-
creases to yB P 1—and technological convergence—g0 decreases to g1. This finding demon-
strates that growth and technological convergence is possible if the source of faster balance of
payments constrained growth is technological change.18 The key implication of this finding
is that technology policy in laggard economies can serve as effective regional cohesion poli-
cies when a technological gap is binding among participating countries. This result provides
strong justification for Regional Systems of Innovation, which focus on technological upgrad-
ing in laggard economies that participate in regional groupings, say, an EMU.19
Figure 2.4: Income Elasticity of Export Demand
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2.3.2.3 Positive Shock to Net Capital Inflows
In this section, the author presents the ambiguous effects of net capital inflows on the bal-
ance of payments constrained growth rate and the evolution of the technological gap. To being
with, consider the case where a positive shock to the rate of growth of capital inflows increases
18 Numerous studies have empirically verified that technological change increases non-price competitiveness
as measured by the foreign trade elasticities (Gouvea and Lima 2010; Romero and McCombie 2016b; 2018; Cimoli
et al. 2010; Martins Neto and Porcile 2017).
19A Regional System of Innovation is a territorially embedded institutional infrastructure and production sys-
tem that creates and diffuses knowledge across a specified territory. See Doloreux (2002) for a discussion of this
concept.
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the home country’s balance of payments constrained growth rate, Figure 2.5a. The initial equi-
librium solution of yB P 0−g0 is associated with T R0−B P0. As c increases, the B P0 regime shifts
to the right and a new equilibrium solution of yB P 1−g1 is derived at T R0−B P1. These results
show the case of a higher balance of payments constrained growth rate and technological con-
vergence, as g0 decreases to g1. It can be inferred that faster rates of capital inflows produce
unambiguous convergence effects. This is the case that numerous scholars have within their
analytical frame and why many regard external imbalances and faster rates of growth in lag-
gard economies as non-problematic.20 However, this chapter argues that this result hinges on
at least two conditions: 1. A small technological gap between frontier and laggard economy
and 2. The home country is a learning society with sufficient absorptive capabilities. Un-
der these conditions, technological catch-up is observed and external imbalances are simply
transitory.
Figure 2.5: Net Capital Inflows
(a) Positive Effect on the B P Regime
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(b) Negative Effect on the B P Regime
 
TR0
 BP1
 yBP
 g g1
 yBP1
 yBP0
 g0
 BP0
Now consider Figure 2.5b, the case where faster rates of growth of capital inflows reduce
yB P . The initial equilibrium solution is yB P 0 − g0 at T R0 − B P0. An exogenous increase in c
shifts the B P regime from B P0 to B P1 and produces absolute divergence, in the sense of faster
rates of technological divergence (g1) and a lower balance of payments constrained growth
rate (yB P 1). In this model, faster rates of capital inflows reduce the technological complexity
20For an example, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002).
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of commodities and the rate of growth of labour productivity, which undermine cost com-
petitiveness. The corresponding decline in the balance of payments constrained growth rate
increases the rate of growth of the technological gap. It follows that external imbalances be-
tween countries with significant technological gaps, can produce a medium-run divergence
in technological capabilities and economic performance. As explained earlier, this result is
more likely when the home country has poor learning capacities and/or the initial technolog-
ical gap exceeds the critical point that maximizes technological spillovers.
There are strong evidence in the case of the Eurozone to support the comparative dynamic
results presented here. Several empirical studies show that the Eurozone periphery has lost
value added share in medium- and high-technology exports since the introduction of the Euro
(Storm and Naastepad 2015b; Botta 2014; Simonazzi et al. 2013; Reinstaller et al. 2012). Fur-
ther, Storm and Naastepad (2015b) draw a clear causal link between rapid capital inflows to-
ward the periphery and the deterioration of their production structures. Moreover, in a se-
ries of publications, Reinert and his co-authors contend that the European crisis can only be
properly understood in the context of dramatic deindustrialization of the periphery, a direct
consequence of abandoning the previous strategy of symmetrical integration based on Lis-
tian21 principles (Reinert and Kattel 2019; Reinert 2019; Reinert and Kattel 2014). To the best
of the author’s knowledge, this is the first time these ideas are formalized.
2.4 Aggregate Demand Growth Rate
This section derives the growth rate of aggregate demand to analyze how capital inflows affect
the dynamics of the technological gap and economic growth in different demand regimes. To
derive the aggregate demand growth rate (yA D ), consider the standard macroeconomic rela-
tionship in the absence of government, where C , I and B are consumption, investment and
net exports respectively.
Y =C + I +B (2.26)
Let consumption demand be defined as
21Reinert (2019) emphasizes three Listian principles: 1. The preconditions for wealth, democracy and political
freedom are based on a diversified manufacturing sector subject to increasing returns, 2. A nation first industri-
alizes and is then gradually integrated into nations at the same level of development and 3. Economic welfare is
a result of synergy—infrastructure, education and science.
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C =C0(ωY )
δ1(ΠY )δ2 (2.27)
where C0 is a constant andω andΠ are the wage and profit share respectively. The parame-
tersδ1 andδ2 are the wage and profit share elasticities of consumption demand. It is assumed
that workers do not save so thatδ1 = 1 but capitalists do save a fraction of their income, which
implies that 0<δ2 < 1.
In growth rate form:
c =δ1(ωˆ+ y ) +δ2(pi+ y ) (2.28)
Recall that U LC =W /a =ω, so that ul c = ωˆ. Also, the rate of growth of the profit share is
given by: pi=−κul c , whereκ=U LC /1−U LC > 0.22 Substitution into Equation (2.28) yields:
c =δ1(ul c + y ) +δ2(−κul c + y ) (2.29)
Investment demand is modeled as a function of both demand and profit share, consistent
with the approaches of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Dutt (1984). Following Blecker (2002),
it assumes the following functional form:
I = I0(Γ
η1Πη2 Y η3) (2.30)
where I0 is a constant and Γ represents animal spirits. The parameters η1, η2 and η3 are
the elasticity of investment with respect to animal spirits, profit share and income (demand).
In growth rate form and after the substitution of pi=−κul c , yields:
Iˆ =η1Γˆ−η2κul c +η3 y (2.31)
Given that B = X −M and in rates of change, b = x −m . Recall:
x =α(ph −pf ) +β z
m = γ(pf −ph ) + "y
Thus, b yields:
221=Π+U LC → 0=pi ΠΠ+U LC +ul c U LCΠ+U LC →pi=−ul c U LCΠ+U LC Π+U LCΠ =− U LC1−U LC ul c =−κul c .
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b = (α+γ)(ph −pf ) +β z − "y (2.32)
Recall that ul c = ph and after substitution yields:
b = (α+γ)(ul c −pf ) +β z − "y (2.33)
The goods market equilibrium condition is given by:
Y =C + I +B
and in growth rate form:
y =ΦC c +ΦI Iˆ +ΦB b (2.34)
where Φi (i = C , I , B ) denotes the income share of each aggregate demand component.
Substitution of Equations (2.29), (2.31) and (2.33) into Equation (2.34), yields the rate of growth
consistent with goods market equilibrium.
yA D =
ΦC
 
ul c −δ2κul c +ΦI (η1Γˆ−η2κul c ) +ΦB (α+γ)(ul c −pf ) +β z 
1−ΦC (1+δ2)−ΦIη3+ΦB" (2.35)
It order to understand the workings of the goods market equilibrium and the dynamics that
follow, it maybe helpful to consider the partial effect of ul c on the rate of growth of aggregate
demand.
yA D u l c =
ΦC (1−δ2κ)−ΦIη2κ+ΦB (α+γ)
1−ΦC (1+δ2)−ΦIη3+ΦB" (2.36)
The partial derivative yA D u l c says that a rise in the rate of growth of unit labour cost has
ambiguous effects on the growth rate of aggregate demand (recall thatα+γ< 0). This standard
result produces either a wage-led or profit-led demand regime (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990).
When yA D u l c > 0, the demand regime is considered to be wage-led, while a profit-led demand
regime emerges when yA D u l c < 0. The basic intuition is that as the growth rate of unit labour
cost rises, consumption demand increases at the expense of investment and net export de-
mand and the corresponding net effect on demand growth depends on the relative strength
of these effects.
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Recall:
ul c = ph = ν0+ν1 y −µ0+µ1g +µ2c
and after substitution into Equation (2.35) derives the extended aggregate demand growth
rate:
yA D =
q0+q1g +q2c
1+ΦC (δ2κν1−ν1−δ2−1) +ΦI (η2κν1−η3) +ΦB ("− (α+γ)ν1) (2.37)
where q0 =ΦC (ν0−µ0)+ΦCδ2κ(−ν0+µ0)+ΦIη1Γˆ+ΦIη2κ(−ν0+µ0)+ΦB [(α+γ)(ν0−µ0−pf )+
β z ]; q1 = (ΦCµ1−ΦCδ2κµ1−ΦIη2κµ1+ΦBµ1); q2 = ΦCµ2−ΦCδ2κµ2−ΦIη2κµ2+ΦBµ2. Con-
sistent with the partial yA D u l c , partials yA D g and yA D c produce ambiguous results depending
on the demand regime.
2.5 Equilibirum II
Given the derivation of the growth rate of aggregate demand and the T R and B P regimes, a
system of three Equations is formed and are reproduced below. Equations (2.38a) and (2.38b)
are the familiar technology and balance of payments regimes. Equation (2.38c) shows the
aggregate demand regime (AD ), the growth rate of aggregate demand consistent with goods
market equilibrium. In other words, yA D illustrates the short-run growth rate.
T R : yB P =
λ f z − g + (ρ f −ρh )
(σ1G −σ2G 2) (2.38a)
B P : yB P =
θ zβ + (1−θ )c + (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ1g +µ2c −pf )
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.38b)
AD : yA D =
q0+q1g +q2c
1+ΦC (δ2κν1−ν1−δ2−1) +ΦI (η2κν1−η3) +ΦB ("− (α+γ)ν1) (2.38c)
Equating Equations (2.38a), (2.38b) and (2.38c) yields the equilibrium rate of growth of the
technological gap (g ∗∗):
g ∗∗ = D H −q0−q2c
q1
(2.38d)
where D = (ρ f −ρh ) + z

λ f −

σ1G −σ2G 2

θβ
"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1

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−σ1G−σ2G 2 (1−θ )c"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1 +σ1G−σ2G 2 (1+θα+γ)(ν0−µ0+µ2c−pf )"−(1+θα+γ)ν1−(1+θα+γ)µ1 and H = 1+ΦC (δ2κν1−
ν1−δ2−1) +ΦI (η2κν1−η3) +ΦB ("− (α+γ)ν1.
2.5.1 Stability Analysis II
This section analyzes the stability of the equilibrium rate of growth of the technological gap
(g ∗∗), when the T R , B P and AD regimes intersect. The mathematical expression in (2.39)
shows that the partial yA D g is ambiguous, it follows that the slope of the AD curve depends
on the demand regime.
yA D g =
(ΦCµ1−ΦCδ2κµ1−ΦIη2κµ1+ΦBµ1)
1+ΦC (δ2κν1−ν1−δ2−1) +ΦI (η2κν1−η3) +ΦB ("− (α+γ)ν1) (2.39)
As the rate of growth of the technological gap increases, productivity growth declines (Equa-
tion 2.18) and the rate of growth of unit labour cost rises, per Equation (2.19). If the growth rate
of AD increases (yA D g > 0), then the demand regime is wage-led and the AD curve is upward
sloping in y − g space. However, if the growth rate of aggregate demand falls as g increases
(yA D g < 0), then the demand regime is profit-led and the AD curve is negatively sloped in y −g
space.
The stability of the equilibrium in both wage-led and profit-led demand regimes is illus-
trated in Figure 2.6, under the assumption that −1/(σ1G −σ2G 2)> 1+θα+γ)µ1/"− (1+θα+
γ)ν1 or the T R regime is steeper than the B P regime. It is transparent that the equilibrium in
the wage-led demand regime in Figure 2.6a is a saddle point and thus, unstable. However, the
equilibrium rate of growth of the technological gap is stable in the profit-led demand regime
(Figure 2.6b).
The comparative dynamic analyses that follow focus exclusively on the partial effects of
an increase in the rate of growth of capital inflows. The corresponding partials for the B P and
AD regimes are shown below. As explained earlier, the growth rate of capital inflows has am-
biguous effects on yB P (2.40a)—recall that (1+θα+γ)< 0—and as shown in (2.40b), the same
holds for the growth rate of aggregate demand. This ambiguous result is driven by the dif-
ferent demand regimes. The precise mechanisms relate to Equations (2.18) and (2.19), where
faster rates of capital inflows reduce productivity growth and increase the rate of growth of unit
labour cost. When yA D c > 0, the demand regime is wage-led and the growth rate of aggregate
demand increases when c accelerates. Conversely, if yA D c < 0, then the demand regime is
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Figure 2.6: Stability Analysis II
(a) Unstable Equilibrium: Wage-led Demand
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profit-led and the short-run rate of growth declines as c increases.
yB P c =
(1−θ ) + (1+θα+γ)µ2
"− (1+θα+γ)ν1 (2.40a)
yA D c =
ΦCµ2−ΦCδ2κµ2−ΦIη2κµ2+ΦBµ2
1+ΦC (δ2κν1−ν1−δ2−1) +ΦI (η2κν1−η3) +ΦB ("− (α+γ)ν1) (2.40b)
2.5.2 Comparative Dynamics II
2.5.2.1 Capital Inflows in a Wage-led Demand Regime
In this section the chapter analyzes how an increase in the rate of growth of capital inflows
affects both short- and medium-run economic growth and the rate of change of the techno-
logical gap in a wage-led demand regime. Consider Figure 2.7a, where it is assumed that a
faster rate of capital inflow increases the balance of payments constrained growth rate. The
initial equilibrium solution of y0− go is given by the T R0−B P0−AD0 regimes. An exogenous
increase in c shifts B P0 upwards to B P1 and simultaneously shifts the AD regime from AD0 to
AD1. The results show that faster rates of capital inflow increase both the short- and medium-
run rates of economic growth and promote technological convergence. These comparative
dynamic results are similar to the findings in section 2.3.2 when capital inflows increase yB P .
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However, the results presented here also demonstrate that a faster rate of capital inflow in-
creases the home country’s short-run growth rate when its demand regime is wage-led. This
case best illustrates the convergence hypothesis that the laggard economy with scarce capital
and relatively high marginal returns, attracts capital inflows and converges to the frontier. It
is important to emphasize that this result hinges on the singular condition that the techno-
logical gap between the laggard and the frontier economy does not exceed the critical value of
σ1−2σ2G . This condition places the laggard economy on its saddle path to produce a stable
equilibrium. In plain terms, faster rates of capital inflows only increase the balance of pay-
ments constrained growth rate when the technological gap is within its convergence range. If
this condition is not met, the equilibrium outcome is unstable and the rate of technological
divergence accelerates until a crisis emerges.
Figure 2.7: Net Capital Inflows in a Wage-Led Demand Regime
(a) Positive Effect on the B P Regime
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(b) Negative Effect on the B P Regime
 
TR0
 BP0
 y
 g g1
 y0
 y1
 g0
 AD0
 AD1
 BP1
 y2
 g2
 AD1
′
In Figure 2.7b, where an acceleration in the rate of growth of capital inflow reduces yB P , the
results differ. Consider the initial equilibrium solution of y0−g0 associated with the T R0−B P0−
AD0 regimes. An exogenous increase in c increases aggregate demand from AD0 to AD1 but
the B P regime shifts downwards from B P0 to B P1. It is transparent that faster rates of capital
inflow increase the growth rate of aggregate demand from y0 to y1 but reduce the balance of
payments constrained growth rate from y0 to y2. Given the contraction in yB P , the rate of
growth of the technological gap increases from g0 to g1. This in turn reduces productivity
growth and increases the rate of growth of unit labour cost. It follows that the growth rate
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of aggregate demand increases and moves further away from the medium-run equilibrium
solution of y2−g2 associated with the T R0−B P1 regimes. No stable adjustment process exists
and the ever increasing unit labour cost and demand growth can only be arrested by way of
a financial crisis, e.g. when concerns about debt sustainability increase and animal spirits
in financial markets wane. The standard consequences of a sudden stop are contraction in
aggregate demand and economic growth but as these results illustrate, an additional levy is
imposed by way of a widening of the technological gap. Such a result can be illustrated by a
collapse in the AD regime from AD1 to AD1
′.
One implication of these comparative dynamic results is that rapid output growth in the
short-run can provide a false impression of convergence. The results presented here make
the case that the relevant growth rate for convergence is the balance of payments constrained
growth rate. Further, the results from Figure 2.7b aptly illustrate the dynamics of the Eurozone
crisis. Rapid capital flows toward the Eurozone periphery led to significant growth in aggre-
gate demand and unit labour cost, a deterioration in their production structures and a rise
in external imbalances that eventually ended in a sudden stop of capital inflows (Storm and
Naastepad 2015b). The corresponding contraction in actual growth rates has led to economic
stagnation and as Figure 2.7b shows, the Eurozone periphery pays an additional cost in terms
of a widening of the technological gap.
2.5.2.2 Capital Inflows in a Profit-led Demand Regime
In this section the author analyzes how an increase in the rate of growth of capital inflow af-
fects economic growth and the rate of change of the technological gap in a profit-led demand
regime. In Figure 2.8a, consider the initial equilibrium solution of y0 − g0, where faster rates
of growth of capital inflow increase yB P . An exogenous increase in c shifts the B P regime up-
wards from B P0 to B P1 but contracts demand growth from AD0 to AD1. The results show that
faster rates of capital inflow produce short-run contractionary effects in a profit-led demand
regime but increase the balance of payments constrained growth rate. The lower short-run
output growth of y2 must eventually adjust to the higher balance of payments constrained
growth rate of y1. The adjustment process is as follows. As c increases yB P , technological
convergence accelerates through the weighted Thirlwall effect and in turn, increases and re-
duces the growth rate of productivity and unit labour cost respectively. The higher profit share
boosts the growth rates of investment and net external demand and consequently, increases
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the growth rate of aggregate demand. These adjustments take place until the new equilibrium
is reached with a higher output growth of y1 and a lower rate of technological divergence (g1)
at the T R0−B P1−AD1′ regimes. According to these findings, faster rates of capital inflows do
not unambiguously increase the growth rate of aggregate demand in the short-term—demand
regimes matter. Notwithstanding a short-period contraction, if faster rates of capital inflows
relax the balance of payments constraint, economies with profit-led demand regimes can ex-
perience faster output growth and technological convergence. As noted earlier, this result
requires that the technological gap between the laggard and the frontier economy does not
exceed the critical value ofσ1−2σ2G .
Figure 2.8: Net Capital Inflows in a Profit-Led Demand Regime
(a) Positive Effect on the B P Regime
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(b) Negative Effect on the B P Regime
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Now consider the initial equilibrium solution of y0−g0 in Figure 2.8b, where faster rates of
capital inflow reduce the balance of payments constrained growth rate. This implies that the
technological gap between the laggard and the frontier economy exceeds the critical value
of σ1 − 2σ2G . An exogenous increase in c contracts both the AD and B P regimes, which
reduce output growth from y0 to y1 and increase the growth rate of the technological gap
from g0 to g1. It follows that faster rates of capital inflow produce medium-run divergence in
economic performance and technological capabilities, when capital inflows deteriorate pro-
duction structures in profit-led demand regimes. In this case, the short-run contraction be-
comes a medium-period stagnation and through lower induced technical change, engenders
a widening of the technological gap. These comparative dynamic results are in stark contrast
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to the case in Figure 2.7b, where the divergence in technological capabilities is temporarily
buttressed by a short-run economic boom. Therefore, demand regimes matter for how lag-
gard economies transition to a growth path with a faster rate of technological divergence.
2.6 Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature on technological gaps and balance of payments con-
strained growth by developing a theoretical framework to account for the ambiguous effects of
capital inflows on demand and balance of payments constrained growth. The model shows
that when a technological gap exists between two countries in an Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) and it exceeds a critical threshold, capital flows toward the technological laggard
deteriorate its production structure and reduce its balance of payments constrained growth
rate. However, these results are reversed when the technological gap between countries falls
within a convergence range. Capital flows are consequential to the catching-up process be-
cause the evolution of the technological gap depends on the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect.
It is noteworthy that the theoretical model relaxes the dichotomy of cost and non-cost
competitiveness by illustrating the adverse effects capital inflows may have on a country’s
production structure. The chapter makes the case that changes in non-cost competitiveness
due to production transformation, alter the rate of productivity growth and correspondingly,
the growth rate of unit labour cost or cost competitiveness. It follows that cost and non-cost
competitiveness are more complementary than traditionally understood.
The multitude of results obtained from the model contribute to the literature by illustrat-
ing the various conditions under which capital inflows can engender short-run booms and
busts and technological convergence and divergence. The chapter demonstrates that capital
inflows can produce a short-run economic boom in wage-led demand regimes but medium-
run contraction and technological divergence when capital inflows deteriorate the production
structure. However, when the initial technological gap is small and the laggard economy has
sufficient absorptive capabilities, capital inflows relax the balance of payments constraint and
promote convergence in technological capabilities and economic performance. But these re-
sults differ in profit-led demand regimes. When a significant technological gap exists and the
demand regime is profit-led, capital inflows lead to stagnation in both the short- and medium-
term and simultaneously widen the technological gap. In the case of a small technological gap,
capital inflows only produce a short-run contraction, in the medium-term, economic perfor-
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mance improves and the rate of growth of technological convergence increases. These varying
results show that demand regimes determine the response of short-run growth but whether a
laggard economy converges to or diverges from the frontier country, depends on how capital
inflows influence its balance of payments constrained growth rate.
These findings have significant implications for EMUs and other regional groupings that
aspire to deeper economic integration. First, the initial size of the technological gap between
frontier and laggard economy is the principal determinant of whether closer economic inte-
gration promotes convergence or divergence. It follows that potential members of EMUs must
pass the litmus test that specifies the maximum distance a member country can be from the
frontier economy. This approach to integration limits the possibility of technological polariza-
tion and therefore, maintains community cohesion. Second, the analytical results show that
expansionary policy in the frontier country is inadequate to promote technological conver-
gence when the initial technological gap is significant. Only technology policy in the laggard
economy can promote technological convergence.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy, Distribution and BOP-Dominated Tech-
nological Change
3.1 Introduction
This chapter makes the case that five conditions are sufficient to produce technological polar-
ization between members of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). First, a technological
gap must exist between countries, second, the laggard economy must have a more unequal
distribution of income, third, there must be no fiscal union that governs the EMU, fourth, the
laggard economy lacks a domestic capital goods producing sector and finally, a higher wage
share must reduce the rate of technological progress. When these conditions hold, this chap-
ter formally demonstrates that the growth-equality tradeoff is binding for the technological
laggard (Kuznets 1955; Scully 1991; Okun 1975; Kaldor 1957; Mirrless 1971). A newly emerging
consensus (Stiglitz 2013; Piketty 2014; Berg et al. 2018; Cingano 2014) challenges this conven-
tional notion that there is a growth-equality tradeoff. It has since become fashionable to talk in
terms of inclusive growth and progressive taxation is now on the policy agenda in many coun-
tries. To demonstrate the power of the newly emerging consensus, reducing inequality within
and between countries, is now one of the United Nations’ sustainable development goals. This
chapter thus contributes to the literature on convergence and divergence in regional group-
ings and EMUs but also the wider literature on economic growth and distribution.
It is well established in the balance of payments constrained growth literature that non-
price competitiveness—the ratio of foreign trade elasticities—is a deep determinant of long-
run growth (Thirlwall 2011). In a two-country model with a common currency—an EMU—this
chapter endogenizes non-price competitiveness for the laggard economy—the home coun-
try. It demonstrates that income distribution and public investment in learning and key in-
frastructure are the driving forces of technological change and non-price competitiveness.
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Though income distribution has ambiguous effects on the rate of technological change, the
model presents a novel mechanism by which lower inequality can reduce long-term growth.
A higher wage share can undermine non-price competitiveness as it lowers the share of im-
ported capital goods in total imports. These are important for technological change in the
laggard economy, which lacks a domestic capital goods producing sector. It follows that fis-
cal redistribution increases the weighted average of income elasticity of import demand and
consequently, reduces the long-run growth rate. The precise mechanism relates to a higher
wage share, lower rate of technological progress and lower balance of payments constrained
growth rate. The growth-equality tradeoff is still binding for laggard economies. However, a
virtuous cycle between lower income inequality and convergence is possible but only for the
least developed laggard economies. The conditions for such an outcome are stricter. Only
when the laggard has unequal access to and poor quality schooling and health care facilities
that lower income inequality can enhance learning and technological change. As the laggard
exceeds a threshold level of poverty, the tradeoff emerges.
On account of the earlier assumptions and the channels through which distribution mat-
ters for technological change, the model is applicable to particularly small open economies or
larger open economies with limited capacity to produce its own capital goods. For example,
small island states in Europe, the Pacific and Caribbean. In these economies, technological
change relies on emulation and adaptation of imported technologies and capital goods. Un-
like the literature that show how higher wage shares reduce profits, R&D expenditure and tech-
nological change (Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Missio and Jayme 2012; Fiorillo 2001),
this chapter identifies how a higher wage share can increase the share of imported consumer
goods at the expense of imported capital goods. In these economies, R&D at the firm-level is
less important as compared to firm-level reverse engineering, which rely on imported capi-
tal goods and the National System of Innovation. It follows that countries with initially high
income inequality, conspicuous consumption of imported consumer goods and low quality
domestic output, face a sharp tradeoff between distribution and economic growth.
One important contribution of this chapter is that it presents these insights in a dynami-
cally stable model of an economy with a low wage share and a high technological gap. Other
works find vicious or virtuous cycles of growth and distribution depending on the unstable
comparative dynamics (Ribeiro et al. 2016; Martins Neto 2017). The finding of a growth-equality
tradeoff is not new but this chapter does present the new channels of technological diver-
gence and increases in the income elasticity of imports. Other works argue for the trade-
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off through an efficiency channel (Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky 2007; Muinelo-Gallo and
Roca-Sagales 2011; 2013; Okun 1975) or the price competitiveness mechanism, associated
with Blecker (1989) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). In the case of the latter mechanism,
higher wage shares reduce international price competitiveness and economic growth. But in
laggard economies that export a handful of commodities or a low quality consumer good in
the case of this chapter, domestic income distribution does not influence world prices. In
terms of the efficiency channel, higher taxes for redistribution present distortionary effects
that reduce economic growth. In this chapter, fiscal redistribution is not undertaken through
higher taxes, rather, a reallocation of funds from public investment, so these distortionary
effects do not arise.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on the demand determinants of trade flows
(Adam et al. 2011; Flam and Helpman 1987; Bekkers et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2009; Dalgin et al.
2008; Mitra and Trindade 2005; Hunter 1991). These scholars show theoretically and empir-
ically that lower inequality reduces the demand for imports. The key argument is that as in-
equality falls, the demand for imported luxury goods declines and consumption switches to
domestic production. Much of the empirical literature is confined to developed countries and
emerging markets where domestic production is a quality variant of imported goods. The as-
sumption of switching to domestic production—a quality variant of imported goods—makes
these insights less applicable to the laggard economies the author has in mind, where do-
mestic production and imported consumer goods are imperfect substitutes. Moreover, the
model’s assumption that the laggard economy has a more unequal distribution of income,
allows for the likelihood of conspicuous consumption. Unlike the literature just cited, con-
spicuous consumption allows for increases in demand for imported consumer durables as
inequality falls (Ray and Vatan 2013).
The chapter also makes the case that the tradeoff is partly imposed by design. In this chap-
ter, the economic policy framework of the EMU imposes stringent limits on debt and deficits
without any compensatory mechanisms like a fiscal union or union-wide cohesion or tech-
nology policy. Given this straitjacket of an economic policy framework, laggard economies are
promised the tale of convergence but experience technological divergence that undermine
long-run growth. The central policy implication, whether at the level of an EMU or world
economy, is that a union-wide technology policy is required to promote economic conver-
gence. For example, the big tradeoff becomes less binding if the EMU or world organiza-
tions provide for investments in technological innovation and emulation that assist laggard
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economies in the catching-up process.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical
model and section 3.3 presents the comparative dynamic results. Finally, section 3.4 con-
cludes.
3.2 Model
Assume that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) consists of two countries: a techno-
logically advanced foreign country and a technological laggard, the home country. An inde-
pendent central bank issues the common currency and there is no fiscal union. Each country
is obligated by treaty to maintain balanced fiscal accounts and observe both debt and deficit
limits.
Given these rules, neither country competes on its tax rate and even if this assumption is
relaxed, it is assumed that the race to the bottom holds; so that neither country can gain a
competitive advantage by reducing its rate of taxation. Similarly, if one country attempts to
raise public revenue by increasing its tax rate, it does injury to its public purse as capital can
move freely to the jurisdiction with a lower tax rate. In short, the rates of taxation are given and
assumed to be the same between countries. The key implication of this fiscal framework—
the absence of a fiscal union and strong limits on debt and deficits—is that under certain
conditions, there are hard tradeoffs to fiscal expenditure at the level of member states.
There are three agents in this model, capitalists who save a fraction of their profits, work-
ers who consume all wage income and government that decides how to allocate its resources
among competing demands. This chapter brings into focus two demands:
• Technological convergence
• Reducing inequality.
It is assumed that the technological laggard—the home country—has a more unequal dis-
tribution of income as compared to the technological leader. In this chapter, the model fo-
cuses on the functional income distribution, i.e. the distribution of wages and profits in na-
tional income.
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3.2.1 Extended Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model
The home country is a one-sector economy that produces and exports one sort of consump-
tion good. By implication of the technological gap, the consumption good is of compara-
tively lower technological-intensity. The foreign country is a two-sector economy that pro-
duces and exports industrial consumption and capital goods. As such, the home country’s
import demand can be divided into the categories of consumption (M c ) and capital goods
(M i ). Crucially, M c and the home country’s consumption good are imperfect substitutes and
both capitalists and workers consume domestic and foreign goods. Given the assumption of
higher income inequality in the home country, it is plausible to assume that the richer class—
capitalist class—conspicuously consumes the foreign good, which is of better quality. This
implies that the consumption of M c also signals social status and ergo, increases the working
class’ latent demand for the foreign consumer good.1 It is assumed that the home country
does not have a domestic capital goods producing sector, therefore, capital accumulation is
exclusively dependent on M i . This is a strong assumption but even in its weaker form, where
the technological laggard has a small capital goods sector, M i remains an important part of
capital formation. In this model, the strong assumption is maintained to operationalize the
promise of technological convergence, as membership in an EMU reduces the costs of M i
through the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.
Two homogeneous factors of production are used in the production process, imported
capital and labour (L), which are combined through a fixed-coefficient technology to produce
the consumer good (Y ).
Y =min (a L , b M i ) (3.1)
The corresponding productivity coefficients for labour and imported capital are a and
b respectively and the fixed-coefficient combination is determined by the existing stock of
knowledge. The latter determines the difference in input efficiencies independent of relative
factor prices and this implies that the elasticity of substitution between L and M i is zero. This
warrants a short discussion. Indeed, the empirical literature indicates that the elasticity of
substitution is greater than zero but less than one.2 For example, Rowthorn (1999) finds that
1Veblen (1994) notes that the rich consume goods and services to display their wealth and social status.
2For empirical evidence see Semieniuk (2017a), Leon-Ledesma et al. (2010), Chirinko (2008) and Rowthorn
(1999).
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the median elasticity of substitution is 0.58 for a selection of advanced countries near the tech-
nological frontier. But there are strong theoretical reasons why the elasticity is much closer to
zero for technological laggards. First, as noted by Piketty and Zucman (2014), capital has fewer
alternative uses in low-technology economies and this lowers the flexibility of capital-labour
substitution. Second, the imported capital may not be ideally suited for the production of the
domestic good and this reduces the elasticity of substitution. It follows that the appropriate-
ness of imported technology or capital is an important determinant of the substitutability of
capital for labour. Third, the low-technology nature of the domestic good may require specific
factor proportions in the production process and this also undermines the flexibility of sub-
stitution. Accordingly, the fixed-coefficient technology assumption captures the inappropri-
ateness of imported capital and the necessity of labour in given proportions in the production
process.
The export demand function is given by Equation (3.2), where Z represents income in the
foreign country and Ph and Pf are the level of prices in the home and the foreign country
respectively. The parameters α < 0 and β > 0 are the price and income elasticities of export
demand respectively.
X =
Ph
Pf
α
Z β (3.2)
In growth rate form:
x =α(ph −pf ) +β z (3.3)
Import demand assumes two specifications, where it is assumed in the interest of simplic-
ity that Pf = P if . This assumption implies that the prices of imported capital and consumer
goods are the same over time. The price elasticity of imported consumer and capital goods is
γ < 0 and Y represents the home country’s level of income. Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) show
that the income elasticity of demand for consumer and capital imports are "1 > 0 and "2 > 0
respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that "1 > "2. This assumption is uncontroversial since
one expects the demand for consumer imports to increase faster than capital imports when
aggregate income in the home country increases.
M c =
Pf
Ph
γ
Y "1 (3.4a)
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M i =
P if
Ph
γ
Y "2 (3.4b)
In growth rate form:
m c = γ(pf −ph ) + "1 y (3.5a)
m i = "2 y (3.5b)
The balance of payments identity is given by:
Ph X = Pf (M
c +M i ) (3.6)
and in rates of change:
ph + x = pf +θm
c + (1−θ )m i (3.7)
where θ = Pf M c /M ; (1−θ ) = P if M i/M and the restriction 0< θ < 1 holds. It is important
to note here that the import shares are not constant.
Substitution of Equations (3.3), (3.5a) and (3.5b) into (3.7) derives the home country’s bal-
ance of payments constrained growth (BPCG) rate.
yB P =
β z + (1+α+γ)(ph −pf )
θ"1+ (1−θ )"2 (3.8)
Equation (3.8) reproduces the standard result with the extension that the income elasticity
of import demand is a weighted average of the income elasticities of demand for imported
consumer and capital goods. It is noteworthy that changes in the distribution of import shares
affect the equilibrium growth rate. For example, an increase in θ—the share of consumer
imports in total imports—reduces the balance of payments constrained growth rate.
Assuming that (ph −pf ) = 0 or that relative costs are constant in the long-term, Thirlwall’s
Law is derived in Equation (3.9). Thirlwall (1979) explains that a country’s rate of economic
growth consistent with balance of payment equilibrium, is a positive function of the growth
of foreign demand and non-price competitive factors—the ratio of β/". Note that " is the
weighted average of income elasticities of import demand.
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yB P =
β
"
z (3.9)
3.2.2 Endogenizing the Trade Elasticities
This section endogenizes the ratio of foreign trade elasticities or non-price competitiveness
as a function of the inverted technological gap and income distribution. Define the inverted
technological gap (S ) as:
S = Th/Tf (3.10)
where Th and Tf are technological capabilities in the home and foreign country respec-
tively. Let β/" =Ψ so that:
yB P =
β z
"
=Ψz = (k0+k1S ±k2σL )z (3.11)
The positive formulation between Ψ and S relate to the basic hypothesis that an increase
in the home country’s technological capabilities—technological convergence to the frontier—
enhances its non-price competitiveness as measured by the ratio of trade elasticities.3 The
principal mechanism is that as the home country increases its technological capabilities, it
improves the quality of the consumer good it produces.4 This is in turn increases its income
elasticity of export demand and equilibrium growth rate. This formulation is consistent with
the literature. The consensus is that technological convergence between laggard and frontier
economy drives the foreign trade elasticities (Davila-Fernandez et al. 2018; Porcile and Spinola
2018; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Cimoli and Porcile 2014; Feijo and Lamonica 2013; Da Silva Catela and
Porcile 2012; Krugman 1989). For example, in an aggregate BPCG model,5 Ribeiro et al. (2016)
models the technological laggard as a one-sector economy that imports intermediate capital
3Numerous studies have empirically verified that technological change increases non-price competitiveness
as measured by the trade elasticities (Gouvea and Lima 2010; Romero and McCombie 2016b; 2018; Cimoli et al.
2010; Martins Neto and Porcile 2017).
4Fiorillo (2001), McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and Fagerberg (1988) argue that technological progress im-
proves product quality, while Krugman (1989) makes the case for product differentiation.
5Araujo and Lima (2007) derive Thirlwall’s Law using a multi-sectoral BPCG model. They show that the ag-
gregate ratio of foreign trade elasticities is simply the weighted average of sectoral elasticities, so that changes in
the sectoral composition of the economy can alter the weighted trade elasticities. See Romero and McCombie
(2016b), Gouvea and Lima (2013), Gouvea and Lima (2010) and Bagnai (2010) for empirical support of the multi-
sectoral Thirlwall’s Law. Since this chapter employs an aggregate BPCG model, it abstracts away the effects of
sectoral composition on the trade elasticities.
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goods and endogenizes its foreign trade elasticities as a positive function of the inverted tech-
nological gap. Ribeiro and his co-authors argue that as the laggard economy converges to the
technological frontier, it is better able to produce higher quality goods, which are associated
with higher income elasticities in export markets. In other formulations, particularly North-
South models, the income elasticity of exports is a positive function of economic complexity,6
in turn determined by the technological gap (Cimoli and Porcile 2014). These scholars posit
that specialization patterns are determined by relative technological capabilities and that in-
come elasticities of export vary by technological specialization. They argue that medium- to
high-technology commodities are associated with higher income elasticities as compared to
say, low-technology goods in the agricultural sector.
Consistent with the literature, a higher wage share (σL ) has ambiguous effects on the ratio
of trade elasticities and by extension, the balance of payments constrained growth rate. How-
ever, this chapter presents a new mechanism by which lower functional income inequality
can reduce non-price competitiveness. The hypothesis is that import demand can increase
independently of the level of income, so that the share of consumer imports to total imports
(θ ) is a positive function of the wage share. This implies that lower functional income in-
equality (higher wage share) increases the weighted average of the income elasticity of import
demand and correspondingly, reduces the ratio of foreign trade elasticities. This formula-
tion closely follows the earlier works of Thirlwall and Hughes (1979) and Thirlwall and White
(1974), which demonstrate that the tightness of the labour market—usually associated with
higher wage shares—increases the demand for imports. It follows that the income elastic-
ity of import demand increases when the labour constraint is binding. More recently, Pal-
ley (2003) endogenizes the income elasticity of import demand as an inverse function of ex-
cess capacity, which produces lower wage shares, so that capacity constraints or higher wage
shares reduce the ratio of foreign trade elasticities. Unlike these works, this model concretely
specifies the channel that lower functional income inequality increases the share of imported
consumer goods and by extension, the weighted average of income elasticities of import de-
mand. Moreover, recall the earlier assumption of conspicuous consumption—this strength-
ens the hypothesis that a higher wage share reduces the ratio of trade elasticities. To model
6See Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2007) for evidence that eco-
nomic complexity and diversification increase economic growth. The key mechanism is that at low (high) levels
of economic complexity and diversification, an economy’s marginal propensity to import is relatively high (low),
which produces a comparatively high (low) income elasticity of import demand and undermines (enhances)
non-price competitiveness (Garcimartin et al. 2012: pp. 199).
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the positive effects of the wage share on non-price competitiveness, the author follows Porcile
et al. (2007)’s formulation and posits that a higher wage share improves workers’ capacity to
learn and imitate foreign technologies, which in turn increases product quality and the ratio
of foreign trade elasticities. The precise mechanisms relate to better access to education and
health care (Ranis and Stewart 2002) and stronger motivations to work (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1989) and innovate. However, the positive effect of the wage share only holds up to a threshold
level, after which a higher wage share undermines non-price competitiveness. This is the in-
sight of Porcile et al. (2007)’s North-South model with a balance of payments constraint, where
real wages beyond a threshold level induces a profit squeeze and undermine product quality,
thereby, the balance of payments constrained growth rate.7 In this model, it is assumed that
the negative effect of the wage share emerges after some threshold level but unlike Porcile
et al. (2007), the negative effect is related to higher income elasticity of import demand rather
than a profit squeeze. In sum, the net effect of the wage share depends on two factors: 1. The
negative effect associated with θ and 2. The positive effect associated with workers’ enhanced
capacity to learn and imitate foreign technologies.
The literature identifies other mechanisms by which distribution affects the trade elas-
ticities. An influential channel relates to the profits-technology-income elasticity of exports
causal chain. For example, in a multi-sectoral BPCG model, Missio et al. (2017) demonstrate
that a currency devaluation reduces the wage share and increases firm-level profits, which
provide the necessary self-financing required for innovation and R&D expenditure. In turn,
these improve product quality and the weighted average of trade elasticities. But Ribeiro et al.
(2016) add an important note of caution to this linear channel. These scholars present a non-
linear relationship between technological change and the wage share in an aggregate BPCG
model.8 This modeling approach builds on the work of Lima (2004), who demonstrates that
too low or high wage shares reduce the rate of technological change. The key implication is
that devaluations only increase technological progress and the trade elasticities if the wage
share is initially high.
In recent work, Ribeiro et al. (2016) presents varying channels through which distribu-
7Unlike the formulation in this chapter, Porcile et al. (2007) do not endogenize the trade elasticities, rather,
technology enters as an argument in the export demand equation. Moreover, import demand is not disaggre-
gated into capital and consumer goods, so that the negative effect of the wage share as outlined in this chapter
is omitted.
8Note that Skott (2016) cautions the use of the wage share as an exogenous factor, given the known endoge-
nieties between growth and distribution.
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tion matters for non-price competitiveness. In their model, higher wage shares can induce
a capital substitution and allow for the production of capital-intensive goods (higher income
elasticity of exports), while lower wage shares can reduce the income elasticity of exports by
incentivizing capitalists to produce labour-intensive commodities. In the case of income elas-
ticity of imports, a higher wage share increases and decreases the demand for luxury imports
for workers and capitalists respectively. The net effect determines how changes in income
distribution affect the overall demand for luxury imports and by extension, the income elas-
ticity of imports.9 Notwithstanding the ambiguous effects of changes in the wage share on the
trade elasticities, Ribeiro et al. (2016) assume that a rising wage share has positive effects on
non-price competitiveness. These scholars place greater premium on the capital substitution
effects of an increase in the wage share. But given the assumption of a fixed-coefficient pro-
duction technology in this chapter, the capital substitution effects of a higher wage share are
weaker in the model presented here.
Other strands of the literature make the case that lower income inequality (higher wage
share) reduces the demand for luxury imports and by extension, increases the ratio of foreign
trade elasticities (Francois and Kaplan 1996). But this result hinges on the assumptions that
domestic and imported consumer goods are substitutes and that the working class does not
emulate the consumption pattern of the rich. Absent these conditions, as this chapter as-
sumes, lower income inequality can reduce the foreign trade elasticities and non-price com-
petitiveness.10
In short, the ratio of foreign trade elasticities are positively related to the inverted techno-
logical gap but ambiguously related to the wage share. To ascertain the effects of distributive
policy on the equilibrium growth rate, the dynamics and interaction of technological progress
and distribution must be anlayzed.
3.2.3 Technological Change
Assume that technological progress is labour-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) and a function
of the inverse of the technological gap, the wage share and the ratio of public investment
9It is not inevitable that rising demand for luxury imports increases the income elasticity of imports. This
requires that the foreign country alters the quality of its product or the structure of its production to meet the
new structure of demand.
10For empirical evidence that lower inequality contracts import demand, see Dalgin et al. (2008), Latzer and
Mayneris (2012) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and the following studies for evidence to the contrary (Thirlwall
and Hughes 1979; Thirlwall and White 1974; Martins Neto 2017).
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to GDP. In terms of Freeman and Perez (1988)’s taxonomy of technical change, technologi-
cal progress in the laggard economy is based on incremental innovation. This in turn pro-
duces improvements in the production process that enhance the quality of the consumption
good produced.11 Equation (3.12) says that the rate of technological progress—where S˙ is the
derivative of S with respect to time—is a negative function of the inverted technological gap,
ambiguously related to the wage share and directly related to the share of public investment in
total GDP. Government collects and spends the share (Φ) of total GDP and its budget is in bal-
ance, so that the tax burden corresponds to the share of public spending in aggregate demand.
Taxes are paid by capitalists on a lump sum basis and government allocates its spending be-
tween transfers to workers and public investment. The tax share used for redistributive and
investment purposes are δ and 1−δ respectively and assumed to be exogenous.
S˙ =ρ0+ρ1(1−δ)Φ±ρ2σL −ρ3S (3.12)
As the technological gap narrows, there are fewer opportunities for technological imitation
and adoption and weaker effects of knowledge spillovers and transfers, therefore, technologi-
cal change slows down with convergence (S ). This is the standard approach to modeling tech-
nical change and the technological gap (Cimoli and Porcile 2014). Moreover, Equation (3.12)
illustrates that a higher wage share produces both convergence and divergence effects. This
ambiguity emerges because of the following factors: 1. The negative effect associated with
θ and 2. The positive effect associated with workers’ enhanced capacity to learn and imitate
foreign technologies. The latter case is straightforward. Higher wage shares can increase the
rate of technological progress as it enhances workers’ learning abilities and capacity to bet-
ter utilize imported technologies. However, higher wage shares can also increase the share
of consumer imports in total imports and consequently, crowd out the importation of capital
goods, which are important for capital accumulation and technical change. This formula-
tion is unlike other approaches where the wage share acts as a proxy indicator of firms’ ability
to self-finance R&D activities.12 This chapter proposes that technological change in laggard
economies is less reliant on firm-level expenditure on R&D but more dependent on firm-level
modification and adaptation of imported technologies.
11Freeman and Perez (1988)’s taxonomy of technical change distinguishes among incremental innovation, rad-
ical technical change, new technological systems and techno-economic paradigms.
12See Missio et al. (2017), Ribeiro et al. (2016), Missio and Jayme (2012) and Fiorillo (2001) for theoretical mod-
els that specify a wage share-profits-technology channel.
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This linear modeling of technological progress and income distribution is unlike the non-
linear approaches associated with the works of Martins Neto (2017), Ribeiro et al. (2016) and
Lima (2004). Martins Neto (2017) and Ribeiro et al. (2016) follow Lima (2004), who models the
non-linear relationship between income distribution and technological change. Lima em-
ploys a post-Keynesian dynamic model where the relative bargaining power of labour pro-
duce non-linearity between accumulation and economic growth. In Lima’s model, techno-
logical change is labour-augmenting and distribution matters for innovation due to its effects
on incentives and resource availability. For example, Lima argues that while firms’ incentive
to innovate is low (high) when wage shares are low (high), investible resources are abundant
(limited). It follows that in Lima (2004), too low or high wage shares reduce the rate of tech-
nological change. Typical of non-linear models, Lima finds multiple equilibria and stable and
unstable dynamics. For example, when wage shares are low and labour’s bargaining power
is weak, there is a stable equilibrium between the wage share and technical change. How-
ever, the equilibrium becomes unstable when labour’s bargaining power is relatively strong.
Interestingly, for higher wage shares, the steady-state equilibrium is saddle point unstable ir-
respective of the relative bargaining power between capitalists and workers.
Martins Neto (2017) and Ribeiro et al. (2016) employ this modeling approach in an aggre-
gate balance of payments constrained growth model. They derive a stable steady-state equi-
librium when the technological gap is small and the wage share is high but demonstrate that
an economy with a large technological gap and low wage share, produces an unstable steady-
state equilibrium. Ribeiro and his co-authors are interested in how a currency devaluation af-
fects income distribution and thus, technological progress. They conclude that devaluations
produce an ever decreasing of the wage share and technological progress in economies with
large technological gaps and low wage shares (unstable equilibrium). Martins Neto (2017) find
similarly unstable results when government increases its distributive transfers to workers. In
both formulations, stability emerges by accident when the economy manages to find itself on
its saddle path.
Such unstable dynamics of ever decreasing wage share and retardation of technological
progress do not adequately capture real world macrodynamics in laggard economies. For
this reason, this chapter follows the linear approach in the literature and provides for a stable
steady-state equilibrium when technological gaps are large and wages shares are low. How-
ever, as noted earlier, in this model, income distribution does not affect internal self-financing.
Rather, it affects technological progress through its effects on the share of consumer imports
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and the efficiency of labour.
The final determinant of the rate of technological progress is the role of the government
sector—the National System of Innovation (NSI). In this model, NSI refers to the framework
within which government forms and implements policies to influence the innovation process
(Metcalfe 1995). Government assumes a leading role in coordinating the various actors (uni-
versities, firms, private & national research councils, private & national financial institutions
etc;) to accelerate the process of technological emulation, innovation and diffusion (Cimoli
2014; Cimoli and della Giusta 2000; Freeman 1995; Nelson and Rosenberg 1993). Cimoli (2014)
explains that the NSI sets the constraints and opportunities each firm faces, e.g. the availabil-
ity of skilled labour, cheap capital and information on new technologies etc. This body of
scholarship concludes that the role of government is to create and diffuse general purpose
technologies, develop the technological infrastructure in both private and public sectors and
expand certain industries that advance technical change (Freeman and Soete 1997).
Mazzucato and Penna (2015) make the case that public investment is particularly com-
plementary to private ingenuity in developing countries.13 They show that the Brazilian De-
velopment Bank provides low-cost finance to key infrastructure projects and basic industries
through a combination of direct lending to industry and indirect financing via private finan-
cial institutions. During the 1960s-1970s, the Development Bank disproportionately funded
the capital goods producing sector and since the 1990s, greater attention is placed on high-
technology firms. Public and low-cost financing become necessary because of the nature of
innovation and emulation—high-risk and high-uncertainty. These increase the costs of capi-
tal at the level of private institutions and in the absence of government policy, innovation and
technological convergence can be crowded out (Mazzucato 2013).
In a series of papers, Keith Nurse argues that inadequate public funding for R&D and
data infrastructure are the key reasons for little innovation14 in the creative industry in the
Caribbean (Nurse 2000; 2001; 2011). According to Nurse, Caribbean countries have failed to
establish the data infrastructure to capture the economic contribution of their creative in-
dustry, thereby, undermining firms’ ability to claim royalties and the incentive to develop new
products within the sector. Martins Neto and Porcile (2017) is one study that directly connects
public investment to non-price competitiveness in a BPCG model, where firm-level innova-
13See Dohnert et al. (2017) on how inadequate public policy and poor public capital can reduce firm-level
innovation in the Caribbean.
14See Alleyne et al. (2017) and Nurse (2007) for evidence that Caribbean countries record substantially lower
coefficients of innovation as compared to their peers in Latin America.
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tion and emulation in laggard economies are based on efficient public utilities and a skilled
workforce. In this regard, Perrotti and Sanchez (2011) and Calderon and Serven (2003) provide
evidence to show that feeble public investment in infrastructure is a contributory factor to the
widening of the productivity gap between Latin American and Asian countries.15
In sum, the evolution of technological change depends on spillover effects, the functional
income distribution and public investment in key infrastructure, education & training and
technology parks etc., which enhance firms’ ability to absorb and improve foreign technolo-
gies.
3.2.4 Functional Income Distribution
In this section, the author endogenizes the wage share to illuminate its own dynamics and
how it interacts with technological progress to influence the BPCG rate. To do so, consider the
mark-up pricing equation of a representative firm, where Ph ,τ, W and a are the price level in
the home country, the mark-up factor, nominal wages and labour productivity respectively.
Ph =τ
W
a

(3.13)
Dividing (3.13) by the domestic price level, the wage share (σL =W /a ) is derived as shown
below, where the profit share isσK .
σL = 1−σK (3.14)
The wage share is determined through a bargaining process, where workers set a target or
expected wage share (σeL ). The growth in the wage share is a positive function of the difference
between the expected and actual wage share. This is illustrated in Equation (3.15) whereλ> 0
is an adjustment parameter.
σ˙L =λ(σ
e
L −σL ) (3.15)
Let σeL be defined as shown in (3.16), where σ
e
K is the expected profit share and inversely
related to the bargaining power of workers.
15In the case of an EMU, see Makkonen (2013) for evidence that the Eurozone periphery—Portugal, Spain, Italy
and Greece—reduced public investment in R&D since 2008.
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σeL = 1−σeK (3.16)
The expected profit share takes the following form where all parameters are positive and e
and l are the rate of growth of employment and the labour force respectively. Equation (3.17)
says that the expected profit share falls with greater government redistribution to workers and
faster rates of employment growth. The principal mechanism is that both redistribution and
employment growth enhance the bargaining power of workers and consequently, their wage
demands.
σeK =ω0−ω1δΦ−ω2(e − l ) (3.17)
By definition, employment growth is the difference between output growth (yB P ) and pro-
ductivity growth (aˆ ), given by Equation (3.18). The latter indicates that economic growth in-
creases employment growth and the bargaining of labour, and based on (3.17), lowers the
expected profit share. Further, recall that productivity growth is a positive function of techno-
logical progress, shown in Equation (3.19).
e = yB P − aˆ (3.18)
aˆ = S˙ =ρ0+ρ1(1−δ)Φ±ρ2σL −ρ3S (3.19)
After substitution of Equations (3.11) and (3.16)-(3.19) into (3.15), the wage share evolves
as shown below.
σ˙L =λ{1−ω0+ω1δΦ+ω2[(k0+k1S −k2σL )z −ρ0−ρ1(1−δ)Φ+ρ2σL +ρ3S + l ]−σL} (3.20)
Equation (3.20) demonstrates that a higher wage share has negative and positive effects
on its rate of change. The negative effect is binding because workers’ demand for higher
wages are depressed as the wage share increases and this holds irrespective of the net effect
of the wage share. Stability requires that the negative effect dominates and henceforth, this
assumption is maintained. Equation (3.20) also shows that the rate of change of the wage
share increases as the home country approaches the technological frontier. In other words,
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the smaller the technological gap, the faster the wage share increases. This result is driven by
Equation (3.11), where technological convergence increases the trade elasticities, the BPCG
rate and therefore, the bargaining power of labour. It is also transparent in Equation (3.20)
that a higher share of government transfers (δ) increases labour’s bargaining power and the
rate of growth of the wage share.
3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Stability Analysis
Equations (3.12) and (3.20) form a two-dimensional system of differential equations repro-
duced below.
S˙ =ρ0+ρ1(1−δ)Φ−ρ2σL −ρ3S
σ˙L =λ{1−ω0+ω1δΦ+ω2[(k0+k1S −k2σL )z −ρ0−ρ1(1−δ)Φ+ρ2σL +ρ3S + l ]−σL}
The Jacobian of the system is:
Jk2 ,ρ2 <0 =

d S˙
d S
d S˙
dσL
d σ˙L
d S
d σ˙L
dσL

=
 −ρ3 −ρ2
λω2k1z +λω2ρ3 −λω2k2z −λ+λω2ρ2

when the net effect of the wage share on the trade elasticities and technological progress
is negative (k2;ρ2 < 0). The trace of the Jacobian matrix is −ρ3−λω2k2z −λ+λω2ρ2 < 0 and
hence always negative. Recall that it is assumed that the negative effect of the wage share
on its rate of change dominates the positive effect. The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
ρ3(λω2k2z−λ+λω2ρ2)−ρ2(λω2k1z+λω2ρ3). Stability requires thatρ3(λω2k2z−λ+λω2ρ2)>
ρ2(λω2k1z +λω2ρ3), otherwise the equilibrium has a saddle path. It is assumed that the de-
terminant is unambiguously positive and therefore, the system has a stable focus (see Figure
3.1a). This implies that cyclical fluctuations around the equilibrium point a is stable and con-
verges back to equilibrium.
When the net effect of the wage share on the trade elasticities and technological progress
is positive (k2;ρ2 > 0), the Jacobian of the system is:
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Jk2 ,ρ2 >0 =

d S˙
d S
d S˙
dσL
d σ˙L
d S
d σ˙L
dσL

=
 −ρ3 ρ2
λω2k1z +λω2ρ3 λω2k2z −λ−λω2ρ2

The trace of the Jacobian matrix is−ρ3+λω2k2z−λ−λω2ρ2 < 0 and hence always negative.
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix isρ3(λω2k2z −λ−λω2ρ2)−ρ2(λω2k1z +λω2ρ3). Sta-
bility requires that ρ3(λω2k2z −λ−λω2ρ2)>ρ2(λω2k1z +λω2ρ3), otherwise the equilibrium
has a saddle path. It is assumed that the determinant is unambiguously positive and there-
fore, the system has a stable focus (see Figure 3.1b). This implies that cyclical fluctuations
around the equilibrium point a ′ is stable and converges back to equilibrium.
The equilibrium technological gap (S˙ = 0) is illustrated below where all parameters are
positive.
S ∗ = ρ0+ρ1(1−δ)Φ±ρ2σL
ρ3
(3.21)
Similarly, when σ˙L = 0, the equilibrium wage share is given by (3.22), where ξ0 = ω0 −
1+ω2[−k0z +ρ0 +ρ1Φ− l ] > or < 0, ξ1 = −ω1 −ω2ρ1 < 0, ξ2 = 1+ω2k2z −ρ2 > 0 and ξ3 =
ω2(k1z +ρ3)> 0. Here it is assumed that ξ0 < 0 and ξ2 > 0 when the negative effect of the wage
share dominates (k2;ρ2 < 0). Conversely, when the net effect of the wage share is positive
(k2;ρ2 > 0), ξ0 > 0 and ξ2 = 1−ω2k2z +ρ2 < 0.
S ∗ = ξ0+ξ1δΦ+ξ2σL
ξ3
(3.22)
It is now possible to derive some implications of the model. First, a smaller technologi-
cal gap increases the BPCG rate but contracts productivity growth. When the former exceeds
the latter, employment growth increases and this strengthens workers’ bargaining power. In
turn, the rate of growth of the wage share accelerates and the corresponding effects depend
on how the wage share affects technological change and the trade elasticities. When the net
effect is negative, a higher wage share contracts the rate of technological progress and the bal-
ance of payments constrained growth rate. In the case where the net effect of the wage share
is positive, a higher wage share activates further rounds of technological progress and eco-
nomic growth. However, as the wage share rises, wage demands contract, which reduces the
wage share along with technological progress and economic growth. It follows that techno-
logical convergence does not engender a cumulative growth process—it sows the seeds of its
own destruction. These mechanisms demonstrate the inherent stability in the growth process
and the stable dynamics between technological change and income distribution. The second
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point to emphasize is that a higher wage share or lower income inequality is only possible
through government redistribution and faster economic growth. The latter does not imply
that economic growth is unambiguously inclusive—faster growth is more likely to enhance
the bargaining power of workers when labour has the right to collective bargaining and the
working class is united. Third, the equilibrium wage share does not indicate a distributional
outcome that is considered to be fair or desirable or one where all participants in the bargain-
ing process are happy. It is simply a stable distributional outcome when neither competing
classes can improve their income share given the prevailing distribution of power. Fourth,
the growth process is ultimately demand-led, the supply-side variables on growth are medi-
ated by their specific effects on the foreign trade elasticities, rather than by price flexibility or
the swift reallocation of factors of production. Supply-side effects are related to systems of
learning and emulation that improve product quality.
Figure 3.1: Stable Equilibrium
(a) Wage Share: Negative Net Effect (k2;ρ2 < 0)
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Consider a possible case of converging fluctuation that characterizes the system, when
the net effect of the wage share on the trade elasticities and technological progress is negative
(k2;ρ2 < 0). Assume that the economy is initially at point b in Figure 3.1a, where both the
technological gap and the wage share are above their equilibrium values. This disequilibrium
ignites a decline in technological progress, growth in labour productivity and the balance of
payments constrained growth rate. As illustrated in Figure 3.1a, the wage share rises so that
productivity growth declines faster than the BPCG rate. In other words, the bargaining power
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of workers increases and so does the rate of change of the wage share. Once the trajectory
of the economy crosses the isocline σ˙L = 0, the rate of technological change declines even
further as strong employment growth continues to increase the wage share. However, fur-
ther technological retardation accelerates the decline in the BPCG rate relative to productivity
growth, until employment growth wanes. It follows that labour’s bargaining power decreases
and triggers a reduction in the wage share. As the economy crosses the isocline S˙ = 0, the con-
traction in the wage share continues and it increases the growth rate of technological progress,
which increases productivity growth relative to the BPCG rate and further undermines the
wage share. These adjustments continue as the economy crosses the isocline σ˙L = 0, where
further decreases in the wage share accelerates technological progress. As such, the BPCG
rate increases and expands employment growth, along with the wage share. Once the econ-
omy crosses the isocline S˙ = 0, the higher wage share undermines technological progress and
these adjustments continue until the cyclical fluctuations in the wage share and technological
progress dampen and obtain the stable equilibrium at point a .
Now consider the case of converging fluctuation when the net effect of the wage share on
the trade elasticities and technological progress is positve (k2;ρ2 > 0). Assume that the econ-
omy is initially at point b ′ in Figure 3.1b, where the technological gap and the wage share are
above and below their equilibrium values respectively. The disequilibrium wage share trig-
gers a reduction in the rate of technological progress, productivity growth and the balance
of payments constrained growth rate. As demonstrated in Figure 3.1b, the wage share con-
tracts, so that the BPCG rate falls faster than productivity growth, which lowers employment
growth (labour’s bargaining power). Once the economy crosses the isocline σ˙L = 0, the rate of
technological progress, productivity growth and the balance of payments constrained growth
rate continue to fall. These downward adjustments persist as the economy crosses the isocline
S˙ = 0, where further reductions in the rate of technological progress lower productivity growth
relative to the BPCG rate. It follows that employment growth and labour’s bargaining power
recover as the rate of technical change reaches its trough. In turn, wage demand rises and
accelerates growth in the wage share and technology. When the economy crosses the isocline
σ˙L = 0, a positive feedback mechanism emerges between technological change and growth in
the wage share. These positive feedbacks are sustained until the wage share reaches its peak
and wage demands contract. As the economy crosses the isocline S˙ = 0, a downward spiral
emerges and the adjustments continue until the cyclical fluctuations in the wage share and
technological progress dampen and obtain the stable equilibrium at point a ′.
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3.3.2 Comparative Dynamics
3.3.2.1 Distributive Policy and The Big Tradeoff
The comparative dynamic results presented here relate to a positive shock to the share of tax
revenue used for redistribution (δ) and it is assumed that the net effect of the wage share on
the trade elasticities and technological progress is negative (k2;ρ2 < 0). Figure 3.2a illustrates
the long-run consequences in terms of the technological gap and the wage share. Initial equi-
librium is given by point a . As demonstrated in Equation (3.21), an increase in δ shifts the
technology curve or the locus S˙0 = 0 downwards to S˙1 = 0. Simultaneously, the wage share
curve or the locus σ˙L 0 = 0 shifts to the right and downwards to σ˙L 1 = 0. This result is driven
by the parameter ξ1 < 0 in Equation (3.22). It is transparent that government redistribution
increases the equilibrium wage share in the long-run but also increases the equilibrium tech-
nological gap between the home and the foreign country, as demonstrated by the new equi-
librium at point b . The mechanisms are as follows. More extensive redistribution increases
workers’ negotiating power during the wage bargaining process and this inevitably increases
their wage share and induces a significant decline in the rate of technological progress. A
higher wage share undermines capital accumulation as it reduces the share of imported cap-
ital goods. These adjustments continue and reduce the BPCG rate when the locus σ˙L 1 = 0
is crossed, where a lower rate of output growth undermines workers’ bargaining power and
the wage share through weaker employment growth. As the wage share falls, the rate of tech-
nological progress and the BPCG rate increase when the locus σ˙L 1 = 0 is crossed again. As
economic growth expands, the rate of growth of employment accelerates and the wage share
recovers, until it reduces the rate of technological progress yet again when the locus S˙1 = 0 is
crossed. These cyclical fluctuations dampen over time, until the new equilibrium at point b
is reached, with a wider technological gap and a higher wage share.
These comparative dynamic results illustrate a hard tradeoff between technological con-
vergence in the EMU and a more egalitarian distribution of income in the laggard economy.
It is important to emphasize that the tradeoff is partly related to the economic policy design
of the EMU. For example, the laggard economy is constrained by treaty obligations from bor-
rowing to finance both public investment in the NSI and redistributive transfers. But it must
be noted that the laggard economy still faces a tradeoff even if these treaty obligations are re-
laxed. Ultimately, creditors must ascribe some subjective valuation about the laggard’s abil-
ity to repay debt and this ability is closely related to its economic performance, which has a
101
Figure 3.2: Distributive Policy and The Big Tradeoff
(a) A Positive Shock to Redistribution (δ)
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ceiling by virtue of the low quality commodity it produces. It is possible that society and gov-
ernment may prefer less redistribution and thus, increase the share of tax revenue used for
investment purposes. In this case, the reverse results hold—the laggard economy reduces the
technological gap but the equilibrium wage share is substantially reduced. In this model, the
author assumes that the home country has initially high income equality—low wage shares.
Under such an initial condition, it is plausible that demands for redistribution are intense
and through populist politics, it is likely that redistribution is undertaken.16 This prediction
becomes stronger when the prospects of joining an EMU increases the expectation of cheaper
consumer imports. In short, real politick produces convergence in distribution but divergence
in technological capabilities.
Four conditions are required to produce the hard tradeoff: 1. The absence of a fiscal union
or transfers, 2. Significant technological gap, 3. Significant differences in income distribu-
tion between frontier and laggard economy and 4. Conspicuous consumption in the laggard
economy. If condition 1 is relaxed, the tradeoff becomes less binding. For example, the lag-
gard economy can choose to reduce income inequality and utilize regional fiscal transfers for
technological upgrading. Alternatively, the laggard can invest its own resources in the pro-
cess of technological catch-up and increase its claim on the fiscal union for distributive pur-
poses. This insight best illustrates the imperative of regional cohesion policies and the design
16See Pineiro et al. (2016) and Leon (2014) for recent evidence in the case of Latin America that initially high
income inequality produces intense cycles of populism and redistribution.
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framework of economic policy at the regional level more generally.17 It is obvious that in the
absence of condition 2, the tradeoff is non-existent. Condition 3 captures an often ignored
convergence criteria within regional groupings. When member states of an EMU experience
different distributional outcomes these generate both centripetal and centrifugal forces18 that
relax or tighten the tradeoff.19 For example, skilled labour may migrate to the frontier, which
lowers the rate of technological convergence but can also reduce distributional tensions.20
However, the evidence shows that skilled migration do not reduce distributional contestation
in laggard economies and this reinforces the hard tradeoff.21 If condition 4 is relaxed, the
tradeoff is less intense as lower income inequality does not necessarily crowd out the share
of imported capital goods. This insight demonstrates that the tradeoff is also related to so-
cial norms and elites’ behavior, i.e. status consumption. Finally, when conditions 3 and 4 are
combined, the tradeoff becomes entrenched.
Consider Figure 3.2b, which illustrates the growth payoffs when the tradeoff between dis-
tribution and technological convergence is binding. Quadrant I shows the wage share and
technological gap that are consistent with long-run equilibrium and quadrant II illustrates
the positive relationship between the BPCG rate and the inverse of the technological gap. In
quadrant IV, the negative relationship between the wage share and the BPCG rate is outlined.
An increase in δ is indicative of a rise in the share of redistributive transfers and starting from
quadrant I with an initial equilibrium of S0−σL 0, a rise in δ shifts the σ˙L 0 = 0 curve to σ˙L 1 = 0
and simultaneously presents a downward shift in the technology curve from S˙0 = 0 to S˙1 = 0.
As demonstrated earlier, this increases the wage share from σL 0 to σL 1 but at the cost of a
wider technological gap, S0 decreases to S1. The increase in the wage share contracts long-run
growth from yB P 0 to yB P 1 in quadrant IV, as it increases the weighted average of income elastic-
ities of import demand. Further, as shown in quadrant II, a widening of the technological gap
17See Stockhammer et al. (2015) for a comprehensive discussion of how the badly designed policy framework
in the Eurozone created and promoted forces of divergence.
18Centripetal and centrifugal forces are those that reduce and increase income inequality respectively.
19According to Samuelson (1948) and Samuelson (1949) free trade leads to factor price equalization and re-
duces concerns over distribution. This theory assumes that firms do not have market power and that neither
capital nor labor are mobile. However, capital mobility and firms’ market power weaken this prediction. The
evidence against factor price equalization is overwhelming: see Stockhammer (2017) and Doan and Wan (2017)
for evidence of falling wage shares in both developed and developing countries. The exception is of course China
but if this outlier is excluded, global inequality is rising (Milanovic 2016; Alvaredo et al. 2018).
20See Constantine (2018; 2017a) for a discussion on how differences in income inequality among countries
affect labour movement within the Caribbean Single Market and Economy and see (Milanovic 2016: pp. 143-
137) for a similar discussion at the level of the world economy.
21See footnote 15 for evidence.
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reduces the BPCG rate from yB P 0 to yB P 1, as the lower technological capabilities in the home
country reduce the ratio of its foreign trade elasticities. In sum, redistribution unambiguously
contracts long-run economic growth. Do note that the results are reversed if government allo-
cates a greater share of its tax revenue to public investment. In this case, the technological gap
narrows and the equilibrium wage share falls, which increases the equilibrium growth rate.
3.3.2.2 Distributive Policy and Technological Convergence
This section presents the comparative dynamic results for a positive shock to δ, when the
net effect of the wage share on the trade elasticities and technological progress is positive
(k2;ρ2 > 0). Figure 3.3a illustrates the long-run consequences in terms of the technological
gap and the wage share. Initial equilibrium is given by point a ′. As illustrated in Equation
(3.21), when ρ2 > 0, the locus S˙0 = 0 is upward sloping. Moreover, per Equation (3.22), when
(k2;ρ2 > 0), ξ0 > 0 and ξ2 < 0, so that the wage share curve or the locus σ˙L 0 = 0 is downward
sloping. A positive shock to δ shifts the technology curve downwards to S˙1 = 0 and simulta-
neously shifts the wage share curve upwards to σ˙L 1 = 0. It is obvious that government redis-
tribution promotes technological convergence and increases the equilibrium wage share, as
demonstrated by the new equilibrium at point b ′. The mechanisms are as follows. More ex-
tensive redistribution increases workers’ negotiating power during the wage bargaining pro-
cess and this inevitably increases their wage share and the rate of technological progress.
A higher wage share enhances workers’ capacity to learn and imitate imported technology.
As the trajectory of the economy crosses the locus σ˙L 1 = 0, faster growth in the wage share
and technological progress reinforce each other and accelerate the balance of payments con-
strained growth rate. Collectively, these activate further rounds of growth in the wage share
and as the locus S˙1 = 0 is crossed, the wage share reaches its peak. Inevitably, this lowers wage
demands and triggers a downward spiral between the rate of technological progress and the
wage share. These cyclical fluctuations dampen over time, until the new equilibrium at point
b ′ is reached, with a smaller technological gap and a higher wage share.
Now consider Figure 3.3b, which illustrates the growth payoffs when no tradeoff exists be-
tween distribution and technological convergence. Quadrant I shows the wage share and
technological gap that are consistent with long-run equilibrium and quadrant II illustrates
the positive relationship between the BPCG rate and the inverse of the technological gap. In
quadrant IV, the positive relationship between the wage share and the BPCG rate is outlined.
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Figure 3.3: Distributive Policy and Technological Convergence
(a) A Positive Shock to Redistribution (δ)
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An increase in δ is indicative of a rise in the share of redistributive transfers and starting from
quadrant I with an initial equilibrium of S0−σL 0, a rise inδ shifts the σ˙L 0 = 0 curve upward and
to the right to σ˙L 1 = 0 and simultaneously presents a downward shift in the technology curve
from S˙0 = 0 to S˙1 = 0. As demonstrated earlier, this increases the wage share from σL 0 to σL 1
and reduces the technological gap, S0 increases to S1. The expansion in the wage share acceler-
ates long-run growth from yB P 0 to yB P 1 in quadrant IV, as it increases workers’ ability to learn
and reverse engineer imported technologies. Further, as shown in quadrant II, a smaller tech-
nological gap increases the BPCG rate from yB P 0 to yB P 1, as higher technological capabilities
in the home country increase the ratio of its foreign trade elasticities. In sum, redistribution
unambiguously accelerates long-run economic growth. Do note that the results are reversed
if government allocates a greater share of its tax revenue to public investment. In this case,
the equilibrium technological gap and wage share expands and contracts respectively, which
reduce the balance of payments constrained growth rate.
Under what conditions do public investment undermine long-term growth and techno-
logical convergence? Alternatively, under what conditions do lower income inequality pro-
duce technological convergence and economic growth? Higher wage shares become con-
sequential to learning when the NSI is particularly weak, i.e. there are poor quality public
schooling and/or unequal access to education. It follows that lower inequality can enhance
non-price competitiveness, growth and convergence when the NSI is non-existent or weak.
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Moreover, when the effects of conspicuous consumption are weak and/or basic human needs
are incompletely satisfied, higher wage shares do not retard technological progress by way of
lowering the share of imported capital goods. Rather, higher wages are spent on goods at
the lowest level of the commodity hierarchy—basic and low quality consumer goods that are
domestically produced. When these conditions hold, it is transparent that a higher share of
tax revenue dedicated to public investment can produce the counter-intuitive result of lower
growth and technological divergence. A higher share of public investment has limited effec-
tiveness when workers have unequal access to key pubic goods and such low wages that they
are unable to satisfy basic human needs. The central implication is that redistribution only in-
creases the prospects of growth and convergence in the least developed laggard economies.22
It follows that the big tradeoff emerges when the laggard economy exceeds a certain threshold
of poverty, where workers’ consumption pattern emulates the rich.
To sum up, the model and its corresponding comparative dynamic results make the fol-
lowing contributions to the literature. First, it presents a new mechanism by which higher
wage shares can lower the rate of technological convergence and the balance of payments
constrained growth rate. When capitalists import higher quality consumer goods to display
prestige and social status, higher wage shares increase the share of imported consumer goods
and the income elasticity of imports. As the share of imported capital goods falls, so does the
rate of technological progress and collectively, these tighten the balance of payments con-
straint. This in turn lowers the rate of long-term growth and widens the technological gap.
In this case, a hard tradeoff emerges between distribution on the one hand and faster long-
term growth and technological convergence on the other hand. Other works argue for the
tradeoff through an efficiency channel (Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky 2007; Muinelo-Gallo
and Roca-Sagales 2011; 2013; Okun 1975) or the price competitiveness mechanism, associ-
ated with Blecker (1989) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Moreover, the chapter contends
that the economic policy framework in EMUs must compensate for these tradeoffs, lest re-
gional cohesion is threatened. A fiscal union with transfers to laggard economies can serve
an important compensatory role. Second, the model shows that a virtuous cycle is possible
between lower income inequality and technological catch-up and growth. However, these
results only hold in the least developed laggard economies, where a higher wage share pro-
22This does not imply that higher wages or lower income inequality does not increase efficiency and produc-
tivity in richer economies. In fact, recent evidence show that the growth-inequality tradeoff is less binding in
more developed economies (Berg et al. 2018; Stiglitz 2013). However, these positive effects are likely to have a
threshold limit in laggard economies.
106
motes learning and enhances workers’ ability to imitate foreign technology. In the least de-
veloped laggard economies, the quality of public schooling is low and the satisfaction of basic
consumer needs are incomplete, so that lower income inequality increases access to learn-
ing and demand for low quality domestically produced consumer goods. These mechanisms
differ from the wage-led growth literature that emphasizes the demand effects only (Bhaduri
and Marglin 1990). Further, this contribution qualifies Porcile et al. (2007)’s finding that higher
wages promote learning, convergence and economic growth in developing economies. This
conclusion is unlikely to hold when the laggard economy has an insignificant capital goods
producing sector, a limited range of domestic consumer goods and conspicuous consumers.
The model reveals that Porcile et al. (2007)’s finding only holds in the least developed laggard
economies. Furthermore, as the latter exceed a threshold level of poverty, a tradeoff between
growth and distribution emerges. Third, this chapter presents these insights in a dynamically
stable model of an economy with a low wage share and a high technological gap. Other works
find vicious or virtuous cycles of growth and distribution depending on the unstable compar-
ative dynamics (Ribeiro et al. 2016; Martins Neto 2017).
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a long-run balance of payments constrained growth (BPCG) model to
demonstrate the relationship among endogenous technological change, income distribution
and long-run economic growth between countries in an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
In this model, non-price competitiveness is endogenously determined by technological change
and income distribution (wage share). Faster technological change through an improvement
in the home country’s National System of Innovation, by way of public investment, improves
product quality and the income elasticity of its exports, while a more egalitarian distribution
of income has ambiguous effects. On one hand, a higher wage share increases import demand
for consumer goods and crowds out the share of capital imports. These in turn are necessary
for capital accumulation and technology transfer, so that a higher wage share reduces techno-
logical change and thus, non-price competitiveness. On the other hand, lower inequality can
improve workers’ access to education and health care, which enhance their ability to emulate
imported technologies, thereby, promoting technological change. When the negative effect
of the wage share dominates, the laggard economy confronts a big tradeoff between lowering
income inequality and technological convergence. In the plausible scenario where the home
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country responds to redistributive demands, the technological gap between the laggard and
frontier economy expands. In turn, this reduces the home country’s balance of payments con-
strained growth rate and engenders a long-run divergence in per capita incomes. The reverse
results hold when higher wage shares accelerate technical change.
The tradeoff is partly determined by the technological backwardness of the home country.
In this model, the laggard economy lacks a domestic capital goods producing sector and pro-
duces and exports a low quality consumer good. Accordingly, the home country is reliant on
the importation of both capital and consumer goods for growth and development. Herein lies
the big tradeoff. As fiscal redistribution improves income distribution in the laggard economy,
imported consumer goods increase disproportionately and undermine the process of accu-
mulation and technology transfer. The tradeoff is also binding because of the absence of a
fiscal union or cohesion/technology policy at the level of the EMU. Technology policy at the
EMU level that promotes technological upgrading in the laggard economy can significantly
reduce the burden of the tradeoff between government transfers and public investment in
the National System of Innovation. It follows that technological and distributional divergence
within the EMU are partly by design—bad design of its policy framework. The model also il-
lustrates that lowering income inequality can accelerate technological convergence. But this
result only holds in the least developed laggard economies. In the latter, there are unequal
access to and poor quality schooling and health care. Further, basic consumption needs are
incompletely satisfied, thus, higher wage shares increase the demand for the low quality but
domestically produced consumer good. When these conditions hold, lower inequality can
increase the rate of technological progress and undermine the tradeoff. However, the trade-
off emerges when the least developed laggard economy exceeds a threshold level of poverty,
where workers’ consumption pattern emulates the rich.
These results produce a number of complications for policy regarding distribution and
growth. First, a laggard economy with a small domestic capital goods producing sector is
caught in a trap that produces extractive growth processes—faster growth with high income
inequality. Second, such a growth regime is consistent with rising demands for fiscal redistri-
bution that end in balance of payments crises and lower long-run growth. Third, these harsh
socio-economic outcomes can be arrested in an EMU if the regional policy framework reduces
the burden of technological or distributional convergence. For example, a laggard economy
can choose to investment disproportionately in redistribution or technology if it can increase
its claim on the fiscal union to ameliorate the tradeoff. This is an important ingredient for re-
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gional cohesion and a key policy insight for regional integration processes. Fourth, unlike the
standard convergence criteria associated with economic integration, the model shows that
initial differences in distributional outcomes matter. In the first instance, these differences an-
chor the rate of technological convergence (divergence). Furthermore, they determine the in-
tensity of the distributional conflict and by extension, the speed at which the tradeoff emerges.
These insights do not present a simply policy solution. Rather, they reinforce economics as
the dismal science. However, they do demonstrate the utility of well designed EMUs that place
greater emphasis on community cohesion in terms of technological capabilities and distribu-
tional outcomes.
The chapter produces several testable hypotheses. First, only the least developed economies
can experience inclusive economic growth and second, beyond a threshold level, a tradeoff
emerges. Third, the intensity of the tradeoff is higher for economies with initially higher in-
come inequality. Fourth, EMUs without a fiscal union or adequate cohesion/technology poli-
cies, will experience technological polarization and its accompanying crises. It is left for future
work to empirically verify these propositions.
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Chapter 4
To Devalue or Not to Devalue? New Channels and
Mechanisms
4.1 Introduction
The debate over the growth and distributional effects of a currency devaluation is an old one
but has received renewed attention with recent calls for GREXIT and China’s alleged currency
manipulation. Moreover, the Eurozone crisis has brought the notion of monetary sovereignty
into sharper focus. Several scholars have argued that Greece and Germany’s trade deficits and
surpluses respectively, could be easily arrested in the absence of the Euro (Stiglitz 2017; Flass-
beck and Lapavitsas 2013). These claims rest on substitution effects and changes in relative
prices. For instance, Bilson (1978) posits that a devaluation increases the costs of imports
relative to domestically produced goods and through substitution effects, employment and
income increases. Moreover, net export demand expands due to relative price changes, the
assumption is that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, i.e. that the sum of the price elastic-
ities of exports and imports exceeds unity.
These optimistic predictions of a currency devaluation have been challenged on several
grounds. Diaz-Alejandro (1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978) demonstrate that devalua-
tions increase the profit share and produce contractionary effects owing to capitalists’ higher
saving propensities. In the case of Krugman and Taylor, additional contractionary effects
relate to higher government savings due to taxes on tradables. Ribeiro et al. (2017a), Krug-
man and Taylor (1978) and Buffie (1986) show that devaluations are uncompetitive (contrac-
tionary) if firms’ have a high share of imported intermediate inputs in total variable costs. In
other words, devaluations increase the cost of production and contract investment demand.
In other strands of the literature, devaluations that lower the wage share engender contrac-
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tionary and expansionary effects in wage-led and profit-led demand regimes1 respectively
(Ribeiro et al. 2017a; Blecker 2011). The differential results hinge on the net effect of a fall in
consumption and an increase in investment demand. Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
98, several scholars underline the contractionary effects devaluations can impose if firms or
governments have undertaken foreign currency denominated debt (Kohler 2019; Gatti et al.
2007; Krugman 1999). The principal channels relate to higher risk premium, bankruptcies
and higher interest payments. Gylfason and Risager (1984)’s work predates these models and
endogenizes fiscal spending as a negative function of external liabilities, so that a devalua-
tion produces austerity effects. Moreover, models within the monetarist framework contend
that devaluations reduce real cash balances, increase the rate of interest and contract real
output (Islam 1984; Gylfason and Schmid 1983; Guitian 1976). Finally, recent empirical work
by Worrell et al. (2018) show that the contractionary effects of devaluations are more likely for
economies with highly concentrated export baskets and population sizes of 1.2 million or less.
This chapter contributes to this rich literature by way of a three-period post-Kaleckian
model with three income sources (wages, profits and banker rents). In the short-run, a real
devaluation produces contractionary effects along the traditional channels of higher external
debt payments and real cost of imported capital goods. In the medium-run, the model finds
that a devaluation raises the loan rate and reduces the profit share—inducing contractionary
effects. The latter result is in contrast to the larger literature on two-class models that formally
demonstrate how a devaluation increases the profit share (Ribeiro et al. 2017a; Missio et al.
2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Blecker 2011; Fiorillo 2001; Blecker 1989; Krugman and Taylor 1978;
Diaz-Alejandro 1963; Alexander 1952). These works employ the mark-up pricing approach
to distribution, where firms’ mark-up is modeled as a positive function of the real exchange
rate, so that a real devaluation increases firms’ market power. According to Blecker (1989) and
Blecker (2011), a devaluation increases the relative costs of competing goods in international
markets and this enables firms to increase their target mark-up or profit share. However, in
this model of a small open economy, firms are price takers in world markets, so that a deval-
uation offers little price competitiveness.
Unlike the channels of risk premium and real balance effects that raise the loan rate, this
chapter presents new mechanisms. First, a devaluation increases bankers’ liquidity prefer-
ence for excess reserves in anticipation of rising non-performing loans and as a means to
1Note that Skott (2016) cautions the use of the wage-led and profit-led dichotomy, given the known endoge-
nieties between growth and distribution.
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prevent flexible devaluations. Second, a devaluation contracts the supply of excess reserves
through the sale of central bank securities and the two mechanisms raise the loan rate. Since
bankers profit from credit creation, an increase in the loan rate increases bankers’ rent share
and lowers the profit share. Moreover, bankers’ income also increase on account of a higher
bond rate and larger holdings of central bank securities. In this model, oligopolistic bankers
have price setting powers in both the loan and bond markets, so that further purchases of
central bank bonds—to prevent flexible devaluations or capital flight—can only be induced
through higher bond rates. Further, a devaluation increases (decreases ) banker rent (profit)
share through higher profitability of foreign assets in local currency. These medium-run re-
sponses engender contractionary effects for the rates of capacity utilization and capital ac-
cumulation through the cost and distribution channels. A lower profit share and higher loan
rate contract investment demand and higher rent share lowers overall consumption due to
bankers’ higher savings rate. One exception to the literature on devaluation and a higher profit
share is Ribeiro et al. (2017a). They show in a general Keynesian-Kaleckian two-class model
that a real devaluation reduces the profit share if the share of imported intermediate inputs
in total variable cost is high. They argue that firms must lower their mark-up factor to main-
tain price competitiveness as a devaluation increases the costs of imported capital. However,
this chapter illustrates that the condition of a high share of imported capital is not necessary
for a devaluation to lower the profit share. This contribution is closely related to Constantine
and Khemraj (2018) but provides several extensions relating to model dynamics and mone-
tary equilibrium in a regime of excess reserves. Constantine and Khemraj present a short-run
post-Kaleckian/Keynesian model of bankers, workers and capitalists. In this set-up, bankers
can induce a currency depreciation and increase rent income through foreign exchange trad-
ing.
Several theoretical models have employed the so-called technology-profits channel, which
endogenizes the rate of technological progress as a positive function of firms’ retained earn-
ings (Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Feijo and Lamonica 2013; Missio and Jayme 2012;
Araujo and Lima 2007). In these works, devaluation raises the profit share and the rate of inno-
vation. This chapter also allows for endogenous innovation as a function of retained earnings
(profit share) but also bank finance (loan rate). Thus, a devaluation lowers the rate of technical
change, which provides for additional contractionary effects on the long-run rates of capacity
utilization and accumulation. Given the contractionary effects in each period, the expansion-
ary effects on the rate of net exports also increases in each period. It is important to emphasize
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that such improvements in the external balance is at the price of domestic demand stagnation
and a lower rate of technological progress.
A noteworthy feature of the model is its approach to the monetary economy: bankers are
assumed to have market power in both the loan and bond markets and liquidity preference
for excess reserves that become perfect substitutes for loans and central bank bonds at non-
zero rates of interest. This monetary set-up is consistent with several developing economies
and emerging markets with an oligopolistic banking sector (Khemraj 2014). As it relates to
policy, the model argues that prospective devaluers must consider the degree of competition
in their banking sector, size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-capital ratios and whether or
not their economy is in a regime of excess reserves. In the latter case, monetary authorities
routinely sell central bank bonds to commercial banks to displace their demand for foreign as-
sets as a means to maintain an orderly foreign exchange market (Downes and Khemraj 2019).
This has the obvious distributional effect of raising banker rent share and the corresponding
contractionary effects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the basic the-
oretical model and section 4.2.1 presents the short-run results. The comparative dynamic
results are discussed in section 4.2.4 and section 4.2.6. Finally, section 4.3 concludes.
4.2 Model
Consider the home country as a small open economy—the technological laggard—that trades
a lower quality good with the technological leader—the foreign country. Assume that the
home country is a price taker in world markets and that there are imperfect capital flows
between countries. Moreover, the home country produces one composite good, which can
be consumed, invested or exported. There are three sources of income in the laggard econ-
omy: wages earned by workers, profits from enterprise and economic rent from bankers. All
three income recipients consume domestic and foreign goods, which are imperfect substi-
tutes. Further, the home country has a fixed exchange rate (e ), where an increase in e indicates
a devaluation. Three homogeneous factors of production are used—labour, domestic and im-
ported capital goods—and are combined through a fixed-coefficient technology to produce
the composite good (Y ), see Equation (4.1). Total capital stock K is the sum of domestic (M h )
and imported capital goods (M f ).
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Y =min (a L , b M h , c M f ) (4.1)
The corresponding productivity coefficients for labour, domestic and imported capital are
a , b and c respectively and the fixed-coefficient combination is determined by the existing
stock of knowledge. The latter determines the difference in input efficiencies independent
of relative factor prices and this implies that the elasticity of substitution among L , M h and
M f is zero. This warrants a short discussion. First, as noted by Piketty and Zucman (2014),
capital has fewer alternative uses in low-technology economies and this lowers the flexibility
of capital-labour substitution. Second, the imported capital may not be ideally suited for the
production of the domestic good and this reduces the elasticity of substitution. It follows that
the appropriateness of imported technology or capital is an important determinant of the sub-
stitutability of capital for labour. Third, the low-technology nature of the domestic good may
require specific factor proportions in the production process and this also undermines the
flexibility of substitution. Fourth, the home country’s domestic capital goods sector may be
too small to allow flexible substitution between M h and M f . Accordingly, the fixed-coefficient
technology assumption captures the inappropriateness of imported capital, the necessity of
labour in given proportions in the production process and the limited production of domestic
capital goods.
The condition for goods market equilibrium in the absence of government is illustrated
below, where S , I and N X are saving, investment and net exports respectively.
S = I +N X (4.2)
In this model, the investment function is expressed in terms of the stock of capital and
assumes the standard neo-Kaleckian form with several extensions (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990;
Blecker 2002).
g ≡ I
ph K
= I0+φ1pi+φ2u −φ3rhΛD D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5 e pfph Λ
M f +φ6τ (4.3)
Animal spirits or investor confidence is captured by I0 and the profit share and rate of ca-
pacity utilization arepi and u respectively. It is well established that better investor confidence
increases investment demand and that a higher profit share enlarges firms’ internal funds for
investment expenditure. Further, as u accelerates, firms are encouraged to invest in larger
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production capacity. Following Hein (2007) and Lavoie (1995), the cost of domestic bank fi-
nance (rhΛD D ) is included to capture the cost channel but also the redistributive effects among
wages, profits and rents. The domestic debt-capital ratio is defined by D Dph K ≡ΛD D and rh is the
loan rate in the home country. Due to open capital accounts, firms may choose to incur foreign
currency denominated debt, so that the foreign interest rate (r f ), e and external debt-capital
ratio ( E Dph K ≡ ΛE D ) become important determinants of investment demand. The cost of exter-
nal debt captures balance sheet effects associated with currency mismatches, where a devalu-
ation increases the costs of foreign interest payments in local currency, induces bankruptcies,
reduces firms’ net-worth and access to foreign finance, thus, contracting investment demand
(Kohler 2019; 2017; Cespedes et al. 2004; Krugman 1999). Moreover, the cost of imported cap-
ital goods (
e pf
ph
ΛM f ) also constrain investment demand through the traditional cost channel,
where M
f
ph K
≡ΛM f is the share of imported capital in total capital stock and pfph captures relative
price levels. Finally, following Lima (2000) and Lima (2004), the rate of technological progess
(τ) is included to account for its effects on investment demand. According to Kalecki (1971)
and Schumpeter (1912), technological progress opens up new investment opportunities and
encourages firms to install the most updated technology or machinery, thus increasing invest-
ment demand. The rationale relates to the acquisition of competitive advantage, since firms
with the most updated technology can increase productivity and gain market share (Landes-
mann and Goodwin 1994).
This chapter assumes a classical savings hypothesis, in other words, workers as a class do
not save. The savings rate (σ) is thus defined, where bankers’ and capitalists’ saving rate are
(sb ) and (sc ) respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that sb > sc .
σ≡ S
ph K
= (sc + sb )u (4.4)
Equation (4.5) demonstrates that the ratio of net exports to capital stock is a positive func-
tion of the foreign rate of capacity utilization (u f ) and relative prices (
e pf
ph
) but negatively re-
lated to the domestic rate of capacity utilization. All parameters are positive with the exception
of ν3 ≶ 0, which is ambiguous depending on whether or not the Marshall-Lerner (ML) condi-
tion holds. If the latter holds, the sum of the price elasticities of exports and imports exceeds
unity, which indicates that a real devaluation improves the trade balance. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the price pf is the same for imported capital and consumer goods.
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b ≡ N X
ph K
= X0−M0+ν1u f −ν2u +ν3 e pfph (4.5)
4.2.1 Short-Run Equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium is defined by the goods market condition σ = b + g and the as-
sumptions that the domestic price level and income distribution are constant. It follows that
a nominal devaluation (↑ e ) engenders a real devaluation in the short-run.2 Moreover, a key
feature of the short-run equilibrium is excess capacity, so that quantity adjustments domi-
nate. After substitution of Equations (4.3)-(4.5) into the goods market equilibrium condition,
the short-run rate of capacity utilization (u ∗) yields the following, whereΨ= I0+X0−M0.
u ∗ =
Ψ+φ1pi−φ3rhΛD D −φ4e rFΛE D −φ5 e pfph ΛM f +φ6τ+ν1u f +ν3 e pfph
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 (4.6)
Given the comparative static result below, where the denominator is assumed to be posi-
tive per the Keynesian stability condition, it is clear that a currency devaluation has ambiguous
effects on the short-run rate of capacity utilization.
∂ u ∗
∂ e
=
−φ4r f ΛE D −φ5 pfphΛM f +ν3 pfph
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 Q 0 (4.7)
The short-run contractionary effects relate to higher interest payments on external debt
and the higher cost of imported capital goods measured in local currency, which depress in-
vestment demand. The ambiguity emerges due to whether or not the ML condition holds,
recall that ν3 ≶ 0. If the ML condition does not hold (ν3 < 0), so that a devaluation reduces the
rate of net exports, it unambiguously reduces the short-run rate of capacity utilization. How-
ever, if the ML condition does hold (ν3 > 0) and improves the trade balance, a devaluation can
expand u ∗ if the increase in the trade balance overcompensates for the contractionary effects
associated with higher interest payments on foreign debt and the increased cost of imported
capital. Thus, much depends on the existing stock of external debt (ΛE D ), the importance of
imported capital to the production process (ΛM f ) and the foreign interest rate. The higher are
ΛE D , ΛM f and r f and the larger the sensitivity of u ∗ with respect to these factors, the stronger
are the overall contractionary effects of a currency devaluation, even if the ML condition holds.
2See Razmi et al. (2012) for evidence that a nominal devaluation quickly translates into a real devaluation.
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Substitution of Equation (4.6) into (4.3) and (4.5) derives the short-run equilibrium rates
of capital accumulation (g ∗) and net exports (b ∗).
g ∗ =
(sc + sb +ν2)[I0+φ1pi−φ3rhΛD D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5 e pfph ΛM f +φ6τ]
sc + sb +ν2−φ2
+
φ2(X0−M0+ν1u f +ν3 e pfph )
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 (4.8)
The comparative static result of a devaluation on g ∗ is ambiguous, as shown in condition
(4.9). It is transparent that a larger weight is placed on investment demand than on net ex-
ports and consumption, as it relates to how these affect the short-run rate of accumulation. It
follows that the negative balance balance sheet effect (−φ4r f ΛE D ) and the higher cost of im-
ported capital goods (−φ5 e pfph ΛM f ) have stronger contractionary effects on the rate of capital
accumulation.
∂ g ∗
∂ e
=
(−φ4r f ΛE D −φ5 pfphΛM f )(sc + sb +ν2) +φ2ν3 pfph
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 Q 0 (4.9)
In the case of the short-run equilibrium rate of net exports (b ∗), the comparative static
result is also ambiguous. However, it is transparent that a devaluation is more likely to improve
the trade balance if the ML condition holds (ν3 > 0) and the stronger the contractionary effects
on the rates of capacity utilization and accumulation (ν2φ4r f ΛE D +ν2φ5
pf
ph
ΛM f ). Therefore,
b ∗ can improve in the short-run due to lower absorption through the channels relating to the
costs of external debt and imported capital. Even if the ML condition does not hold, the rate
of net exports can increase if the contractionary effects are particularly strong.
b ∗ =
(sc + sb −φ2)[(X0−M0) +ν1u f +ν3 e pfph ]
sc + sb +ν2−φ2
− ν2(I0+φ1pi−φ3rhΛ
D D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5 e pfph ΛM f +φ6τ)
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 (4.10)
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∂ b ∗
∂ e
=
ν3
pf
ph
(sc + sb −φ2) +ν2φ4r f ΛE D +ν2φ5 pfphΛM f
sc + sb +ν2−φ2 Q 0 (4.11)
These short-run results are consistent with much of the literature that models the effects
of a currency devaluation. For example, several scholars have formalized the contractionary
effects when an economy depends on imported capital goods. The works of Buffie (1986),
Branson (1986) and Gylfason and Schmid (1983) emphasize the cost channel associated im-
ported capital, while the works of Ribeiro et al. (2017a), Lopez and Perrotini (2006), Taylor
(2004) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) delineate the distribution channel. In other words, the
latter scholarship argues that firms’ mark-up rises as the cost of imported capital increases and
in turn contracts the wage share, which produces contractionary effects. Unlike these works,
income distribution is constant in the short-run in this model, so that short-run effects relate
primarily to the cost channel. Other theoretical models illustrate the contractionary effects
when an economy’s private sector is exposed to foreign currency denominated debt (Kohler
2019; 2017; Krugman 1999; Van Wijnbergen 1986; Gylfason and Risager 1984). Kholer and
Krugman contend that devaluation increases the risks of bankruptcy and interest payments
when external debt is non-trivial and thus, contracts demand through a cost channel. How-
ever, Van Wijnbergen and Gylfason and Risager model wealth as a negative function of exter-
nal debt, so that a devaluation reduces real wealth and output. In the context of the traditional
literature, the short-run results show that a devaluation produces expenditure-reducing ef-
fects through the investment channel and ergo, increases the likelihood that a devaluation
improves the trade balance (Lizondo and Montiel 1989). Expenditure-switching effects are
weak in this model due to the assumptions of a fixed coefficient production function and that
both domestic and imported consumer goods are imperfect substitutes.
4.2.2 The Monetary Economy in an Excess Reserve Regime
Given the short-run results, how does a devaluation affect the price level, income distribution
and the loan rate over the medium-run? To answer these questions, the author models the
home country’s monetary economy. The financial sector is described by the following sys-
tem of equations, where E RD and E RS are bankers’ demand and supply for excess reserves
respectively. The demand curve can be interpreted as banks’s liquidity preference and based
on Equation (4.12), banks’ liquidity preference becomes perfectly elastic at a non-zero bond
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(rc b b ) and loan rate (see Figure 4.1 below).
E RD = a0+a1rc b b
−1+a2r −h
1+a3e (4.12)
E RS = b0+ b1M C − b2ΛC B B + b3(∆I R )− b4R R R (4.13)
Figure 4.1: Banks’ Liquidity Preference in the Bond and Loan Markets
 ER
 rcbb
 ER
 rh
In other words, non-remunerated excess reserves and central bank bills (C B B ) on the one
hand and loans3 on the other, become perfect substitutes over their respective non-zero range
of interest rate. These relationships underscore an important feature of banking in develop-
ing and emerging economies which do not possess a globally traded currency. Khemraj (2014)
and Moore and Craigwell (2002) contend that the non-zero lower bounds are reflective of an
oligopolistic banking mark-up, risks and transaction costs in both the loan and bond markets.4
The negatively slopped section of the liquidity preference curves illustrates that bankers’ de-
mand for excess reserves decreases as rc b b and rh increases. But what explains the persis-
tent excess reserves in the banking system? In other words, why would excess reserves not be
eliminated through the purchase of bonds, credit creation and investment in foreign assets?
3When CBB and loans become perfect substitutes from the perspective of banks, this implies that bankers
are indifferent between holding central bank security and issuing loans/credit to borrowers. This should not be
confused with the demand for loans by borrowers. Bankers’ liquidity preference, which is perfectly elastic at a
non-zero rate of interest, suggests that they are indifferent about holding three classes of assets: 1. CBB, 2. excess
reserves and 3. loan assets.
4Given persistent excess reserves and banks’ liquidity preference, it follows that banks’ liquidity risks are low.
However, there are potential solvency risks during periods of devaluations, if banks are exposed to foreign cur-
rency denominated liabilities.
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According to Khemraj (2018), when no secondary market exists for central bank bills and the
monetary authority limits the supply of C B B , banks are unable to unload their excess reserves
through the bond market. Further, Khemraj (2010) notes that the non-zero lower bound in the
loan market represents the minimum mark-up rate at which banks begin to offer credit. It fol-
lows that banks’ oligopoly power and market risk premia traps the banking sector with excess
reserves. Moreover, Khemraj (2009) finds evidence that banks in Guyana are unable to invest
in foreign assets due to the monetary authority’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
In other words, excess reserves persist because of the foreign currency constraint in develop-
ing and emerging economies. Worrell (1995) presents an additional explanation as to why a
monetary regime of excess reserves might persist in equilibrium. He explains that illiquid mar-
kets increase the cost of shifting between cash balances and financial instruments, so that an
equilibrium of excess reserves emerges. Altogether, these factors explain why excess reserves
remain in monetary equilibrium and ergo, invalidates the reflux principle—that excess liq-
uidity is eliminated through debt repayment and capital flight (Lavoie 2001)—in economies
subject to these constraints.
Several additional points about a regime of excess reserves are noteworthy. The existence
of said regime negates the need for an inter-bank money market or borrowing from the cen-
tral bank’s discount window. This has two fundamental implications: 1. Inflation targeting
through the interest rate operating procedure (IROP) is highly ineffective and 2. Expansion-
ary monetary policy through the use of the IROP is severely limited by the non-zero lower
bound. Moreover, on account of the liquidity trap at the non-zero lower bound, growth in
excess reserves are not inflationary. Finally, as outlined in Equation (4.12), a nominal deval-
uation increases the demand for excess reserves. Two principal factors motivate this speci-
fication. First, banks anticipate a rise in non-performing loans, so that greater demand for
excess reserves is a means to strengthen their balance sheets. Second, to prevent flexible de-
valuations or intensified capital flight, banks curb credit creation through higher demand for
excess reserves.
The supply function for excess reserves is shown in Equation (4.13) and is positively related
to central bank’s money creation (M C ) and its accumulation of international reserves (I R )
but inversely related to the ratio of central bank bills to capital stock ( C B Bsph K ≡ ΛC B B ) and the
monetary authority’s required reserve ratio (R R R ). It is straightforward that money creation
injects liquidity into the banking system as does the central bank’s accumulation of foreign
exchange. If the central bank chooses to sterilize or contract liquidity, it can increase the R R R
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or simply increase the sale of central bank bills.
Equations (4.14) and (4.15) illustrate the central bank bond market, where Equation (4.14)
is the inverse demand function. It shows that the monetary authority must offer bond rates in
excess of the non-zero lower bound bond rate ( ¯rc b b ), if it wishes to induce bankers to part with
excess reserves and hold C B B . The parameter b1 captures the degree by which bond rates
must rise to induce higher demand for C B B . This specification is consistent with banks’ liq-
uidity preference shown in Figure 4.1 and highlights the limited power the monetary authority
has in influencing the bond rate. Given that oligopolistic bankers have disproportionate in-
fluence on market rates, the IROP is not an effective means for the central bank to influence
macroeconomic aggregates, e.g. the rate of inflation and output.
rc b b = ¯rc b b + b1Λ
C B B (4.14)
C B BS
p K
≡ΛC B B = c0+ c1e (4.15)
In turn, the supply of ΛC B B increases with a nominal devaluation. The motivation behind
this specification relates to the central bank’s objective of preventing a flexible devaluation
or capital flight as it undertakes a one-off nominal devaluation. It follows that liquidity pol-
icy is largely related to foreign exchange management by replacing the demand for foreign
assets with central bank securities, rather than sterilizing liquidity in fear of inflationary ef-
fects. Downes and Khemraj (2019) investigate the Barbados case and posit that the central
bank sells its securities to commercial banks and other buyers in order to create a domesti-
cally driven profit opportunity, instead of externally driven profits from foreign securities and
to prevent black market trading in the local foreign exchange market. Downes and Khemraj
refer to this discretionary liquidity management as the compensation mechanism, which dif-
fers from the automatic reflux or compensation mechanism described by Lavoie and Wang
(2012) and Lavoie (2001). In the context of this model and consistent with the stylized facts,
compensation is the one-sided sale of C B B , where investors hold the security until maturity.5
This distinction is consequential to draw contrast with open market operations or steriliza-
tion, which requires a secondary bond market and a central bank that purchases and sells
C B B . Given that the small open economy is in a monetary regime of excess reserves, the
monetary authority is hardly in a position to repurchase bonds or inject liquidity. The cen-
5Former Governor of the Central Bank of Barbados explains that the so-called open market operations in
Barbados are essentially the primary offerings of treasury bills (Worrell 1997).
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tral point here is that compensation is largely a matter of policy and judgement rather than
automatic forces in the secondary money market (Downes and Khemraj 2019).
Given Equations (4.14) and (4.15), the equilibrium bond rate and quantity sold are derived
below. It is transparent that a currency devaluation increases both quantity and price in the
bond market. These results follow logically from the idea that compensation can only take
place if bankers are offered higher rates of return that exceed the non-zero lower bound rate.
rc b b
∗ = ¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e ) (4.16)
∂ rc b b
∗
∂ e
= b1(c1)> 0
ΛC B B ∗ = c0+ c1e (4.17)
∂ ΛC B B ∗
∂ e
= c1 > 0
The loan rate that clears the market for excess reserves can be derived by equating Equa-
tions (4.12) and (4.13) and substituting Equations (4.16) and (4.17) into the solution. This
derivation departs from the monetary extensions of post-Keynesian models of growth and
distribution that assume an exogenous interest rate (Lavoie 1999; Moore 1989; Kaldor 1985).
It is closer to other post-Keynesian scholars like Palley (1996), Wray (1995) and Arestis and
Howells (1996) but unlike these works, the endogeneity of rh is related to the demand and
supply of excess reserves rather than economic activity per se or demand for credit.
rh
∗ =
a2
h
¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )
i
b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e (4.18)
The partial derivative in (4.19) illustrates that a nominal devaluation increases the loan
rate that clears the market for excess reserves, where Γ = b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R −
b4R R R−a0−a1−a3e . Two mechanisms produce this result. First, a rise in e increases bankers’
liquidity preference and this puts upward pressure on the loan rate. Second, a devaluation
contracts the supply of excess reserves through the sale of central bank securities and this
further increases the loan rate.
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∂ rh
∗
∂ e
=
Γ(a2b1c1)−
h
a2

¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )

(−b2c1−a3)
i
(b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e )2 > 0 (4.19)
These mechanisms that relate a nominal devaluation to the loan rate are unlike those ad-
vanced in the literature. For example, Bilson (1978) presents a dynamic model and concludes
that a devaluation increases the loan rate in the medium-term, if it produces short-run expan-
sionary effects. Bilson contends that a short-term expansion in output also raises the demand
for money and thus, the rate of interest. By implication, contractionary devaluations lower the
rate of interest. Other works look at the real balance effects, where a devaluation contracts the
real money stock and wealth balances that engender an excess demand for loans and ergo,
raises the loan rate (Lizondo and Montiel 1989). Under the assumptions of uncovered interest
rate parity and an effective IROP, anticipated devaluations put upward pressure on the money
market rate and by extension, the loan rate. But Turnovsky (1981) and Burton (1983) add the
reminder that there are no interest rate effects if devaluations are unanticipated. In the case
of the latter, Taylor (1981a) demonstrates that even unanticipated devaluations can increase
the loan rate, if the economy is reliant on imported capital. Taylor argues that a devaluation
increases the costs of capital imports in local currency and generates an excess demand for
loans or working capital, thereby, raising rh . Other mechanisms relate to risk premium, where
a devaluation induces a higher policy rate to stem capital outflow but undermines firms’ net-
worth and their corresponding balance sheets. In turn, loan rates rise even further to account
for the higher risk premium (Gatti et al. 2007). Given this short review, it is transparent that
this chapter presents two new channels through which a nominal devaluation can increase
the loan rate: 1. Downes and Khemraj (2019)’s compensation channel that contracts the sup-
ply of excess reserves and 2. An increase in banks’ liquidity preference. It follows that a nom-
inal devaluation unambiguously produces higher loan rates, irrespective of whether or not
it is anticipated, its corresponding balance sheet effects and short-run impacts on the real
economy.
It is important to emphasize here that recommendations of devaluations or transitions to
flexible exchange rate systems are often supported by the thesis that these enhance mone-
tary policy autonomy and thus, better enable the central bank to influence macroeconomic
performance. However, if the economy in question is within a regime of excess reserves that
are dominated by oligopolistic banks, the monetary authority may gain little policy flexibility.
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This insight is particularly sobering in light of recent calls for GREXIT and similar abandon-
ment of other fixed exchange rate regimes. Much depends on banks’ liquidity preference, the
degree of effectiveness of the IROP and the level of development of money markets.
4.2.3 Income Distribution and Prices
This section relaxes the assumption that income distribution is constant and presents a model
of its behaviour in the medium-run. Equation (4.20) shows the time derivative of the real profit
share, where Ω1 > 0 is an adjustment parameter and piE is the expected profit share. In turn,
as specified in Equation (4.21), piE is a negatively related to the expected wage (αE ) and rent
share (β E ).6
p˙i=Ω1(pi
E −pi)−ph (4.20)
piE = 1−αE −β E (4.21)
This model employs the post-Keynesian bargaining approach of the labour market where
unions negotiate wage contracts with firms (Stockhammer 2011). The bargaining power of
labour unions increases with the rate of capacity utilization and this in turn leads to higher
wage demand (Equation 4.22). If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is
less than one, a rise in the wage rate increases the wage share.7 These effects are even stronger
in this model given the assumption of a fixed coefficient production function, where capital
and labour substitution effects are ruled out. The constant (ω0) captures labour’s exit options
like unemployment benefits etc., that increases labour’s bargaining power.
αE =ω0+ω1u (4.22)
Equation (4.23) demonstrates that the expected rent share is a positive function of for-
eign assets-capital ratio, credit-capital ratio and the central bank bills-capital ratio, along with
their respective rates of return, less the total income paid to depositors (rdΛD ). Total deposit-
capital ratio is defined as Dph K ≡ ΛD and rd is the deposit rate banks pay to depositors. The
6This specification omits the share of imported capital goods in the interest of presentation, since the model
already adds a third income claimant—banker rent share. In standard formulation, the share of imported capital
goods is exogenously given, which implies that no income group has any influence over its share, e.g. (Ribeiro
et al. 2016). Its inclusion would not alter the results in any substantial manner but merely present the well estab-
lished channel through which a devaluation can influence the profit share.
7See Rowthorn (1999) and Semieniuk (2017b) for evidence that the elasticity of substitution is less than one.
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foreign asset-capital ratio (ΛF ) has two rates of return, e and r f , to illustrate the point that a
devaluation also increases bankers’ rent income in local currency, given an existing stock of
ΛF .
β E =δ0+δ1(e + r f )Λ
F +δ2rhΛ
D D +δ3rc b bΛ
C B B −δ4rdΛD (4.23)
To fully specify the evolution of the real profit share, the author endogenizes the home
country’s price level (ph ). Equation (4.24) outlines the time derivative of ph , whereΩ2 > 0 is an
adjustment parameter and p Eh is home country’s expected price level.
p˙h =Ω2(p
E
h −ph ) (4.24)
Equation (4.25) shows that the expected price level is a positive function of the nominal
exchange rate. This simplistic formulation narrows in on the importance of imported con-
sumer and capital goods to the overall price level. The constant h0 captures all other factors
that might raise the expected price level.
p Eh = h0+h1e (4.25)
Substitution of Equation (4.25) into (4.24), yields the home country’s equilibrium price
level (p ∗h ) when p˙h = 0. This derivation shows that a nominal devaluation raises the equilib-
rium price level (4.27).
p ∗h = h0+h1e (4.26)
∂ p ∗h
∂ e
= h1 > 0 (4.27)
Given the equilibrium price level, it is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium profit
share at a constant price level and p˙i= 0. Substitution of Equations (4.21)-(4.23) and (4.26) into
Equation (4.20), derives the equilibrium profit share (pi∗), where χ =δ4rdΛD −ω0−δ0−h0.
pi∗ = 1−χ −ω1u −δ1(e + r f )ΛF −δ2rhΛD D −δ3rc b bΛC B B −h1e (4.28)
Since rh , rc b b , and ΛC B B are endogenous variables, substitution of Equations (4.16)-(4.18)
into (4.28), yields the extended equilibrium profit share consistent with constant prices and
monetary equilibrium in a regime of excess reserves.
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pi∗ = 1−χ −ω1u −δ1(e + rF )ΛF −δ3
h
¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )

(c0+ c1e )
i
−h1e
−δ2
h a2 ¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )
b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e
i
ΛD D (4.29)
The partial derivative in (4.30) shows that a nominal devaluation unambiguously reduces
the equilibrium profit share through four channels, κ1 to κ4. In the interest of presentation,
r ∗h is used instead of its complete specification and it is instructive to recall that
∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0.
∂ pi∗
∂ e
=
κ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
−δ1ΛF −
κ2︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ3

b1c1(c0+ c1e ) + c1

¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )
− κ3︷︸︸︷h1 −
κ4︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ2
∂ r ∗h
∂ e
> 0

ΛD D < 0 (4.30)
The first channel (κ1) lowers the equilibrium profit share through higher rent income in lo-
cal currency. The higher the existing stock of foreign assets to capital ratio (ΛF ), the larger the
increase in rent income share and the smaller is the profit share. The second channel relates
to κ2, which captures the increase in banker rent share through the purchase of central bank
bills or securities. Banker rent share benefits from the twin increases in central bank bills and
the corresponding bond rate. The third channel, κ3, does not directly indicate a redistribution
away from profits to banker rent share, it simply illustrates the price effect of a nominal deval-
uation that lowers the real profit share. Finally, κ4 does illustrate another channel by which a
devaluation redistributes income in favour of bankers’ rent share. It highlights the distributive
effects of a higher loan rate as a nominal devaluation is undertaken. The larger is the existing
stock of domestic debt to capital ratio (ΛD D ), the stronger are the distributive effects in favour
of banker rent share.
The last channel associated withκ4 is consistent with several works that emphasize how rh
affects income distribution (Hein 2007; Ciccarone 1998; Panico 1985; Pivetti 1985). For exam-
ple, Hein (2007) presents a Kaleckian model where distribution among wages, profits and rent
are determined by firms’ mark-up pricing. According to Hein, how the rate of interest affects
distribution depends on the relative bargaining power of each income group. If firms’ mark-
up is interest inelastic (elastic), higher interest rates redistributes income away from profits
(wages) toward rent income. Unlike the mark-up pricing approach to income distribution,
the result in (4.30) shows that an increase in rh redistributes income away from profits toward
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rent income but how it affects the wage share largely depends on how it influences the rate of
capacity utilization (see Equation 4.22).
The result in (4.30) is in stark contrast to the larger literature on two-class models that for-
mally demonstrate how a devaluation increases the profit share (Ribeiro et al. 2017a; Missio
et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Blecker 2011; Fiorillo 2001; Blecker 1989; Krugman and Taylor
1978; Diaz-Alejandro 1963; Alexander 1952). In these works, firms’ mark-up is modeled as a
positive function of the real exchange rate, so that a real devaluation increases firms’ market
power. According to Blecker (1989) and Blecker (2011), a devaluation increases the relative
costs of competing goods in international markets and this enables firms to increase their tar-
get mark-up or profit share. But given that the small open economy is a price taker in world
markets, a devaluation offers little price competitiveness and thereby, undermines Blecker’s
mechanism. The finding in (4.30) also differs from the more general result that a devaluation
can produce ambiguous distributional effects depending on the extent of international com-
petition and how wages and domestic prices react (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). It follows that
the chapter contributes to the literature by identifying the precise conditions under which a
devaluation unambiguously reduces the profit share. The following conditions must be satis-
fied to produce this result: 1. The monetary economy must be in a regime of excess reserves
and 2. The banking sector must be dominated by oligopolistic banks that are in a liquidity
trap at a non-zero lower bound in the bond and loan markets.
One exception to the literature on devaluation and distribution is Ribeiro et al. (2017a).
They show in a general Keynesian-Kaleckian two-class model that a real devaluation reduces
the profit share if the share imported intermediate inputs in total variable cost is high. They
argue that firms must lower their mark-up factor to maintain price competitiveness as a de-
valuation increases the costs of imported capital. It follows that the result presented in (4.30)
shows that the condition of a high share of imported capital is not necessary for a devalua-
tion to lower the profit share. This contribution is closely related to Constantine and Khem-
raj (2018) but provides several extensions relating to model dynamics and monetary equi-
librium in a regime of excess reserves. Constantine and Khemraj present a short-run post-
Kaleckian/Keynesian model of bankers, workers and capitalists. In this set-up, bankers can
induce a currency depreciation and increase rent income, since they are the dominant partic-
ipants in the foreign exchange market. Thus, Constantine and Khemraj (2018) conclude that
a currency depreciation reduces the profit share.
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4.2.4 Medium-Run Equilibrium
This section derives the medium-run equilibrium rates of capacity utilization, capital accu-
mulation and net exports. Substitution of Equation (4.18), (4.26) and (4.29) into Equation
(4.6), yields the medium-run rate of capacity utilization (u ∗∗). In the interest of presentation,
pi∗ and r ∗h are used instead of their complete specifications but the denominator fully accounts
for the effects of u on the profit share by the inclusion ofω1φ1.
u ∗∗ =
Ψ+φ1pi∗−φ3r ∗hΛD D −φ4e rFΛE D −φ5

e pf
h0+h1e

ΛM f +φ6τ+ν1u f +ν3

e pf
h0+h1e

sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2 (4.31)
Recall the following conditions, which demonstrate that a devaluation unambiguously
contracts and increases the profit share and loan rate respectively.
∂ pi∗
∂ e
< 0
∂ r ∗h
∂ e
> 0
Given these unambiguous findings, the author presents the medium-run comparative dy-
namic result for the equilibrium rate of capacity utilization. The partial derivative in (4.32)
illustrates that a nominal devaluation has ambiguous effects on the medium-run rate of ca-
pacity utilization. However, as compared to the short-run result, there are additional contrac-
tionary effects through the channels of a lower profit share

∂ pi∗
∂ e < 0

and a higher loan rate
∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0

. Further, as the price effects of higher consumer and capital imports are incorpo-
rated in the medium-run price level, the size of the real devaluation gets smaller. This implies
that the real increase in the cost of imported capital is smaller as compared to the short-run
result and that any short-run gains (losses) in price competitiveness are weakened (stronger).
∂ u ∗∗
∂ e
=
φ1

∂ pi∗
∂ e < 0

−φ3

∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0

ΛD D −φ4r f ΛE D −φ5

(h0+h1e )pf −(e pf )h1
(h0+h1e )2
> 0

ΛM f
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
+
ν3

(h0+h1e )pf −(e pf )h1
(h0+h1e )2
> 0

sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2 Q 0 (4.32)
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The comparative dynamic result that a devaluation can produce medium-run contrac-
tionary effects through a lower profit share is a novel contribution to the literature on growth
and distribution in an open economy. In other scholarship that employs the mark-up pricing
approach to distribution, the mark-up is elastic to the exchange rate, so that a devaluation in-
creases the mark-up and the profit share. In these works, the contractionary effects relate to
lower consumption demand as profit earners have a higher saving propensity (Ribeiro et al.
2017a; Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Blecker 2011; Fiorillo 2001; Blecker 1989; Krug-
man and Taylor 1978; Diaz-Alejandro 1963; Alexander 1952). However, in this model, there are
two contractionary effects relating to a lower profit share: 1. Lower investment demand and
2. Lower consumption demand as rent earners—bankers—have a higher saving propensity.
Another novel contribution of this medium-run result is that it demonstrates how a nominal
devaluation affects the loan rate and accounts for both its cost and distributive effects. As a
nominal devaluation raises r ∗h , there are two contractionary effects: 1. A contraction of invest-
ment demand through higher cost of bank finance and 2. A contraction of investment demand
through a lower profit share (internal finance). It follows that a nominal devaluation reduces
firms’ access to both internal and external sources of capital, deepening the contractionary
effects.
It is instructive to recall the channels through which a devaluation reduces the profit share:
• Higher rent income in local currency, subject to bankers’ existing stock of foreign assets
to capital ratio (ΛF )
• Higher rent income through compensation, subject to the bond rate (rc b b ) and the stock
of central bank bills to capital ratio (ΛC B B )
• Higher rent income through an increase in the loan rate, subject to the existing stock of
domestic debt to capital ratio (ΛD D )
• Higher price level reduces the real profit share.
Only the latter two channels are meaningfully subjected to the representative firm’s mark-
up factor. In other words, the mark-up pricing approach to income distribution omits two
factors that lower the profit share: 1. Higher rent income in local currency due to banks’
holding of foreign assets and 2. The sale of central bank bills to bankers (compensation).
These twin factors demonstrate that bankers can earn economic rent from activities not re-
lated to credit creation. In other words, oligopoly banks can profit without intermediation and
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thus, impose contractionary effects. The principal insight here is that the theory of distribu-
tion matters for how exogenous factors affect distributional dynamics. For example, Lavoie
(1995) shows that while the rate of interest contracts investment demand, it does not affect
income distribution. Lavoie assumes that the mark-up factor is interest inelastic. However, in
Kaldorian/Robinsonian models, where income distribution is determined by accumulation, a
higher rate of interest not only lowers the rate of accumulation but also the profit share (Hein
2007). This result holds even if the mark-up is interest inelastic. It follows that the analysis of
growth and distributional dynamics must fully appreciate all the key factors that affect income
claimants, whether in the real or financial economy and whether or not these are reflected in
firms’ mark-up.
Substitution of Equation (4.31) into (4.3) and (4.5) derives the medium-run equilibrium
rates of capital accumulation (g ∗∗) and net exports (b ∗∗).
g ∗∗ =
(sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1)
h
I0+φ1pi∗−φ3r ∗hΛD D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5

e pf
h0+h1e

ΛM f +φ6τ
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
+
φ2
h
X0−M0+ν1u f +ν3

e pf
h0+h1e
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2 (4.33)
The comparative dynamic result of a devaluation on g ∗∗ remains ambiguous but there are
additional contractionary effects relating to a lower and higher profit share and loan rate re-
spectively. Since investment demand gets a greater weight in the equilibrium rate of accumu-
lation, the additional contractionary effects are particularly pronounced.
∂ g ∗∗
∂ e
=
φ2ν3

∂ e pf /p
∗
h
∂ e > 0

sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
+
h
φ1

∂ pi∗
∂ e < 0

−φ3

∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0

ΛD D −φ4r f ΛE D −φ5

∂ e pf /p
∗
h
∂ e > 0

ΛM f
i
(sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1)
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
Q 0 (4.34)
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In turn, Equation (4.35) depicts the medium-run equilibrium rate of net exports (b ∗∗) and
its comparative dynamic result is similarly ambiguous.
b ∗∗ =
(sc + sb +φ1ω1−φ2)
h
(X0−M0) +ν1u f +ν3

e pf
h0+h1e
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
−
ν2
h
I0+φ1pi∗−φ3r ∗hΛD D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5

e pf
h0+h1e

ΛM f +φ6τ
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2 (4.35)
As compared to its short-run result, there are additional expansionary channels that in-
crease the likelihood of an improvement in the external balance. Omitting concerns over
the ML condition, a devaluation that contracts and raises the profit share and loan rate re-
spectively, can compress absorption through lower consumption and investment demand.
Collectively, these expenditure-reducing effects can improve the rate of net exports through
the income/expenditure channel. Given the model’s set-up of a fixed-coefficient production
technology and price taking firms in world markets, devaluations are more likely to improve
b ∗∗ through contractions in income rather than enhanced price competitiveness. It becomes
a matter of political judgement if policymakers find it prudent to induce domestic income
stagnation as a means to improve the external balance. In the case of chronic and prolonged
external deficits caused by unsustainable/irresponsible consumption, a devaluation may in-
deed be well suited. However, if the objective of a nominal devaluation is to enhance compet-
itiveness, the medium-run results show that a lowering of the rate of capital accumulation is
more likely, which in turn undermines competitiveness, notwithstanding a faster rate of net
exports. Ergo, it is crucial to ascertain the source of improvement in the external balance—
enhanced competitiveness or income stagnation—before assessments can be conclusive.
∂ b ∗∗
∂ e
=

∂ e pf /p
∗
h
∂ e > 0

(sc + sb +φ1ω1−φ2)
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2
+
ν2φ3

∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0

ΛD D −ν2φ1

∂ pi∗
∂ e < 0

+ν2φ4r f ΛE D +ν2φ5

∂ e pf /p
∗
h
∂ e > 0

ΛM f
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1−φ2 Q 0 (4.36)
These medium-run comparative dynamic results underscore the crucial importance of
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context in determining the impact of a nominal devaluation. The existing literature identifies
several consequential factors for how a nominal devaluation affects distribution and output:
• Degree of substitutability between domestic and imported consumer and capital goods
• Price elasticities
• Demand regimes
• Relative bargaining power of labour and capital
• Share of imported capital goods in variable costs
• Extent of foreign currency denominated liabilities
• Extent of excess capacity.
This chapter adds the following to the literature:
• Degree of competition in the banking sector
• Size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-capital ratios
• Whether or not the monetary economy is in a regime of excess reserves.
From the last item follows the monetary operation of compensation that increases banks’
profitability without intermediation and this effect is intensified following a devaluation. More-
over, the liquidity trap at the non-zero lower bound, where excess reserves become perfect
substitutes for loans and central bank bonds, indicate the enormous influence bankers have
over the bond and loan rates. These particular features conspire to increase the loan rate and
bankers’ rent share as a direct consequence of a nominal devaluation and engender contrac-
tionary effects.
4.2.5 Technological Change
To investigate the long-run implications of a nominal devaluation, this section allows for the
endogeneity of the rate of technological progress (τ). Assume that technical change is labour-
augmenting and progresses incrementally to improve the existing processes of production.
Equation (4.37) argues that a higher profit share increases the rate of technical change. The
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basic intuition is that investment in learning and R&D or firm-level adaptation of imported
technologies, which enhance the rate of innovation, can only take place if firms have suf-
ficient internal funds. This modeling approach is consistent with a well-established liter-
ature on firms’ ability to self-finance R&D activities. Several theoretical works emphasize
the profits-technololgy channel in post-Keynesian/Kaleckian and balance of payments con-
strained growth models (Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Missio and Jayme 2012; Lima
2004; Fiorillo 2001).8
τ=σ0+σ1pi−σ2rh −σ3T (4.37)
The cost of bank finance (rh ) is added as an important factor that determines the rate of in-
novation. External finance becomes particularly important when incentives to innovate are
high but internal resources are low. Finally, the rate of technical change is inversely related
to the inverted technological gap (T ), which is defined as the ratio of technological capabil-
ities in the home and foreign country. It follows that τ captures the rate at which the home
country closes the technological gap. As the latter narrows, there are fewer opportunities for
technological imitation and adoption and weaker effects of knowledge spillovers and trans-
fers, therefore, technical change slows down with convergence (T ) (Porcile and Spinola 2018;
Ribeiro et al. 2016; Cimoli and Porcile 2014; Verspagen 1991).
Given the equilibrium profit share and loan rate, it is straightforward to solve for the equi-
librium rate of innovation—τ∗—that is consistent with equilibrium in the money market for
excess reserves and stable income distribution at constant prices. Substitution of Equations
(4.18) and (4.29) into Equation (4.37), yields the equilibrium rate of technical change.
τ∗ =σ0+σ1pi∗−σ2r ∗h −σ3T
8This linear modeling of technological progress and income distribution is unlike the non-linear approaches
associated with the works of Martins Neto (2017), Ribeiro et al. (2016) and Lima (2004). Martins Neto (2017) and
Ribeiro et al. (2016) follow Lima (2004), who models the non-linear relationship between income distribution and
technological change. Lima employs a post-Keynesian dynamic model where distribution matters for innovation
due to its effects on incentives and resource availability. For example, while firms’ incentive to innovate is high
(low) when wage shares are high (low), the availability of internal funds is low (high). It follows that in Lima
(2004), too low or high wage shares reduce the rate of technological change.
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τ∗ =σ0+σ1
n
1−χ −ω1u −δ1(e + rF )ΛF −δ3
h
¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )

(c0+ c1e )
i
−h1e
−δ2
h a2 ¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )
b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e
i
ΛD D
o
+σ1
n a2h ¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )i
b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e
o
−σ3T (4.38)
Recall that ∂ pi
∗
∂ e < 0 and
∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0, so that a nominal devaluation reduces the rate of innovation
through lower retained earnings and higher cost of bank finance.
∂ τ∗
∂ e
=σ1
∂ pi∗
∂ e
< 0

−σ2
∂ r ∗h
∂ e
> 0

< 0
∂ τ∗
∂ e
=σ1
n
−δ1ΛF −δ3
h
b1c1(c0+ c1e ) + c1

¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )
i
−h1e −δ2
∂ r ∗h
∂ e
> 0

ΛD D
o
−σ2
n Γ(a2b1c1)− ha2 ¯rc b b + b1(c0+ c1e )(−b2c1−a3)i
(b0+ b1M C − b2(c0+ c1e ) + b3∆I R − b4R R R −a0−a1−a3e )2
o
< 0 (4.39)
This result clearly illustrates that a nominal devaluation—which is modeled as a real deval-
uation in the short-run in this chapter—can have long-run effects, contrary to the proposition
in the traditional literature (Thirlwall 1979; Bilson 1978). These scholars contend that long-run
adjustment in prices, either through higher nominal wages or other variable costs, negate the
short-run effects of a real devaluation. But as noted earlier, several theoretical models have
endogenized technical change as a function of distribution and formalized the distributive
effects of a real devaluation, thereby, undermining the traditional proposition. One contri-
bution to the literature on endogenous technological change and income distribution, is that
the model brings to the forefront distributional conflict in a three-incomes setting—profits,
wages and rents. The finding in condition (4.39), qualifies the standard result in two-class
models that show how a real devaluation can raise the profit share and the rate of techno-
logical progress (Missio et al. 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Feijo and Lamonica 2013; Missio and
Jayme 2012; Araujo and Lima 2007). Ribeiro et al. (2016) add an important note of caution to
the thesis that devaluations reduce wage shares and engender technological change. Unlike
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the previous studies, Ribeiro and his co-authors present an aggregate balance of payments
constrained growth model that formalizes a non-linear relationship between technological
change and the wage share, along the lines of Lima (2004). They find that real devaluations
have ambiguous effects on the wage share, thus retained earnings and the rate of innovation.
This chapter adds to this note of caution, albeit through different mechanisms. Much of the
literature that investigates the long-run effects of a real devaluation are preoccupied with the
channel of retained earnings. They fail to consider the cost of bank finance and its relationship
with the real exchange rate. This leads to the second contribution to the literature—the chap-
ter identifies novel channels by which a real devaluation raises the loan rate but also demon-
strates its short, medium and long-run effects. In the case of the latter, a real devaluation
increases the cost of bank finance, which lowers the incentive to innovate and consequently,
contracts the rate of technological progress.
4.2.6 Long-Run Equilibrium
This section derives the long-run equilibrium rates of capacity utilization, capital accumula-
tion and net exports. Substitution of Equation (4.38) into (4.31), yields the long-run rate of
capacity utilization (u ∗∗∗). In the interest of presentation, τ∗ is used instead of its complete
specification but the denominator fully accounts for the effects of u on the equilibrium rate
of innovation by the inclusion ofφ6σ1ω1.
u ∗∗∗ =
Ψ+φ1pi∗−φ3r ∗hΛD D −φ4e rFΛE D −φ5

e pf
h0+h1e

ΛM f +φ6τ∗+ν1u f +ν3

e pf
h0+h1e

sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2 (4.40)
Given the unambiguous finding of ∂ τ
∗
∂ e < 0, the author presents the long-run comparative
dynamic result for the equilibrium rate of capacity utilization. Consistent with the short- and
medium-run results, the partial derivative in (4.41) illustrates that a nominal devaluation has
ambiguous effects on the long-run rate of capacity utilization. However, as compared to both
the short- and medium-run results, there is one additional contractionary effect through the
channel of a lower rate of technological progress
h
φ1σ1

∂ τ∗
∂ e < 0
i
. This increases the likelihood
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that a real devaluation is contractionary in the long-term.
∂ u ∗∗∗
∂ e
=
ν3

(h0+h1e )pf −(e pf )h1
(h0+h1e )2
> 0

sc + sb +ν2+ω1φ1+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2
+
φ1

∂ pi∗
∂ e < 0

−φ3

∂ r ∗h
∂ e > 0

ΛD D −φ4r f ΛE D −φ5

(h0+h1e )pf −(e pf )h1
(h0+h1e )2
> 0

ΛM f +φ6σ1

∂ τ∗
∂ e < 0

sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2
Q 0 (4.41)
Substitution of Equation (4.40) into (4.3) and (4.5) derives the long-run equilibrium rates
of capital accumulation (g ∗∗∗) and net exports (b ∗∗∗).
g ∗∗∗ =
φ2
h
X0−M0+ν1u f +ν3

e pf
h0+h1e
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2
+
(sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1)
h
I0+φ1pi∗−φ3r ∗hΛD D −φ4e r f ΛE D −φ5

e pf
h0+h1e

ΛM f +φ6τ∗
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2
(4.42)
The comparative dynamic result of a devaluation on g ∗∗∗ remains ambiguous but the like-
lihood that a real devaluation contracts the long-run rate of accumulation increases, due to
the lower rate of innovation. Further, since investment demand gets a greater weight in the
equilibrium rate of accumulation, the additional contractionary effect of a lower rate of tech-
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nical change is particularly strong.
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Equation (4.44) depicts the long-run equilibrium rate of net exports and its comparative
dynamic result is similarly ambiguous.
b ∗∗∗ =
(sc + sb +φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2)
h
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e pf
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
e pf
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
ΛM f +φ6τ∗
i
sc + sb +ν2+φ1ω1+φ6σ1ω1−φ2 (4.44)
The condition in (4.45) illustrates that a lower rate of technological progress dampens in-
vestment demand and increases the likelihood that the rate of net exports increases in the
long-term. As explained in previous sections, this result is likely through the expenditure-
reduction channel.
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∂ e
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4.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents a three-period post-Kaleckian model with three sources of income: wages,
profits and rents, to demonstrate the dynamic effects of a real devaluation. The model ac-
counts for the profit share, loan rate, foreign denominated liabilities, imported capital and
the rate of technological progress. The chapter finds that the contractionary effects of a real
devaluation increases in the short, medium and long-run. In the short-period, when prices
and distribution are held constant, contractionary effects relate to higher costs of imported
capital goods and foreign interest payments. This is a standard result for open economies
with foreign liabilities.
Several novel contributions are derived in the chapter’s medium-run results. In this pe-
riod, prices, distribution and the loan rate are endogenous and uniquely related to the mon-
etary economy. The latter is modeled as a regime of excess reserves, where bankers’ liquidity
preference for excess reserves and central bank bonds and loans become perfect substitutes
at non-zero rates of interest. Moreover, bankers are assumed to hold foreign assets and cen-
tral bank bonds, with price setting power in both the loan and bond markets. In the case of
the latter, the monetary authority is primarily interested in managing excess reserves for the
purpose of an orderly foreign exchange market. In the medium-term, a devaluation has sev-
eral consequential effects for the loan rate and the profit share. First, a devaluation increases
bankers’ liquidity preference and this puts upward pressure on the loan rate. Second, a de-
valuation contracts the supply of excess reserves through the sale of central bank securities
and this further increases the loan rate. Since bankers also profit from credit creation, an in-
crease in the loan rate increases bankers’ rent share and lowers the profit share. Moreover,
bankers’ income also increase on account of a higher bond rate and larger holdings of cen-
tral bank securities. Further, a devaluation increases banks’ profitability of foreign assets in
local currency. These medium-run responses engender contractionary effects for the rates
of capacity utilization and capital accumulation through the cost and distribution channels.
A lower profit share and higher loan rate contract investment demand and higher rent share
lowers overall consumption due to bankers’ higher savings rate.
In the long-period, the rate of innovation is determined by retained earnings (profit share)
and the cost of bank finance (loan rate). Given the medium-run findings, a devaluation lowers
the rate of technological progress and by extension, the long-run rates of capacity utilization
and capital accumulation. It follows that the contractionary effects of a devaluation increases
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through time when oligopolistic banks dominate an economy trapped in a regime of excess
reserves. The implication of dynamic contractionary effects is that the rate of net exports in-
creases, in other words, a regime of domestic demand stagnation co-exists with improvements
in the external balance. Crucially, growth in the rate of net exports is the dubious reward for
expenditure-reduction effects, on account of a lower and higher profit share and loan rate re-
spectively, rather than growth in competitiveness. In fact, as the long-period result shows,
long-run growth is unambiguously compromised through a lower rate of innovation.
The central policy insight of the model is that the decision to exit currency unions, un-
dertake a real devaluation or adopt flexible exchange rate regimes, must be based on sound
assessments of the particular country’s context. The established literature highlights several
conditional factors that determine the effects of a devaluation: price elasticities, degree of fac-
tor substitutability, demand regimes, degree of import penetration, extent of excess capacity
and foreign liabilities. This work demonstrates that prospective devaluers must also consider
the degree of competition in their banking sector, size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-
capital ratios and whether or not their economy is in a regime of excess reserves.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate how technological gaps and differences in
income distribution affect regional cohesion in an Economic and Monetary Union and the
possible effects of an exit from the latter. Below I highlight the main contributions of each
chapter.
Chapter 1 summarizes the main themes in the balance of payments constrained growth lit-
erature. Namely, its historical origins, the elasticity pessimism and relative price adjustments,
capital flows and endogenous trade elasticities. The review is partial to aggregate models
but where it is instructive, multi-sectoral models are discussed. One limitation of this review
is that it omits criticisms raised against the balance of payments constrained growth model
and the corresponding replies, but the interested reader is encouraged to consult McCombie
(2011) for extensive details.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on technological gaps and balance of payments
constrained growth by developing a theoretical framework that accounts for the ambiguous
effects of capital inflows on demand and balance of payments constrained growth. The model
shows that when a technological gap exists between two countries in an Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU) and it exceeds a critical threshold, capital flows toward the technological
laggard deteriorate its production structure and reduce its balance of payments constrained
growth rate. However, these results are reversed when the technological gap between coun-
tries falls within a convergence range. Capital flows are consequential to the catching-up pro-
cess because the evolution of the technological gap depends on the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect.
These findings have significant implications for EMUs and other regional groupings that as-
pire to deeper economic integration. First, the initial size of the technological gap between
frontier and laggard economy is the principal determinant of whether closer economic inte-
gration promotes convergence or divergence. It follows that potential members of EMUs must
pass the litmus test that specifies the maximum distance a member country can be from the
frontier economy. This approach to integration limits the possibility of technological polariza-
tion and therefore, maintains community cohesion. Second, the analytical results show that
expansionary policy in the frontier country is inadequate to promote technological conver-
140
gence when the initial technological gap is significant. Only technology policy in the laggard
economy can promote technological convergence.
Chapter 3 makes the case that five conditions are sufficient to produce technological po-
larization between members of an EMU. First, a technological gap must exist between coun-
tries, second, the laggard economy must have a more unequal distribution of income, third,
there must be no fiscal union that governs the EMU, fourth, the laggard economy lacks a do-
mestic capital goods producing sector and finally, a higher wage share must reduce the rate
of technological progress. When these conditions hold, this chapter formally demonstrates
that the growth-equality tradeoff is binding for the technological laggard. The chapter also
underlines the point that the tradeoff is partly imposed by design. In this work, the economic
policy framework of the EMU imposes stringent limits on debt and deficits without any com-
pensatory mechanisms like a fiscal union or union-wide cohesion or technology policy. Given
this straitjacket of an economic policy framework, laggard economies are promised the tale of
convergence but experience technological divergence that undermine long-run growth. The
central policy implication, whether at the level of an EMU or world economy, is that a union-
wide technology policy is required to promote economic convergence. For example, the big
tradeoff becomes less binding if the EMU or world organizations provide for investments in
technological innovation and emulation that assist laggard economies in the catching-up pro-
cess.
Chapter 4 looks at the growth and distributional effects of a real currency devaluation, say
an exit from an EMU. In each period—short, medium and long-run—a real devaluation be-
comes increasingly contractionary. A noteworthy feature of the model is its approach to the
monetary economy: bankers are assumed to have market power in both the loan and bond
markets and liquidity preference for excess reserves that become perfect substitutes for loans
and central bank bonds at non-zero rates of interest. As it relates to policy, the model argues
that prospective devaluers must consider the degree of competition in their banking sector,
size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-capital ratios and whether or not their economy is in
a regime of excess reserves. In the latter case, monetary authorities routinely sell central bank
bonds to commercial banks to displace their demand for foreign assets as a means to main-
tain an orderly foreign exchange market (Downes and Khemraj 2019). This has the obvious
distributional effect of raising banker rent share, which induces contractionary effects.
Overall, this dissertation presents three formal theoretical models of regional integration,
with particular reference to the case of the Eurozone. I argue that the convergence criteria of
141
debt, deficits and inflation targets etc., were largely misplaced as more fundamental asym-
metries relating to income distribution, technological capabilities and demand regimes were
unaddressed. I formally demonstrate that regional divergence and crises are inevitable when
demand regimes differ and the initial size of the technological gap and differences in income
distribution exceed a critical threshold. These findings lead to two principal policy conclu-
sions: 1. Convergence criteria for EMUs must include demand regimes, technological gaps
and income distribution and 2. Absent these convergence criteria, a Fiscal Union or Regional
System of Innovation is necessary to arrest inevitable polarization and regional crises.
These theoretical models readily lend themselves to empirical application. First, chapter 2
presents two testable hypotheses within the context of regional groupings: 1. Capital inflows
engender deindustrialisation in the laggard economy and 2. A technological gap beyond a
critical threshold produces divergence in rates of economic growth. Future work can estimate
the effect of capital inflows on manufacturing value added for laggard economies in say, the
Pacific Alliance. Also, several empirical studies are needed to estimate the maximum techno-
logical gap allowable for economic convergence. This involves estimating a growth model that
accounts for a non-linear specification of the technology gap, which can be proxied by sev-
eral indices including the ratio of labour productivity between frontier and laggard economy.
Second, chapter 3 argues that empirical growth models must control for the interaction effect
among inequality, consumption and the technological gap. Absence this approach, empirical
works will not capture the growth-inequality tradeoff in laggard economies. Finally, chapter 4
outlines several channels through which devaluations can be contractionary. Future empiri-
cal work that tests for the growth effects of a nominal devaluations must control for the degree
of competition in the banking sector, size of bankers’ foreign assets- and loan-capital ratios
and whether or not the economy is in a regime of excess reserves. Further, interaction effects
can verify which channels are more important.
On the theoretical front, much research is needed on the appropriate form/s of regional
integration for developing and emerging economies—e.g. some form of production integra-
tion as distinct from the European Model—with intra-regional distributional conflict at the
centre of the agenda.
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